scholarly journals Apportionment, Allegiance, and Birthright Citizenship

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Vlahoplus
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
The United States ◽  
District Court ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Constitutional History ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Birthright Citizenship ◽  
Simple Question ◽  
Resident Aliens

AbstractTrump v. New York appears to present the Supreme Court with a simple question of statutory construction: do federal statutes allow the President to exclude unlawfully resident aliens from the apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives? The President claims that they do. A three-judge District Court ruled that they do not.However, many arguments for the President go further and assert that the Constitution supports or even compels the exclusion. Some are historical, like the argument that no federal law restricted immigration before 1875, or that apportionment historically included aliens only because they were on a path to citizenship. Others assert that unlawfully present aliens should not be counted because they are outside the allegiance, jurisdiction, and polity of the United States. Some even utilize discredited theories that reject birthright citizenship for U.S.-born children of aliens. This Article rebuts those arguments and shows constitutional history supporting inclusion in the decennial apportionment. It demonstrates that the arguments ignore early federal, state, and colonial restrictions on immigration and naturalization and are inconsistent with fundamental constitutional principles governing apportionment, liability for treason, and birthright citizenship.Because these arguments reach far beyond the apportionment issue and threaten to surreptitiously alter longstanding constitutional law, the Court should disregard them and decide the case on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. If instead the Court addresses these arguments, it should reject them and reaffirm longstanding principles governing apportionment, liability for treason, and birthright citizenship.

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 565-568
Author(s):  
Carlos M. Vázquez
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
District Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Southern District ◽  
Law Of Nations ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Argentine Republic ◽  
Federal Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs and respondents, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. and United Carriers, Inc., were respectively the charterer and owner of the Hercules, a crude oil tanker that was bombed in international waters by Argentine military aircraft during the war over the Malvinas or Falkland Islands. The ship was severely damaged and had to be scuttled off the coast of Brazil. After unsuccessfully seeking relief in Argentina, the companies filed suit against defendant and appellant, the Argentine Republic, in the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs argued that the federal courts had jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C. §1350 (1982)), which confers federal jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1602-1611 (1982)) (FSIA) is by its terms the sole basis of federal jurisdiction over cases against foreign states. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court (per Rehnquist, C.J.) unanimously reversed the Second Circuit and held that the FSIA provides the exclusive basis of federal jurisdiction over suits against foreign states.

scholarly journals "Hurricane" Sandy

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-192
Author(s):  
Cheryl L. Pollak
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
The United States ◽  
Hurricane Sandy ◽  
Small Business Administration ◽  
Mitigation Measures ◽  
District Court ◽  
Flood Insurance ◽  
Recent Experience

On the evening of October 29, 2012, “Hurricane” Sandy made land- fall on the New York coastline, battering the land with strong winds, torrential rain, and record-breaking storm surges. Homes and commercial structures were destroyed; roads and tunnels were flooded; and more than 23,000 people sought refuge in temporary shelters, with many others facing weeks without power and electricity. At the time, Sandy was heralded as one of the costliest hurricanes in the his- tory of the United States; the second costliest hurricane only to Katrina, which hit New Orleans in 2005. Unfortunately, recent experience with Hurricanes Florence, Maria, Harvey, and Irma suggest that this pattern of devastating superstorms may become the new norm as climate change produces more extreme and unpredictable weather events. In Sandy’s aftermath, as individuals returned to their homes, or what remained of them, and communities began to rebuild, the true cost of the storm became apparent. A year after the storm, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) estimated that over $1.4 billion in assistance was provided to 182,000 survivors of the dis- aster; another $3.2 billion was provided to state and local governments for debris removal, infrastructure repair, and emergency protective measures. More than $2.4 billion was provided to individuals and businesses in the form of low-interest loans through the Small Business Administration (“SBA”), and millions more were spent on grants de- signed to implement mitigation measures in the future and to provide unemployment assistance to survivors. Before the storm, homeowners paid premiums for flood insurance provided through the National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”), and for homeowner’s insurance provided by dozens of private insurers. In the months following the storm, they began to file claims for assistance in rebuilding their homes. While many such claims were re- solved successfully, many homeowners were unhappy with the settlement amounts offered by their insurance carriers and felt compelled to file lawsuits in the surrounding state and federal courts. Many of those lawsuits were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (“EDNY”). This case study describes the EDNY’s specifically crafted, unique approach to handling the mass litigation that ensued from Sandy’s devastation, documents some of the problems that the Court faced during that mass litigation, and describes some of the lessons learned from the Court’s experience.

scholarly journals The Price of Poverty: Policy Implications of the Unequal Effects of Monetary Sanctions on the Poor

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-65
Author(s):  
Ilya Slavinski ◽  
Kimberly Spencer-Suarez
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Low Income ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Federal State ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Time Requirements ◽  
State And Local ◽  
Set Up

Over the last several decades, with the rise of mass incarceration in the United States and its steep costs, governments at the federal, state, and local levels have dramatically ramped up monetary punishment. Monetary sanctions are now the most common type of criminal penalty in the United States. The growth of fines, fees, and other legal financial obligations (LFOs), and the ensuing legal debt, reflect a shifting of the system’s costs onto its primarily low-income and indigent subjects. This study provides an exploration of previously underexamined ways in which monetary sanctions impose distinct burdens on the poor. Interviews with 121 defendants in Texas and New York, along with courtroom observations, demonstrate that criminal legal debt is particularly challenging for people with low incomes in three meaningful ways. First, systems set up to handle indigency claims do not adequately address the needs or complex individual circumstances of those who simply do not have the ability to pay. Oftentimes, alternatives are unavailable or statutorily prohibited. Second, the lack of alternatives to payment lead to compromising situations, which then compel indigent defendants to make difficult choices about how to allocate scant resources. Finally, being encumbered with fines and fees and participating in alternatives like community service comes with taxing time requirements that can prove uniquely challenging for those who are poor. These three findings lead us to propose a series of policy recommendations revolving around three key themes: (a) enhancement of indigency procedures, (b) equity in monetary sanctions, and (c) alleviating burdens by improving accessibility.

United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization

1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 833-837
Author(s):  
Eric S. Koenig
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
United Nations ◽  
The United States ◽  
District Court ◽  
Palestine Liberation Organization ◽  
Southern District ◽  
The Status ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Summary Judgment

Plaintiff, the United States, brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and four individuals seeking an injunction to close the PLO’s Permanent Observer Mission (Mission) to the United Nations as violative of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (ATA). The district court (per Palmieri, J.) entered summary judgment for defendants and held: (1) the ATA does not require the closure of the PLO’s Mission to the United Nations; (2) the status of the PLO’s Mission, an invitee of the United Nations, is protected by the Agreement Between the United States and the United Nations Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations (Headquarters Agreement); and (3) Congress did not intend the ATA to supersede the Headquarters Agreement.

Recent Developments in Health Law: Constitutional Law: Despite Reservations, the Second Circuit Defers to State Court's Determination That a Preponderance of the Evidence Standard is Constitutional for Recommitment of NRRMDD Defendants – Ernst J. v. Stonea

2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 826-828
Author(s):  
Erika Wilkinson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New York ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Mental Disease ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
District Court ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
Equal Protection Clause ◽  
Court Of Appeals

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently upheld United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York Judge's denial of petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that it was not objectively unreasonable for the Appellate Division to conclude, in light of clearly established federal law as expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States, that a New York statute providing for the recommitment of specific defendants who plead not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect (NRRMDD) under a mere “preponderance of the evidence” standard does not violate either due process or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document