The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense

Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.

Excluding Forced Heirs due to a Lack of Personal Relationship with the Deceased in Spain in a Comparative Perspective

Forced heirship is considered a limit on the freedom of will of the deceased in favour of intergenerational solidarity. It involves that some relatives, usually descendants, have the right to claim a share of the deceased’s assets or estate. Although recognized in most EU jurisdictions, authors discuss about the need to regulate this institution taking into account new family models and societal changes. In fact, this debate has been intensified due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which showed that several elders died alone in nursing homes without family support, and part of their assets shall be reserved to their relatives. This paper analyses the legal framework of forced heirship in Spain and examines to which extent it is possible to exclude this right due to a lack of personal relationship with the beneficiaries in view of comparative models.

Kantian Moral Agency and the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence

This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial intelligence (AI). Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘freedom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ through ‘happiness’ as the end. Lastly, we argue that the Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ do not belong to any deterministic model of ‘agency’ as these are sacrosanct systems. The conclusion narrates the non-feasibility of Kantian AI agents from the genuine Kantian ethical outset, offering a utility-based Kantian ethical performer instead.

Contingency, Free Will, and Particular Providence

The results from contemporary science, especially the theory of evolution and quantum physics, seem to favor process theology. Moreover, the evil committed by free will leads some theologians to reduce divine action in order to prevent God from being responsible for evil. Thus, among those who defend a particular providence, Molinism finds many followers. This article first argues that contemporary science does not constrain us to deny particular providence. Second, it criticizes the implicitly deterministic character of Molinism. Thirdly, a Thomistic solution is proposed as an alternative which, by means of a different metaphysical approach to cosmic contingency and freedom of will, defends particular providence without reducing divine activity except in personal sins.

Good and Evil

This chapter examines Nietzsche’s genealogical account of the concepts “good and evil.” I suggest that the introduction of this conceptual pair involves two fundamental innovations, both of which motivated by ressentiment: a normative concept of equality, or the idea that all human beings have equal worth; and a certain conception of moral agency, centered around the possession of freedom of will, which underwrite a descriptive concept of equality, or the idea that all moral agents are not only subject to the new evaluative categories, but also may be expected to comply with them. I also examine the sense in which the invention of Christian morality constitutes an imaginary revenge, and argue that this indicates a change in the very character of the revenge, rather than an ordinary act of revenge that is merely imagined. I conclude with a discussion of the manner in which self-deception is involved in this imaginary revenge.

MAKNA HIDUP PERSPEKTIF VICTOR FRANKL: KAJIAN DIMENSI SPIRITUAL DALAM LOGOTERAPI

This article aims to reveal the concept of logotherapy of Victor Frankl. This study uses descriptive analysis. First, the concept of logotherapy has three pillars in its philosophical foundation, the freedom of will, in this context every human being free to make choices to determine his own choice and destiny. The will to meaning, which every human being has the desire to have meaning in life. The meaning of life is an awareness of the possibility to realize what is being done at that time which then if successfully fulfilled will produce happiness. Second, in logotherapy, there is a noetic dimension which equivalent to the spiritual dimension, which tends toward the anthropological dimension rather than the theological dimension and does not contain religion. Third, the spiritual logotherapy dimension is different from Sufism. If Sufism spiritual affirms the sharia, then logotherapy departs from human existence. The implications of these differences give to a variety of happiness, both spiritual and physical. Artikel ini bertujuan mengungkap konsep logoterapi yang diformulasikan oleh Victor Frankl. Dengan menggunakan metode deskriptif analitis kajian ini menghasilkan beberapa kesimpulan: pertama, konsep logoterapi memiliki tiga landasan filosofis yaitu, kebebasan berkeinginan (the freedom of will). Dalam konteks ini setiap manusia bebas menentukan pilihan dan nasibnya sendiri. Keinginan akan makna (the will to meaning), yaitu manusia memiliki hasrat untuk memiliki makna hidup. Makna hidup adalah sebuah kesadaran untuk mengetahui apa yang dilakukan saat itu hingga menghasilkan kebahagiaan. Kedua, di dalam logoterapi terdapat dimensi spiritual yang cenderung ke arah antropologis daripada kearah teologis serta tidak mengandung konotasi agama. Ketiga, dimensi spiritual logoterapi berbeda dengan dimenssi dalam tasawuf. Jika para sufi mengafirmasi spiritual pada syariat maka logoterapi berangkat dari human exsistence. Implikasi dari kedua perbedaan tersebut melahirkan ragam kebahagiaan baik kebahagiaan ruhani dan ragawi.

Libertas contractus. Paolo Comitoli SJ (1545–1626) on freedom of contract in light of early modern private law

The paper presents the results of research devoted to the concept of freedom of contract in the writings of an early modern Italian Jesuit, Paolo Comitoli. He claimed that freedom of contract was one of the attributes of contracts and it was essential for the consent of parties entering into a contract. He distinguished between three types of this freedom. Freedom of will was a prerequisite in case of any and all human actions including contracts. Voluntariness was tantamount to a requirement for the will of the parties, which led to the consent to the contract, and it was the result of a voluntary decision which was not disturbed by any vices. Freedom of ownership enabled the parties to conduct a transfer of the object of contract in its broadly understood sense. Comitoli’s concept of contractual freedom was an expression of his belief that voluntary consent of the wills of the parties as the foundation of contractual consent was the basis and the main cause of a contract.

FREEDOM OF WILL AND CULPABILITY

Unlike animals (which are programmed by nature), the human being, at birth, brings with him an innate characteristic: freedom of action. In our legal-criminal system, after completing 18 years, the individual acquires the fullness of that freedom and, consequently, the capacity for culpability. This is because, from this age, it is assumed that the person achieves so-called self-determination, that is, the ability to direct alone to his own actions according to the formation of his independent will. In other words: legally it no longer requires the guidance of parents or guardians to direct their conduct. You have complete freedom of action.

The Enslavement of the Human Being

Luther underscores sin as unbelief which cuts off the relationship between the human being and his/her Creator resulting in the imprisonment of the human by sin, death, and transcendental evil. He/she exists in the state of infirmity, incapable of changing his/her basic orientation of life. Sin is weakness, inability to be free. Paradoxically, the enslavement of sin entered humanity when the human being was deceived by an illusion of absolute freedom, independence from the Creator: “man himself wants to be God, and does not want God to be God.” Erasmus criticized Luther for using the deterministic concept of “absolute necessity.” In fact, Luther is not a determinist, but he uses a hamartiological idea of “the necessity of immutability”: the sinner necessarily must continue to be a captive of unfaith until efficient Pneumatological grace liberates him/her. Luther’s thought does not include any notion of “the necessity of coaction.” The sinner freely enjoys sinning unless changed by God. The necessity of immutability concerns the human being’s relation to the “things above oneself,” not to those “below oneself” where natural freedom of will prevails. Luther represents no theodicy, he leaves open the question about where the ultimate origin of evil will lies. God is not the cause of evil will, but he may sometimes use it as an “instrumental cause” for his good purposes. In Luther’s treatise there is no trace of a doctrine of predestination applied to individual human beings. Any notion of double predestination is impossible in Luther’s doctrine of grace.

THE NOTION OF FREE WILL AND ETHICAL CHOICE IN THE WORK “SHARH AL- 'AQA'ID” OF SA'AD AD-DIN TAFTAZANI

The article provides an in-depth analysis of Sa’ad ad-Din Taftazani’s philosophical and ethical views on kalam (a popular speculative discipline of medieval Muslim literature that provides any reasoning on religious and philosophical topics) based on rational thinking. In particular, it aims at looking through one of the puzzling issues of kalam philosophy – freedom of will and ethical (moral) choice of a man discussed in “Sharh al- ‘Aqa’id” written by the great thinker. The work of Taftazani describes some features of the Creator as kindness and good deeds originally appeared from His creativity and instructs people to refrain from various actions that may occur due to undesirable human behavior. In this article, we analyze the conceptual ideas and views on the freedom of will and ethical (moral) choice of a man. We presented them as the biggest problems in the outstanding thinker’s spiritual heritage based on the philosophy of time and space. To be specific, the thinker considers the inadequacy of sin and apostasy as the features of disrespectful behavior and social morality. Furthermore, various religious and moral guidelines for testing people through their actions prohibited by socio-moral norms have been substantiated based on intellectual and metaphorical sources. Taftazani perfectly illustrated that the Creator has always commanded the human community to do only good deeds. Next, He commanded to be abstinent from restricted things and actions. He kept the freedom of man under moral criteria as obedience or disobedience to Shari’ah commands. The research discusses the harmony and disproportions in modern philosophy with the philosophical views of the thinker Taftazani in the management of human destiny and freedom of will. It thoroughly compares the notions of voluntarism and fatalism existing in modern philosophical terminology with Taftazani’s views on the issue related to freedom of will and moral choice. Additionally, I provide a comparative analysis on the interrelationship and differences between European philosophers’ views on the subject and Taftazani’s ideas. We have tried to express our views on the issue of freedom of will and ethical (moral) choice using the copy of “Sharh al- ‘Aqa’id” published in Great Britain.