scholarly journals On the Regress Argument for Infinitism

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Regress Argument ◽  
Peter Klein

This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification. I conclude that the regress argument for infinitism should not convince us.

Relative identity, singular reference, and the Incarnation: a response to Le Poidevin

2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER HUGHES CONN
Keyword(s):  
Formal Logic ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Direct Theory ◽  
The Trinity

AbstractIn this article I object to Le Poidevin's (2009) contention that relative identity is beset with an infinite metaphysical regress. I argue, first, that since Le Poidevin's regress argument presupposes a direct theory of reference, it does not apply to accounts of relative identity which reject this account of reference. I argue, second, that Le Poidevin's regress is not inevitable for one who accepts a direct account of reference, since it does not apply to the formal logic of relative identity which van Inwagen uses to articulate and defend the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

scholarly journals Skill, Drill, and Intelligent Performance: Ryle and Intellectualism

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stina Bäckström ◽  
Martin Gustafsson
Keyword(s):  
Current Debate ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
Dispositional Account ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Category Distinction

In this paper, we aim to show that a study of Gilbert Ryle’s work has much to contribute to the current debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism with respect to skill and know-how. According to Ryle, knowing how and skill are distinctive from and do not reduce to knowing that. What is often overlooked is that for Ryle this point is connected to the idea that the distinction between skill and mere habit is a category distinction, or a distinction in form. Criticizing the reading of Ryle presented by Jason Stanley, we argue that once the formal nature of Ryle’s investigation is recognized it becomes clear that his dispositional account is not an instance of reductionist behaviorism, and that his regress argument has a broader target than Stanley appears to recognize.

scholarly journals Revisiting knowledge from Falsehood

2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 705 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues
Keyword(s):  
False Beliefs ◽  
Peter Klein

***Revisitando o Conhecimento a partir de Falsidade***Os defensores da teoria do Conhecimento a partir de Falsidade (KFF) nos apresentam exemplos putativos de conhecimento inferencial nos quais um sujeito S, supostamente, adquire conhecimento através de uma inferência competente realizada a partir de uma falsidade. Se eles estiverem certos, teremos que enfrentar alguns problemas importantes para a epistemologia do raciocínio. No entanto, neste artigo, argumentarei que não há conhecimento a partir de falsidades (KFF), os casos apresentados pelos defensores de KFF não constituem casos de conhecimento inferencial genuíno e a reação intuitiva de atribuir conhecimento ao sujeito em tais casos não tem nenhuma relação com a falsidade. Eu irei direcionar a minha oposição à KFF através de duas objeções que ofereço à explicação apresentada por Peter Klein em seu artigo "Useful False Beliefs" (2008). Em particular, mostro que a explicação de Klein falha porque ela (i) é incapaz de demonstrar como uma falsidade pode fornecer um status epistêmico positivo à crença inferida para torná-la conhecimento; e (ii) ela é incompatível com uma noção tácita e amplamente aceita de inferência.

scholarly journals Bradley's Regress, Russell's States of Affairs, and Some General Remarks on the Problem

2008 ◽  
pp. 249-264
Author(s):  
Holger Leerhoff
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Ontological Category ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Ontological Pluralism ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Compelling Argument ◽  
Bradley’S Regress ◽  
State Of Affairs

In this paper, I will give a presentation of Bradley's two main arguments against the reality of relations. Whereas one of his arguments is highly specific to Bradley's metaphysical background, his famous regress argument seems to pose a serious threat not only for ontological pluralism, but especially for states of affairs as an ontological category. Amongst the proponents of states-of-affairs ontologies two groups can be distinguished: One group holds states of affairs to be complexes consisting of their particular and universal constituents alone, the other holds that there has to be a "unifying relation" of some sort to establish the unity of a given state of affairs. Bradley's regress is often conceived to be a compelling argument against the first and for the latter. I will argue that the latter approaches have no real advantage over the simpler theories—neither in the light of Bradley's regress nor in other respects.

The Unity of the Proposition – The Rise of a Philosophical Problem

Conceptus ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 39 (96) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Bonino
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Clear View ◽  
Unity Of The Proposition ◽  
External Relations ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Bradley’S Regress

SummaryThe question of the unity of the proposition has recently enjoyed an increasing amount of attention. The paper aims at reconstructing its development and its historical starting points, focusing especially on Bradley’s regress argument, Russell’s concerns about the unity of the proposition and Frege’s notion of unsaturatedness. It is held that a clear view of the central issue (how one can distinguish between a complex composed out of other entities and the aggregate of its constituents) has only recently been isolated from some more peripheral questions, such as that of internal vs. external relations or the realism-nominalism debate, which for a long time were almost inextricably interwoven with it.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Epistemic Condition ◽  
Section 8 ◽  
The Core ◽  
Current State

This Introduction provides an overview of the current state of the debate on the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. Its main goal is to offer a framework that contextualizes the chapters that follow. Section 1 discusses the main concepts of ‘ignorance’ and ‘responsibility’. Section 2 asks why agents should inform themselves. Section 3 describes what is taken to be the core agreement among the main participants in the debate. Section 4 explains how this agreement invites a regress argument with a revisionist implication. Section 5 provides an overview of the main responses to the regress argument. Section 6 addresses the question of why blameless ignorance excuses. Section 7 describes further issues that are addressed in the book. Section 8 concludes with some discussion of future directions the debate might take.

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