Nietzsche’s Heraclitean Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same

There is a long and successful scholarly tradition of commenting on Nietzsche’s deep affinity for the philosophy of Heraclitus. But scholars remain puzzled as to why he suggested at the end of his career, in Ecce Homo, that the doctrine he valued most, the eternal recurrence of the same, might also have been taught by Heraclitus. This essay aims to answer this question through a close examination of Nietzsche’s allusions to Heraclitus in his first published mention of eternal recurrence in The Joyful Science and in a related set of notes from the period when he was formulating and defending his doctrine of eternal recurrence while writing Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The key to answering this question, it is argued, is that Nietzsche came to believe that the doctrine of eternal recurrence, when properly understood as requiring identical repetition, has to presuppose a Heraclitean reality of eternal, absolute, and universal flux.

Jewish Nietzscheanism

Jewish Nietzscheans have traditionally shied away from any detailed examination of Nietzsche’s comments on contemporary Jewry or the Jewish religion. Scholars who have examined Jewish Nietzscheans have therefore sought to connect Nietzsche with some dimension of Jewish thought through similarities in views between Nietzsche and the Jewish intellectuals who were purportedly influenced by him. The two books under consideration in this essay strain to find solid connections between Nietzsche’s philosophy and the writings of eminent Jewish writers. Daniel Rynhold and Michael Harris examine how selected Nietzschean concepts can also be found in the work of the noted Jewish thinker Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik. David Ohana, by contrast, examines a variety of Jewish writers who at some point exhibited an enthusiasm for Nietzsche, ranging from Hebrew scholars and translators to German-Jewish intellectuals. Both books suffer from many of the shortcomings of general Nietzschean influence studies: there is often no sound philological evidence of influence, or the “connection” is so general that it is difficult to see Nietzsche as the source of influence, or the alleged influence was of short duration, and it is difficult to understand what remains Nietzschean in the individual influenced.

Recent Work on Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology and Ethics

Each of these books presents itself as rescuing Nietzsche from misinterpretation. Thus, Leiter wants to prevent Nietzsche from being “moralized” (i. e., read in a way that makes him sound like a contemporary moral philosopher); Stern wants to prevent Nietzsche from being iron-manned (i. e., read in a way that assumes his arguments must be invulnerable to critique); Alfano wants to correct what he sees as a tendency to misrepresent Nietzsche’s central concerns; and Ridley claims writers have been misled when thinking about Nietzsche on action. Alfano’s book is, to my mind, the most successful at achieving its stated aims; while I point out some potential oversights and some areas that could benefit from further development, Alfano’s book is both novel and important. Leiter’s book is clearly written and presents the arguments in an admirably forthright manner, but some of its conclusions are vitiated by lapses and mischaracterizations. Stern gets Nietzsche’s basic view right, but does not probe it very deeply and is too quick to present Nietzsche as confused; I see the confusions as emanating less from Nietzsche’s texts and more from Stern’s reading of them. Ridley’s book is original and provocative, but I find the central claim - that Nietzsche endorses an expressive account of action - ultimately unconvincing.

Die „Magie des Extrems“ in philosophischen Neuorientierungen. Nietzsches neue extreme Problemstellungen und -lösungen und das alte Beispiel des Sokrates

The later Nietzsche developed the “magic of the extreme” as a special strategy in order to make his philosophical reorientations successful. He needed this strategy not only to be heard at all; also the problems he faced called for it. The article first gives an overview of the most important problems Nietzsche coped with and the extreme solutions he offered. Then, we show how, according to Nietzsche, even Socrates, who stands for the beginning of the European Enlightenment, used the “magic” of extreme irritation and fascination to get this Enlightenment on its way.

Nietzsche’s Compassion

Nietzsche is known for his penetrating critique of Mitleid (now commonly rendered as “compassion”). He seems to be critical of all compassion but at times also seems to praise a different form of compassion, which he refers to as “our compassion” and contrasts it with “your compassion” (BGE 225). Some commentators have interpreted this to mean that Nietzsche’s criticism is not as unconditional as it may seem - that he does not condemn compassion entirely. I disagree and contend that even though Nietzsche appears to speak favorably of some forms of compassion, he regards the nature of all compassion to be fundamentally bad. Furthermore, I suggest that Nietzsche’s discussion on different forms of compassion have significant implications for achieving greatness and meaning in life. More specifically, I argue that, for Nietzsche, “our compassion,” however regrettable qua compassion it is, may give occasion for a rare and peculiar insight into “co-suffering” with others, which in turn results in overcoming compassion entirely. I also argue that although Nietzsche objects to compassion, he approves of a form of what feminist theorists might now call “anticipatory empathy.” Even though a large body of literature has evolved over Nietzsche’s critical evaluation of compassion, his understanding of a non-compassionate response to suffering is, in my view, rather overlooked and should receive more attention.