A Note on the Unprovability of Consistency in Formal Theories of Truth

Author(s):  
Kevin Davey
Author(s):  
Alan H. Nelson

This is an interpretation of some important theories of truth from Descartes to Leibniz. The main focus is on three related features of these theories. The first is that true propositions are analyzed in terms of ideas or concepts. The second is that concept containment is the primary account of truth. And the third is that ideas or concepts are understood compositionally; they are aggregates of ideas that bottom out in simple ideas. In the case of Spinoza, the traditional equation of truth with existence or being can also be found. Finally, in Hobbes and Leibniz we find the framework for formal theories of truth and inference.


Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood

In its original meaning, the word ‘rational’ referred to the faculty of reason—the capacity for reasoning. It is undeniable that the word later came also to express a normative concept—the concept of the proper use of this faculty. Does it express a normative concept when it is used in formal theories of rational belief or rational choice? Reasons are given for concluding that it does express a normative concept in these contexts. But this conclusion seems to imply that we ought always to think rationally. Four objections can be raised. (1) What about cases where thinking rationally has disastrous consequences? (2) What about cases where we have rational false beliefs about what we ought to do? (3) ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’—but is it true that we can always think rationally? (4) Rationality requires nothing more than coherence—but why does coherence matter?


Author(s):  
Paul M. Pietroski

This chapter summarizes the main themes. Humans naturally acquire generative procedures that connect meanings with pronunciations. These meanings are neither concepts nor extensions. Meanings are composable instructions for how to access and assemble concepts of a special sort. In particular, phrasal meanings are instructions for how to build monadic (i.e., predicative) concepts that are massively conjunctive. Theories of meaning should not be confused with theories of truth. Lexicalization is a process of introducing concepts that can be combined via simple operations whose inputs must be monadic or dyadic. In theorizing about meanings, we can and should eschew much of the powerful typology and combinatorial operations that the founders of modern logic introduced for very different purposes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Capps

Abstract John Dewey’s theory of truth is widely viewed as proposing to substitute “warranted assertibility” for “truth,” a proposal that has faced serious objections since the late 1930s. By examining Dewey’s theory in its historical context – and, in particular, by drawing parallels with Otto Neurath’s concurrent attempts to develop a non-correspondence, non-formal theory of truth – I aim to shed light on Dewey’s underlying objectives. Dewey and Neurath were well-known to each other and, as their writing and correspondence make clear, they took similar paths over the mid-century philosophical terrain. I conclude that Dewey’s account of truth is more principled, and more relevant to historical debates, than it first appears.


BMJ Open ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. e019827 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niall Winters ◽  
Laurenz Langer ◽  
Anne Geniets

ObjectivesUndertake a systematic scoping review to determine how a research evidence base, in the form of existing systematic reviews in the field of mobile health (mHealth), constitutes education and training for community health workers (CHWs) who use mobile technologies in everyday work. The review was informed by the following research questions: does educational theory inform the design of the education and training component of mHealth interventions? How is education and training with mobile technology by CHWs in low-income and middle-income countries categorised by existing systematic reviews? What is the basis for this categorisation?SettingThe review explored the literature from 2000 to 2017 to investigate how mHealth interventions have been positioned within the available evidence base in relation to their use of formal theories of learning.ResultsThe scoping review found 24 primary studies that were categorised by 16 systematic reviews as supporting CHWs’ education and training using mobile technologies. However, when formal theories of learning from educational research were used to recategorise these 24 primary studies, only four could be coded as such. This identifies a problem with how CHWs’ education and training using mobile technologies is understood and categorised within the existing evidence base. This is because there is no agreed on, theoretically informed understanding of what counts as learning.ConclusionThe claims made by mHealth researchers and practitioners regarding the learning benefits of mobile technology are not based on research results that are underpinned by formal theories of learning. mHealth suffers from a reductionist view of learning that underestimates the complexities of the relationship between pedagogy and technology. This has resulted in miscategorisations of what constitutes CHWs’ education and training within the existing evidence base. This can be overcome by informed collaboration between the health and education communities.


2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-90
Author(s):  
Sebastian Knell

The paper presents an interpretation of Brandom’s analysis of de re specifying attitude-ascriptions. According to this interpretation, his analysis amounts to a deflationist conception of intentionality. In the first section I sketch the specific role deflationist theories of truth play within the philosophical debate on truth. Then I describe some analogies between the contemporary constellation of competing truth theories and the current confrontation of controversial theories of intentionality. The second section gives a short summary of Brandom’s analysis of attitude-ascription, focusing on his account of the grammar of de re ascriptions of belief. The third section discusses in detail those aspects of his account from which a deflationist conception of intentionality may be derived, or which at least permit such a conception. In the proposed interpretation of Brandom’s analysis, the vocabulary expressing the representational directedness of thought and talk does not describe a genuine property of mental states, but has an alternative descriptive function and in addition contains a performative and a meta­descriptive element.


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