This article examines the effectiveness of grassroots lobbying at the regional level in Poland. For the purpose of the article, “loyalty to the citizens versus party theory” was formulated. It distinguishes two stages of the policy-making process within which the councilors react differently to grassroots lobbying. The first stage refers to the preparation of the law by the region’s board. The theory assumes that the more people pressure the legislator to persuade the board to their initiative, the more inclined he is to endorse it. This way he proves loyalty to the citizens and secures his reelection. The second stage concerns the legislators’ voting behavior. In this case, grassroots lobbying has a neutral impact on them. The councilors remain loyal to the party leaders and vote accordingly so that their position on the party list is guaranteed in the next election. In order to verify the theory, a study consisting of anonymous interviews with sixty legislators from the Opole and Subcarpathian Assembly was conducted. The outcome of the research indicates that (1) a considerable majority of legislators were positively influenced by grassroots lobbying to pressure the region’s board; (2) the voting behavior of the majority of legislators was not impacted by grassroots lobbying; (3) grassroots lobbying is the most effective at the first stage of the policy-making process; (4) the structure of government does not determine the legislators’ reaction to grassroots lobbying; (5) the party’s status (in power or in opposition) impacts the legislator’s voting behavior.
Corrigendum to How the Flattened Costs of Grassroots Lobbying Affect Legislator Responsiveness
