A Heretical Student in the Schopenhauerian School

The Schopenhauer-Schule was a group of original and diverse thinkers working in the wake of a common inspiration. This paper elucidates Nietzsche’s relationship with these thinkers specifically as concerns their intertwined theories of will. It shows that despite his efforts to suppress and ridicule them, Nietzsche was influenced by the Schopenhauer-Schule and adopted several of their alterations to Schopenhauer. But it will also show that Nietzsche was a heretical member of this school in the sense that his theory of will was not only different from theirs but also subversive. Whereas each member of the Schopenhauer-Schule posits a realist ontology of will, Nietzsche’s perspectivism undercuts the possibility of their ontological realism and puts in its place a semiotical system of expression. As a result of this contextualized framework, Nietzsche’s will to power is revealed, not as an intended reference to a real “thing” in the world, but as a symbol that expresses his perspective about an unknowable reality.

A Heretical Student in the Schopenhauerian School

The Schopenhauer-Schule was a group of original and diverse thinkers working in the wake of a common inspiration. This paper elucidates Nietzsche’s relationship with these thinkers specifically as concerns their intertwined theories of will. It shows that despite his efforts to suppress and ridicule them, Nietzsche was influenced by the Schopenhauer-Schule and adopted several of their alterations to Schopenhauer. But it will also show that Nietzsche was a heretical member of this school in the sense that his theory of will was not only different from theirs but also subversive. Whereas each member of the Schopenhauer-Schule posits a realist ontology of will, Nietzsche’s perspectivism undercuts the possibility of their ontological realism and puts in its place a semiotical system of expression. As a result of this contextualized framework, Nietzsche’s will to power is revealed, not as an intended reference to a real “thing” in the world, but as a symbol that expresses his perspective about an unknowable reality.

A Functional Approach to Ontology

There are two ways of approaching an ontological debate: ontological realism recommends that metaphysicians seek to discover deep ontological facts of the matter, while ontological anti-realism denies that there are such facts; both views sometimes run into difficulties. This paper suggests an approach to ontology that begins with conceptual analysis and takes the results of that analysis as a guide for which metaontological view to hold. It is argued that in some cases, the functions for which we employ a part of our conceptual scheme might give us reasons to posit ontological facts regarding certain objects. The proposed approach recommends ontological realism about an object just in case our conceptual scheme gives us reason to. This yields a mixed overall metaontological view that adopts ontological realism to some issues and ontological anti-realism to others, and that avoids the difficulties that typically arise for the two views.

Transforming Problematic Into Positive: Practice-Based Recommendations for Resolving Paradigmatic and Methodological Conflicts in Appreciative Inquiry

Researchers have employed Appreciative Inquiry (AI) in a variety of methodological contexts, in a variety of settings, and toward a variety of outcomes. For practitioners seeking to both identity and amplify the best of what is, AI has been a sort of multi-functional toolset, improving outcomes both small and grand. Amidst this successful history of the application of Appreciative Inquiry (AI), little attention has been given to some of the limitations or even risks of applying its practices to whatever extent and toward whichever outcomes. The models supplied by AI may prove problematic in several ways, among them: ontological realism, epistemological objectivism, the potential for axiological denial and ethical deception, the potential for methodological discord, a posture rooted in problems, blind spotting, and a neglect of the integral nature of things. This paper brings together the theoretical premises of Appreciative Inquiry methodologies, emerging considerations from transdisciplinarity and consciousness studies, and practical applications from a recent AI project, so as to construct considerations and recommendations for AI practitioners for resolving some of the methodological and paradigmatic conflicts that may arise.

Metaontology, Existence, and Reference

This chapter presents and defends a conventionalist-friendly metaontology, thereby showing how conventionalism manages to vindicate trivial ontological realism in mathematics. After clarifying and demonstrating this entailment of conventionalism, it clarifies the metaontology involved. The chapter then defends metadeflationism about quantifiers, which entails a version of quantifier pluralism. This is a form of what has recently been called “modest quantifier variance” in joint work with Eli Hirsch. After laying out this view, it is defended from several objections. With this groundwork set out, the chapter then explains how this answers Kant’s challenge for trivial realism that was explained in the previous chapter. Finally, the chapter closes by discussing the metaphysics of mathematical objects, in conventionalist terms, addressing the Julius Caesar problem and structuralism, among other things.

Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality

This book is the first edited volume on the philosophy of one of the most seminal and profound contemporary philosophers. The volume is intended for philosophers, linguists, and cognitive scientists interested in metaphysics, language, and philosophical logic. The readers will benefit from the debates over Kit Fine’s novel theories on meaning and representation, arbitrary objects, essence, ontological realism, metaphysics of modality, and constitution of things. The work contains original essays which evaluate both the philosophical and some of the formal seminal contributions of Kit Fine to contemporary metaphysics, ontology, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic. The chapters in the work also advance new ideas and arguments which help in developing the debates on concepts of interests not only for philosophers but also for linguists and cognitive scientists who are interested in the foundations of their own fields. The work gives Kit Fine’s current views on the topics that he has helped to renew in today’s metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic. The work contributes to the furthering of the debates in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of language, focusing on brand new theories in the forefront of analytic philosophy. More generally, the hope is that a thorough discussion of the work of a very innovative and profound author such as Kit Fine can contribute to a better understanding of what is at stake within contemporary analytic philosophy.

Virtuality and the Problem of Agency in Object-Oriented Ontology

In his Prince of Networks, Graham Harman reconstructs Latourian critique of concepts of potentiality and virtuality with which he claims to agree. This seems striking because Latour’s arguments seem to be exactly those Harman rejects in his other writings as overmining. Furthermore, this critique of potentiality and virtuality creates a dividing line between Harman and Bryant’s Democracy of Objects, where the concept of virtual plays a central role. In this article, I will explore this debate, focusing on how the concept of virtuality works in the context of the ontological realism that Object-Oriented Ontology is. To do this, I will first present Bryant’s notion of virtuality focusing on the problem of the individuality of the object. Then I will explore Latourian–Harmanian arguments against virtuality and show that the main issue Harman has with virtuality has to do with the agency of objects. Therefore, I claim that the main dividing line between Bryant’s and Harman’s versions of Object-Oriented Ontology is the difference between the two notions of agency.

Realism about Film and Realism in Films

Realism has a significant place in the history of film theory. The claim that film is essentially a realistic art form has been employed to justify the art-status of films as well as the distinctness of film as a form. André Bazin and others once used realist ontologies of film to try to establish realist teleologies and universal critical standards. I briefly sketch this history before considering the prospects for various versions of realism: Bazin’s, as well as Kendall Walton’s and Gregory Currie’s less ambitious but more plausible accounts. I argue that these theories, though they are the best cases we have for realism, are not adequate ontologies of film. However, while prior realist philosophers and critics were wrong to think that realism can provide a critical standard for all films, realism is nonetheless a praiseworthy filmic achievement - one that the opponent of ontological realism should not dismiss.