Self-Enforcing Collective Counterterror Retaliation

Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable circumstances under which any nation that is a target of a terrorist attack finds it desirable to be a member of the international counterterror coalition, holding the choices of all other nations as given. The incentives to join the coalition are the group-specific benefits from retaliation enjoyed by each coalition member, the relatively lower spillover benefit from retaliation enjoyed by each stand-alone nation, and the inability of pre-emptive measures to avert terrorist attacks. The disincentive to join is the anticipated backlash from retaliation, which targets coalition members only.

The Architecture of Cooperation Among Non-kin: Coalitions to Move Up in Nature’s Housing Market

The evolution of cooperation among non-kin poses a major theoretical puzzle: why should natural selection favor individuals who help unrelated conspecifics at a cost to themselves? The relevance of architecture to this question has rarely been considered. Here I report cooperation among non-kin in social hermit crabs (Coenobita compressus), where unrelated conspecifics work together to evict larger individuals from a housing market of architecturally remodeled shells. I present (1) the first detailed description of natural coalitions in the wild and (2) a theoretical framework, which examines the evolutionary benefits to each coalition member and predicts when forming a coalition will be successful. In the wild, important ecological and social constraints exist, which are built into the model. Based on these constraints, I show that coalitions can be a successful strategy if several key criteria hold: the coalition is necessary, effective, stable dyadically, and stable polyadically. Notably, the “splitting the spoils” problem—which often undermines non-kin cooperation—is eliminated via architecture: a small individual (C) who helps a medium individual (B) to evict a large individual (A) will ultimately benefit, since C will get B’s left behind shell after B moves into A’s shell. Coalitions, however, can break down due to added layers of social complexity involving third-party “free riders” and “cheaters,” which strategically butt in the architectural queue and thereby steal incentives from the smaller coalition member. Overall, therefore, substantial scope exists for both cooperation and conflict within nature’s housing market of architecture. Experiments are now needed to directly test the impact on coalitions of architecture, from the interior of homes up to whole housing markets.

THEORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: RULES TRANSFORMATION

The authors examine the mathematical modeling of methods for the coordination of collective action in the self-organization and self-governance mode. It is assumed that members of the collective create aggregate income whose value grows, as each member invests more effort. The goal pursued by each member of the collective is to maximize personal gains. As we established in the first part of the study, the lack of universal interpersonal trust prevents members of a uniform (unstructured) collective from overcoming a non-effective, Nash equilibrium outcome. Alternative options for structuring the collective were considered, such as creating small groups (coalitions) of agents sharing mutual trust within each group. The strategy of such coalition, aimed at maximizing coalitional gains rather than personal, leads to greater investment of effort by each coalition member, which in turn produces greater aggregate gains for the entire collective. We have shown that in order to secure stability of a coalition structure, first, stimuli for each coalition member are needed such that imply redistribution of quasi-rent to their benefit, and second, control must be exercised on the efforts of the agents. As models demonstrate, members of the collective left outside coalitions or forming small coalitions with a low share taken together (in aggregate) gains, have weaker stimuli for investment. The potential of increasing such stimuli and thereby increasing aggregate gains may be furnished by another, stronger hierarchic-shaped structure – provided transactional costs are sufficiently low. In order to realize this potential, entitlements to residual income must be concentrated in the hands of a single largest coalition or a number of largest coalitions, while banning all other members of the collective from receiving such income. The income of each agent is defined by the terms of the stimulating contract. We have proposed a general design of such a stimulating contract, creating all prerequisites for achieving equilibrium outcome, with Pareto-dominates equilibrium outcomes for other collective structuring options.

The Social Construction of Policy Feedback: Incarceration, Conservatism, and Ideological Change

Over the last decade, in a major switch in position, conservatives have embraced the cause of reducing prison populations in the states and, increasingly, at the national level. The long-term crime decline and the increasing antistatism of the Republican Party contributed to this change, but it also has an important cognitive component: Policy makers have become more open to evidence of the damaging effects of mass incarceration. In contrast to previous studies, our case shows that such policy “feedback” only functions politically when a signal about a policy consequence is assigned valence and intensity by policy makers, whose calculations are heavily structured by the demands of party coalitions. On issues in which no core coalition member has a major stake, feedback can be tipped from reinforcing to undermining and vice versa, but this process depends on the efforts of entrepreneurs to change the way information is processed. In a highly polarized environment, opening policy makers to previously ignored evidence requires the cultivation of a reform cadre composed of ideological standard-bearers who can vouch for the orthodoxy of the new position.

Non-Governmental Organisations and the un Convention on the Rights of the Child

This study seeks to contribute to knowledge of the implementation of the U.N Convention on the Rights of the Child (crc). Focus was restricted to one of eight General Measures of Implementation – involvement of civil society, in particular, non-government organisations (ngos), in the implementation and monitoring of the crc. The study had three aims: (1) to develop initial indicators of ngo involvement; (2) to explore level of ngo activity; and (3) to explore which aspects of ngo involvement might have an effect on extending human rights to children in the most fundamental area of protection from violence. Results indicate that most State Parties (sps) have at least one ngo member and 50 per cent had a National Coalition member in the Child Rights Information Network (crin). Regarding activity, at least one alternative ngo report was submitted to the crc Committee for most sps. Analyses of Concluding Observations indicate that the Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concerns about most sp’s involvement with ngos and found very few governments encouraging ngos to take a child-rights focus. Overall, few indicators of ngo involvement were related to lower rates of child physical abuse – what appeared most important was having a government that encourages ngos to have a child-rights focus. Reasons for these findings and directions for future research are discussed.

An Initial Attempt at Operationalizing and Testing the Community Coalition Action Theory

The Community Coalition Action Theory (CCAT) blends practice wisdom with empirical data to explain how community coalitions achieve community change and community capacity outcomes. The current study uses data from an evaluation of 20 California Healthy Cities and Communities coalitions to test relationships between coalition factors and outcomes as predicted by CCAT in two stages of coalition development. Data are from two rounds of coalition member surveys, interviews with local coalition coordinators, and semiannual progress reports. Consistent with CCAT predictions and prior research, shared decision making and leadership were correlated with participation; staff competence, task focus, and cohesion were correlated with member satisfaction. Coalition size was associated with participation and dollars leveraged. Also, consistent with CCAT, diversity of funding sources was associated with new leadership opportunities and program expansion; dollars leveraged was correlated with new leadership opportunities and new partners. Findings provide preliminary support for many, but not all, of the relationships predicted by CCAT.