Divine Action and the Emergence of Four Kinds of Randomness

If the microphysical domain is deterministic, this would seem to leave God with only two ways of influencing events: setting initial conditions or law-breaking intervention. Arthur Peacocke and Philip Clayton argue there is a third possibility, if there is strong emergence. We will examine four candidates for emergence: of intentionality from computational animal behavior, of sentience from biology, of biology from chemistry, and of chemistry from finite quantum mechanics. In all four cases, a kind of finite-to-infinite transition in modeling is required, and in each case a kind of randomness is involved, potentially opening up a third avenue for divine action.

A mechanism that realizes strong emergence

The causal efficacy of a material system is usually thought to be produced by the law-like actions and interactions of its constituents. Here, a specific system is constructed and explained that produces a cause that cannot be understood in this way, but instead has novel and autonomous efficacy. The construction establishes a proof-of-feasibility of strong emergence. The system works by utilizing randomness in a targeted and cyclical way, and by relying on sustained evolution by natural selection. It is not vulnerable to standard arguments against strong emergence, in particular ones that assume that the physical realm is causally closed. Moreover, it does not suffer from epiphenomenalism or causal overdetermination. The system uses only standard material components and processes, and is fully consistent with naturalism. It is discussed whether the emergent cause can still be viewed as ‘material’ in the way that term is commonly understood.

Emergence and Algorithmic Information Dynamics of Systems and Observers

Previous work has shown that perturbation analysis in algorithmic information dynamics can uncover generative causal processes of finite objects and quantify each of its element's information contribution to computably constructing the objects. One of the challenges for defining emergence is that the dependency on the observer's previous knowledge may cause a phenomenon to present itself as emergent for one observer at the same time that reducible for another observer. Thus, in order to quantify emergence of algorithmic information in computable generative processes, perturbation analyses may inherit such a problem of the dependency on the observer's previous formal knowledge. In this sense, by formalizing the act of observing as mutual perturbations, the emergence of algorithmic information becomes invariant, minimal, and robust to information costs and distortions, while it indeed depends on the observer. Then, we demonstrate that the unbounded increase of emergent algorithmic information implies asymptotically observer-independent emergence, which eventually overcomes any formal theory that any observer might devise. In addition, we discuss weak and strong emergence and analyze the concepts of observer-dependent emergence and asymptotically observer-independent emergence found in previous definitions and models in the literature of deterministic dynamical and computable systems.

Complex systems

Wilson considers whether complex systems are either Weakly or Strongly emergent. She first traces the demise of nonlinearity as criterial of Strong emergence, and offers a new criterion in terms of apparent violations of a conservation law. By these lights, the Strong emergence of complex systems remains a live but currently unmotivated possibility. Wilson then argues that while appeals to algorithmic incompressibility, dynamic self-organization, and universality do not establish the Weak emergence of complex systems, cases can be made that these or related features satisfy the conditions in the schema. Most promisingly, complex systems exhibiting universality have eliminated degrees of freedom (DOF), and so are Weakly emergent by lights of a DOF-based account; and other complex systems (gliders in the Game of Life; flocks of birds) may also be seen as Weakly emergent by these lights.

Consciousness

Wilson considers whether consciousness is either Weakly or Strongly emergent. Some have seen consciousness as the best case for a Strongly emergent phenomenon, reflecting that subjective or qualitative aspects of consciousness depart so greatly from physical features that some anti-physicalist view (perhaps Strong emergence) must be true. Wilson considers two such ‘explanatory gap’ strategies, associated with the knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986) and the conceivability argument (Chalmers 1996, 2009). She argues that each strategy fails, for reasons not much previously explored; hence while the Strong emergence of consciousness remains an open empirical possibility, there is currently no motivation for taking this to actually be so. Wilson then argues that attention to the determinable nature of qualitative conscious states provides good reason to take such states to be Weakly emergent by lights of a determinable-based account, and defends the application of such an account to mental states against various objections.

Ordinary objects

Wilson considers whether ordinary (inanimate) objects are either Weakly or Strongly emergent. First, she argues that ordinary objects are at least Weakly emergent: first, by lights of a degrees of freedom (DOF)-based account, reflecting that quantum DOF are eliminated from those of ordinary objects in the classical limit; second, by lights of a functional realization account, reflecting a conception of artifacts as associated with sortal properties and distinctive functional roles; third, by lights of a determinable-based account, reflecting that ordinary objects have metaphysically indeterminate boundaries, which are best treated by appeal to a determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy. While the Strong emergence of ordinary objects remains an open empirical possibility, the best such case involves artifacts: artifacts might be Strongly emergent, if the states of consciousness that determine what powers are possessed by artifacts are Strongly emergent, as is explored in Chapter 7.

Free will

Wilson considers whether free will is either Weakly or Strongly emergent. She starts by drawing on Bernstein and Wilson (2016) to present a framework for connecting positions on the problem of free will with positions on the problem of mental (higher-level) causation. Bernstein and Wilson argue that compatibilist accounts implement a ‘proper subset’ strategy relevantly similar to that implemented by nonreductive physicalists/Weak emergentists; here Wilson extends this result to establish that the compatibilist strategy entails satisfaction of the conditions in Weak emergence. Wilson then argues that libertarian accounts implement a ‘new power’ strategy entailing satisfaction of the conditions on Strong emergence. Wilson goes on to suggest that free will of the compatibilist/Weakly emergent variety is plausibly widespread, and to present a novel argument for taking some instances of seemingly free choice to be Strongly emergent.

Metaphysical Emergence

The special sciences and ordinary experience present us with a world of macro-entities trees, birds, lakes, mountains, humans, houses, and sculptures, to name a few which materially depend on lower-level configurations, but which are also distinct from and distinctively efficacious as compared to these configurations. Such appearances give rise to two key questions. First, what is metaphysical emergence, more precisely? Second, is there actually any metaphysical emergence? In Metaphysical Emergence, Jessica Wilson provides clear, compelling, and systematic answers to these questions. Wilson argues that there are two and only two forms of metaphysical emergence making sense of the target cases: ‘Weak’ emergence, whereby a macro-entity or feature has a proper subset of the powers of its base-level configuration, and ‘Strong’ emergence, whereby a macro-entity or feature has a new power as compared to its base-level configuration. Weak emergence unifies and accommodates diverse accounts of realization (e.g., in terms of functional roles, constitutive mechanisms, and parthood) associated with varieties of nonreductive physicalism, whereas Strong emergence unifies and accommodates anti-physicalist views according to which there may be fundamentally novel features, forces, interactions, or laws at higher levels of compositional complexity. After defending each form of emergence against various objections, Wilson considers whether complex systems, ordinary objects, consciousness, and free will are actually either Weakly or Strongly metaphysically emergent. She argues that Weak emergence is quite common, and that Strong emergence, while in most cases at best an open empirical possibility, is instantiated for the important case of free will.

The viability of Strong emergence

Wilson considers and responds to a range of objections to the schema for Strong emergence and the associated ‘new power’ approach to physically unacceptable emergence. These objections include that satisfaction of the conditions in the schema renders Strong emergence naturalistically unacceptable or ‘scientifically irrelevant’, is compatible with physicalism, is impossible owing to the base entity or feature inheriting any purportedly novel power, or is not necessary for physically unacceptable emergence. Each challenge admits of one or more responses available on any sensible implementation of the schema for Strong emergence; certain additional responses draw on features of Wilson’s preferred ‘fundamental interaction-relative’ account of Strong emergence.