India: Erstwhile Ally and Nuclear Reversal

This chapter contains the first of the three comparative case studies—Indian, Iranian, and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. It begins by presenting an in-depth case selection discussion and the utility of both an intra-case and comparative case selection method. The chapter continues by examining how India successfully, and clandestinely, developed a nuclear capability despite early counterproliferation attempts by the United States. The first half of the chapter describes the initial phase of the Indian program that culminated in the 1974 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion. Despite the United States’ early success in incentivizing the Indians to suspend their nuclear pursuit, U.S. efforts at nuclear reversal failed and the Indians ultimately became a full-fledged nuclear weapons state in 1998. The chapter concludes by describing the ultimate failure of counterproliferation attempts by the United States in accord with the expectations of the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter 2.

Success and Failure in Nuclear Reversal

To better understand the impact of inducements and to get a broader sense of the process of nuclear reversal, this chapter presents two vignettes of nuclear proliferation: the critical cases of Libya and China. These analyses help isolate core distinctions from the historical record: nuclear reversers from the current proliferators, allies from adversaries, those that tried and succeeded decades ago, and those that remained committed for decades with a failing nuclear program and ultimately abandoned it. These illustrative vignettes of success and failure help to delve deeper into the nuclear reversal process. This chapter provides a better understanding of how states embark on and are incentivized to end their pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Evidence from the Historical Record

This chapter provides a series of quantitative, large-n analyses of nuclear reversal that test the core propositions and hypotheses derived in Chapter 2. It expands on existing work to systematically examine all states that engaged in nuclear weapons activity. It overviews the data on rewards (political, military, or economic) and punishments (economic or military) for analysis. It presents several statistical tests of the six hypotheses derived in Chapter 2. Using a time-series panel study that incorporates a variety of model specifications examining the impact of inducements on nuclear reversal, it finds significant support for the theoretical framework introduced earlier. Further, it finds support for the probabilistic conditions that examines special circumstances of leadership change and nuclear reversal among allies and adversaries. Appendix 3.1 presents a battery of robustness checks to provide additional support for the findings.

Theory of Nuclear Reversal

This chapter presents the core theoretical framework in this study: an analysis of nuclear reversal at the systemic level and the conditions under which the international community is able to induce a proliferator to abandon a nascent nuclear program. Specifically, it introduces a novel theoretical approach that highlights the necessity to negotiate with both positive and negative inducements in the shadow of military force. In addition to including the core hypotheses for empirical testing, it includes a discussion of probabilistic conditions to help examine a broader set of proliferation cases. These conditions include the impact of leadership change on the association between inducements and nuclear reversal, as well as how a proliferator’s relationship with the United States influences the likelihood of nuclear reversal. It concludes with potential limitations and overarching policy implications of the framework.

The Puzzle of Counterproliferation

A brief introduction describes the scope of the project, the key questions, and why they deserve attention. It focuses specifically on two important questions: why would states opt to end their nuclear weapons pursuit and which set of policy levers is most likely to succeed in achieving this outcome? Second, this chapter presents the core argument in brief: the decision to end a nuclear program is significantly impacted by external factors. Further, it presents the existing literature—both scholarship examining nuclear decision-making as well as the research on inducements in international relations—that is used as the foundation for the analysis. Lastly, it defines nuclear reversal and establishes a framework for analyzing its variation, introduces the utility of bargaining with rewards and sanctions. It concludes by providing an overview of the entire book project and brief introductions of each chapter.

Lessons Learned: Nuclear Reversal, International Relations, and Future Challenges

The concluding chapter summarizes the book’s findings and examines its implications for both theorists and practitioners of international relations and nuclear security. In specific, it begins by providing a brief summary of the main argument, empirical results, and insights into current proliferation challenges. It next identifies four implications of this study for further consideration: rewards for tough proliferators, nuclear latency, multilateral bargaining, and credibility. It focuses on developments regarding current counterproliferation policy and how best to engage potential nuclear proliferators in the future. The chapter concludes with a summary of the recommendations for policymakers engaging in broader international efforts at nuclear reversal. Given the threat that future nuclear proliferators can pose to international security, there is no better time to focus our attention on the politics of nuclear reversal.