Gappy, glutty, glappy

According to the Determinable Based Account (DBA) of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI), there is MI when there is an indeterminate state of affairs, roughly a state of affairs in which a constituent object x has a determinable property but fails to have a unique determinate of that determinable. There are different ways in which x might have a determinable but no unique determinate: x has no determinate—gappy MI, or x has more than one determinate—glutty MI. Talk of determinables and determinates is usually constructed as relative to levels of determination. In this paper I first (1) provide a formal construction for determinables and determinates that pays crucial attention to intermediate levels of determination, and then (2) explore the consequences for the DBA of introducing such intermediate levels. In particular, I argue that intermediate levels of determination highlight crucial differences between gappy and glutty cases of MI, and allow one to introduce a third way of indeterminacy, glappy MI.

Yet again, quantum indeterminacy is not worldly indecision

It has been argued that non-relativistic quantum mechanics is the best hunting ground for genuine examples of metaphysical indeterminacy. Approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy can be divided into two families: meta-level and object-level accounts. It has been shown (Darby in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88(2):27–245, 2010. 10.1080/00048400903097786; Skow in Philosophical Quarterly 60(241):851–858, 2010) that the most popular version of the meta-level accounts, namely the metaphysical supervaluationism proposed by Barnes and Williams (Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 103–148, 2011), fails to deal with quantum indeterminacy. Such a fact has been taken by many as a challenge to adapt supervaluationism to quantum cases. In this paper, I will focus on the very last of these attempts, i.e. the situation semantics account proposed by Darby and Pickup (Synthese 1–26, 2019). After having shown where quantum indeterminacy arises and having surveyed the assumptions endorsed by the participants of the debate, I turn to Darby and Pickup’s proposal. I argue that, despite the machinery introduced, their account still fails to account for quantum indeterminacy. After considering some possible counterarguments, I suggest in the conclusion that one can plausibly extend the argument to those meta-level approaches that treat quantum indeterminacy as worldly indecision.

Ordinary objects

Wilson considers whether ordinary (inanimate) objects are either Weakly or Strongly emergent. First, she argues that ordinary objects are at least Weakly emergent: first, by lights of a degrees of freedom (DOF)-based account, reflecting that quantum DOF are eliminated from those of ordinary objects in the classical limit; second, by lights of a functional realization account, reflecting a conception of artifacts as associated with sortal properties and distinctive functional roles; third, by lights of a determinable-based account, reflecting that ordinary objects have metaphysically indeterminate boundaries, which are best treated by appeal to a determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy. While the Strong emergence of ordinary objects remains an open empirical possibility, the best such case involves artifacts: artifacts might be Strongly emergent, if the states of consciousness that determine what powers are possessed by artifacts are Strongly emergent, as is explored in Chapter 7.

INDETERMINATEZZA METAFISICA E MECCANICA QUANTISTICA

The paper argues that quantum mechanics provide examples of genuine metaphysical indeterminacy that cannot be accounted for in purely modal terms. The best account of quantum indeterminacy has it that quantum systems have determinable properties without thereby having a unique determinate of that determinable.