scholarly journals A Variant of Material Connexive Logic

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Belikov ◽  
Dmitry Zaitsev
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Informal Reasoning ◽  
Complete Axiomatization ◽  
Connexive Logic ◽  
Everyday Reasoning ◽  
The Relationship

The relationship between formal (standard) logic and informal (common-sense, everyday) reasoning has always been a hot topic. In this paper, we propose another possible way to bring it up inspired by connexive logic. Our approach is based on the following presupposition: whatever method of formalizing informal reasoning you choose, there will always be some classically acceptable deductive principles that will have to be abandoned, and some desired schemes of argument that clearly are not classically valid. That way, we start with a new version of connexive logic which validates Boethius' (and thus, Aristotle's) Theses and quashes their converse from right to left. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization of this logic. We also study the implication-negation fragment of this logic supplied with Boolean negation as a second negation.

Do informal reasoning fallacies really shape decisions? Experimental evidence

2021 ◽  
pp. 104346312110336
Author(s):  
Lucie Vrbová ◽  
Kateřina Jiřinová ◽  
Karel Helman ◽  
Hana Lorencová
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Slippery Slope ◽  
Paired Comparisons ◽  
Anecdotal Evidence ◽  
Informal Reasoning ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Fallacious Reasoning

Informal reasoning fallacies belong to a persuasive tactic, leading to a conclusion that is not supported by premises but reached through emotions and/or misleading and incomplete information. Previous research focused on the ability to recognize informal reasoning fallacies. However, the recognition itself does not necessarily mean immunity to their influence on decisions made. An experiment was designed to study the relationship between the presence of informal reasoning fallacies and a consequent decision. Having conducted paired comparisons of distributions, we have found some support for the hypothesis that informal reasoning fallacies affect decision-making more substantially than non-fallacious reasoning—strong support in the case of a slippery slope, weak in that of appeal to fear, anecdotal evidence argument defying evaluation. Numeracy and cognitive reflection seem to be associated with higher resistance to the slippery slope, but do not diminish appeal to fear.

Ontology and Perception

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-58
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Galko ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cognitive Capacity ◽  
Complex Environment ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Ontological Question ◽  
The One ◽  
Bodies Of Water ◽  
The Relationship

The ontological question of what there is, from the perspective of common sense, is intricately bound to what can be perceived. The above observation, when combined with the fact that nouns within language can be divided between nouns that admit counting, such as ‘pen’ or ‘human’, and those that do not, such as ‘water’ or ‘gold’, provides the starting point for the following investigation into the foundations of our linguistic and conceptual phenomena. The purpose of this paper is to claim that such phenomena are facilitated by, on the one hand, an intricate cognitive capacity, and on the other by the complex environment within which we live. We are, in a sense, cognitively equipped to perceive discrete instances of matter such as bodies of water. This equipment is related to, but also differs from, that devoted to the perception of objects such as this computer. Behind this difference in cognitive equipment underlies a rich ontology, the beginnings of which lies in the distinction between matter and objects. The following paper is an attempt to make explicit the relationship between matter and objects and also provide a window to our cognition of such entities.

Turnout and the Vote: The Joke's on the Democrats

1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 406-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
James DeNardo
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Conventional View ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning ◽  
The Relationship

A heavy turnout is commonly believed to favor the Democrats. This study presents theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence that challenge the conventional view. Reasonable assumptions about the behavior of core and peripheral voters lead to the conclusion that the majority party is most likely to suffer when turnout increases, common sense notwithstanding. It also appears that the recent decay of partisan loyalties among voters has eroded the relationship between turnout and the vote.

Beyond equality of opportunity: from 'common sense' to 'good sense'

Soundings ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 79 (79) ◽  
pp. 78-93
Author(s):  
Tony Jefferson
Keyword(s):  
Working Class ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Social Forces ◽  
Racial Justice ◽  
Good Sense ◽  
Political Ideas ◽  
The Social ◽  
Ready Availability ◽  
The Relationship

This article addresses the Labour Party's apparent inability to capitalise on the ready availability of good, progressive ideas. It suggests the key is to be found in the idea that the Labour Party no longer represents working-class people, a disjunction that can be best understood using Gramsci's distinction between 'common sense' and 'good sense'. Good sense is a more coherent development of everyday, commonsense thinking, based on its 'healthy nucleus'. However, it must never lose contact with common sense and become abstract and disconnected from life. Using this distinction, a critique of the common-sense notion of meritocracy follows, since the educational disconnect between Labour politicians and their working-class supporters is one of its malign results. This critique builds from the evidence of working-class rejection of meritocracy - the healthy nucleus that recognises the inadequacy of its justifying principle of equality of opportunity. To this is counterposed a good-sense notion of equality - one that embraces equal access to the means for achieving a flourishing life. This notion of equality is then used to explore a number of currently circulating political ideas concerned with equality, both their relationship to common sense and their potential to meet good sense criteria. These ideas include universal basic income, the Conservatives' proposed 'levelling up' agenda, and the demands of Black Lives Matter for racial justice, including the demand to 'defund the police'. A second thread is focused on the relationship between these discourses of common or good sense and the social forces with which they can be connected.

Using the Common Sense Model of Self-Regulation to Understand the Relationship Between Symptom Reporting and Trait Negative Affect

2014 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 989-994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa M. McAndrew ◽  
Pablo A. Mora ◽  
Karen S. Quigley ◽  
Elaine A. Leventhal ◽  
Howard Leventhal
Keyword(s):  
Negative Affect ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Symptom Reporting ◽  
Common Sense Model ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Sense Model

Dewey and Confucian Philosophy

2018 ◽  
pp. 552-574
Author(s):  
Roger T. Ames
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Moral Imagination ◽  
First Century ◽  
Technical Term ◽  
American Pragmatism ◽  
History Of ◽  
Confucian Philosophy ◽  
Twenty First Century ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Role Ethics

Perhaps the most important international relationship in the twenty-first century is that between America and China. Given the often delicate and sometimes underproductive history of the relationship between America and China broadly, this chapter argues that American pragmatism might serve as a vocabulary to promote a positive dialogue between these cultures at a moment in history when such a conversation is imperative. These commonalities provide a language introducing Confucian philosophy to the Western academy and also an external perspective from which to examine the presuppositions of our own worldview and common sense. The chapter compares the central Confucian notion of relationally constituted persons (ren 仁)— or human “becomings”—with Dewey’s technical term, “individuality.” It explores the centrality of moral imagination in Confucian role ethics and in Deweyan ethics and also concludes that these two traditions share the idea of a human-centered religiousness.

(d) Appellate courts in a case like this, where there is room for legitimate judicial difference, should refrain from interfering unless it is considered that the decision reached was based on the application of wrong principles or the case is clearly wrongly decided. Decision of court Appeal dismissed. 4.8 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CASE LAW AND LEGISLATION 4.8.1 Introduction The discussion of George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v finney Lock Seeds (1985) has indicated what happens when a problem about the meaning of a statutory provision goes before a court. In this section, attention will be given to statutory interpretation in court. The courts and tribunals have, as one of their most important tasks, the application of legislative rules to various fact situations. They must decide whether these legislative rules apply to given situations. Already in this text there have been several illustrations of words not meaning what they appear to mean. Despite the supposed certainty of statutory rules, rules in ‘fixed verbal form’. Words can change over time, and courts will disagree over the meaning of words. Choices of meaning, not perceived by the drafters, may lie latent in the words and are drawn out in court in a manner defeating intention, narrowing, extending or making meaningless the ambit of the rule. Many people need to apply statutory rules, often this application will be purely routine but sometimes doubts will arise. Such doubts may, or may not, reach court. How do judges set about deciding the meaning of words? Reference has already been made to the three rules of statutory interpretation. The literal, the mischief and the golden rules (see Figure 3.2, above, in the introduction to Chapter 3). These rules it should be remembered are rules of practice not rules of law. Do judges really use the rules of statutory interpretation? If so, which rule do they use first? Judges rarely, if ever, volunteer the information that they are now applying a certain rule of interpretation. Often, judges look to see if there can be a literal meaning to the words used in the disputed statutory rule. However, there is no rule that states that they must use the literal rule first. Holland and Webb (1994) quite correctly assert that interpretation is more a question of judicial style than the use of interpretational rules. Indeed, should a student attempt to use the rules of statutory interpretation as a guide in the interpretation of a statutory word or phrase, the uselessness of the rules as an interpretational tool becomes immediately apparent. However, as a justificatory label they may have a function. As students gain experience in reading judgments they notice vast differences in judicial styles. Some judgments seem to be based on a blow by blow analysis of precedents and earlier usage of words, others seem based on tenuous common sense rationales. Decisions based on the external context of the statute will be identified. This covers situations where judicial decision making appears to be based on issues of

2012 ◽  
pp. 117-117
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Verbal Form ◽  
External Context ◽  
Law And Legislation ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Over Time

Common-Sense Epidemiology in the Age of Electronic Patient Records (EPR)

2020 ◽  
pp. 343-364
Author(s):  
Shirly Bar-Lev ◽  
Dizza Beimel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Clinical Information ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Patient Records ◽  
Electronic Patient Records ◽  
Professional Help ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Practical Recommendations

Encouraging patients to play a more active role in their health care is crucial for healthcare planning and for the design of services. This chapter shifts the scholarly focus from practitioners' decision making to that of laypersons' trying to make sense of the lab results available on their EPRs. The authors developed a methodology to capture the relationship between information formats (graph, numeric, or verbal), laypersons' assessment of the conditions' gravity, and their preferred course of action. Focusing on the effect of “not knowing” on laypersons' preferred courses of action, our findings show that formats that left respondents less able to understand the results—namely, the numeric and verbal formats—produced a lower sense of urgency, and correspondingly, less inclination to actively seek professional help. The chapter takes a step toward deriving practical recommendations as to how personal clinical information should be communicated, to improve laypersons' interpretation of the information's significance.

Philosophy and Common Sense

Philosophy ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 63 (244) ◽  
pp. 161-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Jerry Fodor ◽  
Rational Acceptability ◽  
Three Stages ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship

This paper raises once more the question of the relationship between philosophy on the one hand and common sense on the other. More particularly, it is concerned with the role which common sense can play in passing judgment on the rational acceptability (or otherwise) of large-scale hypotheses in natural philosophy and the cosmological part of metaphysics. There are, as I see it, three stages through which the relationship has passed in the course of the twentieth century. There is the era of G. E. Moore, the Quine–Feyerabend period, and now a new and modest vindication of common sense is emerging in the work of Jerry Fodor.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document