Birthright Citizenship

Birthright citizenship refers to the legal status of citizenship when acquired through birth to a citizen parent (ius sanguinis) or birth in the territory of a state (ius soli). This is how most people acquire citizenship, often unconditionally and automatically at birth. A minority across the globe acquire citizenship through naturalization. Historically ius soli predominated from the Early Modern period, when those born in the sovereign’s territory automatically became their subjects. Ius sanguinis arose following the French Revolution, reflecting the free citizen father’s right to pass citizenship on to his child. Both forms spread globally through imitation and colonization. All states now award citizenship by birth; most have a combination of the two forms. But the strength of provisions varies. All states have substantial ius sanguinis provision; fewer have strong ius soli. In both, acquisition may depend on certain restrictive conditions related to parental birthplace or residence, marital status, gender, religion, ethnicity, or race. Until recently citizenship has been studied more by lawyers than political scientists, and birthright citizenship has received less attention than naturalization. Studies have tended to focus on the citizenship laws and policies of a limited number of states, mainly in the Global North. Only recently have studies covering a greater number and diversity of countries begun to emerge. Comparative scholars have sought to identify and explain different patterns of birthright citizenship provision related to the strength of ius soli and ius sanguinis. These have been interpreted variously as alternative models reflecting different national conceptions of citizenship, as determined by civil or common law traditions, or as dependent on histories of emigration, immigration, and colonization. Contemporary changes have been understood as a function of domestic electoral politics, developments in international law, norm diffusion among states, or a range of contingent contextual factors. Scholars dispute whether diversity of citizenship regimes has been succeeded by convergence. More complex typologies and indices, including birthright citizenship, have emerged, along with increasing availability of data on citizenship around the world. The justification of birthright citizenship has been much debated. Birthright citizenship has been seen as an appropriate way of allocating democratic membership, providing intergenerational continuity of citizenry, reducing the incidence of statelessness, and integrating immigrants. But ius sanguinis has often been criticized as exclusive and illiberal. It is debated whether ius soli is better justified, or if all forms of birthright citizenship should be seen as conveying arbitrary privilege and contributing to global inequality.

Birthright citizenship: reflexiones en torno a familias, menores y la nacionalidad por derecho de nacimiento en los Estados Unidos de América

El presente artículo trata sobre la nacionalidad por derecho de nacimiento en los Estados Unidos de América y expone cómo esta nación es uno de los 34 países que otorgan la nacionalidad por ius soli; es decir, por el hecho de haber nacido en territorio nacional, tal y como se deriva de la Decimocuarta Enmienda constitucional norteamericana, y en este caso, una adquisición de la nacionalidad sin restricciones a pesar de que la tendencia actual es hacia la imposición de condiciones para adquirir la nacionalidad mediante ius soli. Un ejemplo de esta tendencia, plasmada en iniciativas de leyes, la encontramos en la política más reciente estadounidense, a través de la Birthright Citizenship Act (H. R. 140), de 2019. Esta iniciativa de ley de ciudadanía por derecho de nacimiento, negaría la ciudadanía a los niños nacidos en los Estados Unidos, a menos que uno de los padres del niño sea ciudadano, residente legal permanente o residente legal que preste servicio militar en los Estados Unidos. Dicha ley violaría el texto de la mencionada decimocuarta enmienda constitucional, así como leyes secundarias. Como parte de la casuística expuesta, en el mismo tenor, en el artículo se analiza el fenómeno de los bebés anclas y el caso de las familias separadas en la frontera México-Estados Unidos bajo la denominada doctrina de “tolerancia cero”, por la cual todo inmigrante indocumentado se considera un delincuente y se le procesa judicialmente como tal, aunque no tenga antecedentes penales; “motivo” por el cual los niños no pueden seguir junto a sus padres y son separados, con un resultado para los padres que suele ser la deportación. La práctica de separar a los menores de sus familiares no respondió nunca a ninguna ley, y de ahí la orden ejecutiva del 20 de junio de 2018 que paralizó tal medida.

Apportionment, Allegiance, and Birthright Citizenship

Trump v. New York appears to present the Supreme Court with a simple question of statutory construction: do federal statutes allow the President to exclude unlawfully resident aliens from the apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives? The President claims that they do. A three-judge District Court ruled that they do not.However, many arguments for the President go further and assert that the Constitution supports or even compels the exclusion. Some are historical, like the argument that no federal law restricted immigration before 1875, or that apportionment historically included aliens only because they were on a path to citizenship. Others assert that unlawfully present aliens should not be counted because they are outside the allegiance, jurisdiction, and polity of the United States. Some even utilize discredited theories that reject birthright citizenship for U.S.-born children of aliens. This Article rebuts those arguments and shows constitutional history supporting inclusion in the decennial apportionment. It demonstrates that the arguments ignore early federal, state, and colonial restrictions on immigration and naturalization and are inconsistent with fundamental constitutional principles governing apportionment, liability for treason, and birthright citizenship.Because these arguments reach far beyond the apportionment issue and threaten to surreptitiously alter longstanding constitutional law, the Court should disregard them and decide the case on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. If instead the Court addresses these arguments, it should reject them and reaffirm longstanding principles governing apportionment, liability for treason, and birthright citizenship.