Z.6 and the Regress Argument

2019 ◽  
pp. 185-198
Author(s):  
Norman O. Dahl
Keyword(s):  
Regress Argument

Relative identity, singular reference, and the Incarnation: a response to Le Poidevin

2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER HUGHES CONN
Keyword(s):  
Formal Logic ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Direct Theory ◽  
The Trinity

AbstractIn this article I object to Le Poidevin's (2009) contention that relative identity is beset with an infinite metaphysical regress. I argue, first, that since Le Poidevin's regress argument presupposes a direct theory of reference, it does not apply to accounts of relative identity which reject this account of reference. I argue, second, that Le Poidevin's regress is not inevitable for one who accepts a direct account of reference, since it does not apply to the formal logic of relative identity which van Inwagen uses to articulate and defend the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

scholarly journals Skill, Drill, and Intelligent Performance: Ryle and Intellectualism

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stina Bäckström ◽  
Martin Gustafsson
Keyword(s):  
Current Debate ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
Dispositional Account ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Category Distinction

In this paper, we aim to show that a study of Gilbert Ryle’s work has much to contribute to the current debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism with respect to skill and know-how. According to Ryle, knowing how and skill are distinctive from and do not reduce to knowing that. What is often overlooked is that for Ryle this point is connected to the idea that the distinction between skill and mere habit is a category distinction, or a distinction in form. Criticizing the reading of Ryle presented by Jason Stanley, we argue that once the formal nature of Ryle’s investigation is recognized it becomes clear that his dispositional account is not an instance of reductionist behaviorism, and that his regress argument has a broader target than Stanley appears to recognize.

scholarly journals Bradley's Regress, Russell's States of Affairs, and Some General Remarks on the Problem

2008 ◽  
pp. 249-264
Author(s):  
Holger Leerhoff
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Ontological Category ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Ontological Pluralism ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Compelling Argument ◽  
Bradley’S Regress ◽  
State Of Affairs

In this paper, I will give a presentation of Bradley's two main arguments against the reality of relations. Whereas one of his arguments is highly specific to Bradley's metaphysical background, his famous regress argument seems to pose a serious threat not only for ontological pluralism, but especially for states of affairs as an ontological category. Amongst the proponents of states-of-affairs ontologies two groups can be distinguished: One group holds states of affairs to be complexes consisting of their particular and universal constituents alone, the other holds that there has to be a "unifying relation" of some sort to establish the unity of a given state of affairs. Bradley's regress is often conceived to be a compelling argument against the first and for the latter. I will argue that the latter approaches have no real advantage over the simpler theories—neither in the light of Bradley's regress nor in other respects.

The Unity of the Proposition – The Rise of a Philosophical Problem

Conceptus ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 39 (96) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Bonino
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Clear View ◽  
Unity Of The Proposition ◽  
External Relations ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Bradley’S Regress

SummaryThe question of the unity of the proposition has recently enjoyed an increasing amount of attention. The paper aims at reconstructing its development and its historical starting points, focusing especially on Bradley’s regress argument, Russell’s concerns about the unity of the proposition and Frege’s notion of unsaturatedness. It is held that a clear view of the central issue (how one can distinguish between a complex composed out of other entities and the aggregate of its constituents) has only recently been isolated from some more peripheral questions, such as that of internal vs. external relations or the realism-nominalism debate, which for a long time were almost inextricably interwoven with it.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Epistemic Condition ◽  
Section 8 ◽  
The Core ◽  
Current State

This Introduction provides an overview of the current state of the debate on the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. Its main goal is to offer a framework that contextualizes the chapters that follow. Section 1 discusses the main concepts of ‘ignorance’ and ‘responsibility’. Section 2 asks why agents should inform themselves. Section 3 describes what is taken to be the core agreement among the main participants in the debate. Section 4 explains how this agreement invites a regress argument with a revisionist implication. Section 5 provides an overview of the main responses to the regress argument. Section 6 addresses the question of why blameless ignorance excuses. Section 7 describes further issues that are addressed in the book. Section 8 concludes with some discussion of future directions the debate might take.

Meaning

2020 ◽  
pp. 145-181
Author(s):  
Michael Della Rocca
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Analysis ◽  
Linguistic Meaning ◽  
Conceptual Scheme ◽  
Regress Argument

In its most general form, the explanatory demand with regard to meaning addresses the question: what is it for representation or aboutness or meaning to be present? This question can focus on linguistic meaning in particular or on aboutness in general, including non-linguistic aboutness. Through a detailed analysis of leading theories—including those of Grice, Searle, Soames, Descombes, Horwich, Putnam, Kripke, Lewis, and Davidson—it is shown how the failure to meet the explanatory demand with regard to meaning is pervasive. A Bradleyan regress argument is then deployed to make a Parmenidean Ascent: there is no differentiated meaning, instead all is meaning. This ascent is intimated—perhaps unwittingly—in the classic arguments of Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” and Davidson’s “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” The chapter closes with a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to truth that follows from the Parmenidean Ascent with regard to meaning.

scholarly journals La logique peut-elle mouvoir l'esprit?

Dialogue ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascal Engel
Keyword(s):  
Modus Ponens ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Lewis Carroll ◽  
Brute Force ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
The Mind ◽  
New Look

AbstractThis paper attempts to take a new look at the famous Lewis Carroll paradox about Achilles and the Tortoise. It examines in particular the connections between Lewis Carroll's regress argument for logical inferences and a similar regress for practical inferences. The Tortoise's point of view is espoused: no norm of reasoning or of conduct can in itself “make the mind move,” only the brute force of belief can. This conclusion is a Humean one. But it does not imply that we renounce altogether the normative force of such principles of reasoning as modus ponens. Connexions with the Wittgensteinian rule-following problem are indicated.

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