ON TYPE-THEORETICAL FORMALIZATION OF SITUATION SEMANTICS

Situation semantics is an effective instrument for analysing semantical aspects of natural languages with explicit dependence on contexts, like referential opacity of belief contexts etc. Making use of type-theoretical approaches not only makes its formalism more practical in many ways, but also facilitates its migration to computer systems, specifically, the formalization in functional programming languages. The article deals with a prototype of the type theoretical language of situation semantics, implemented on the basis of the language Racket. It decribes principal approaches, methods of solving some problems of formal semantics as well as issues that need to be addressed.

Yet again, quantum indeterminacy is not worldly indecision

It has been argued that non-relativistic quantum mechanics is the best hunting ground for genuine examples of metaphysical indeterminacy. Approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy can be divided into two families: meta-level and object-level accounts. It has been shown (Darby in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88(2):27–245, 2010. 10.1080/00048400903097786; Skow in Philosophical Quarterly 60(241):851–858, 2010) that the most popular version of the meta-level accounts, namely the metaphysical supervaluationism proposed by Barnes and Williams (Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 103–148, 2011), fails to deal with quantum indeterminacy. Such a fact has been taken by many as a challenge to adapt supervaluationism to quantum cases. In this paper, I will focus on the very last of these attempts, i.e. the situation semantics account proposed by Darby and Pickup (Synthese 1–26, 2019). After having shown where quantum indeterminacy arises and having surveyed the assumptions endorsed by the participants of the debate, I turn to Darby and Pickup’s proposal. I argue that, despite the machinery introduced, their account still fails to account for quantum indeterminacy. After considering some possible counterarguments, I suggest in the conclusion that one can plausibly extend the argument to those meta-level approaches that treat quantum indeterminacy as worldly indecision.

Theories of Meaning for the Internet of Things

In this chapter, we consider the theoretical foundations for representing knowledge in the Internet of Things context. Specifically, we consider (1) the model-theoretic semantics (i.e., extensional semantics), (2) the possible-world semantics (i.e., intensional semantics), (3) the situation semantics, and (4) the cognitive/distributional semantics. Given the peculiarities of the Internet of Things, we pay particular attention to (a) perception (i.e., how to establish a connection to the world), (b) intersubjectivity (i.e., how to align world representations), and (c) the dynamics of world knowledge (i.e., how to model events). We come to the conclusion that each of the semantic theories helps in modeling specific aspects, but does not sufficiently address all three aspects simultaneously.

Affordances

This chapter elaborates on the idea that significance is manifested in music’s affordances relative to listeners’ bodily capabilities. The author argues that music is a significant phenomenon because it furnishes listeners with two kinds of affordances: “social affordances,” and “temporal affordances.” These latter affordances specify when an action can be performed, and thus differ from their spatial counterparts, which specify the kinds of actions one can perform. Social and temporal affordances can interact, but current theories of musical affordances are incomplete insofar as they treat music as an environmental sound while deferring its aesthetic value to “higher” cognitive processes. In contrast to these theories, the author argues that the process of aestheticization begins precisely when music temporalizes the world for its listeners—that is, when time becomes a point of concern. This claim is illustrated with a situation semantics model of affordances, and an analysis of breath in Anna Clyne’s Roulette (2007).

Semantics, situation

Situation semantics attempts to provide systematic and philosophically coherent accounts of the meanings of various constructions that philosophers and linguists find important. It is based on the old idea that sentences stand for facts or something like them. As such, it provides an alternative to extensional semantics, which takes sentences to stand for truth-values, and to possible worlds semantics, which takes them to stand for sets of possible worlds. Situations are limited parts or aspects of reality, while states of affairs (or infons) are complexes of properties and objects of the sort suitable to constitute a fact. Consider the issue of whether Jackie, a dog, broke her leg at a certain time T. There are two states of affairs or possibilities, that she did or she did not. The situation at T, in the place where Jackie was then, determines which of these states of affairs (infons) is factual (or is the case or is supported). Situation theory, the formal theory that underlies situation semantics, focuses on the nature of the supports relation. Situation semantics sees meaning as a relation among types of situations. The meaning of ’I am sitting next to David’, for example, is a relation between types of situations in which someone A utters this sentence referring with the name ’David’ to a certain person B, and those in which A is sitting next to B. This relational theory of meaning makes situation semantics well-suited to treat indexicality, tense and other similar phenomena. It has also inspired relational accounts of information and action.