What explains party unity? A test of competing theories

Several theories have been created to explain party unity in Congress, but previous studies have generally assumed the same factors affect party unity for both parties. Given the differences between the two parties (the ideological heterogeneity of their electoral coalitions, how the party’s electoral coalitions view partisanship, etc.), this assumption may limit our understanding of the sources of party unity. In this paper, I test three theories of party unity (cartel theory, Conditional Party Government, and Strategic Party Government) on separate panels for the two parties. I find cartel theory helps explain party unity for both parties, but, unlike what has previously been argued, I find this is not entirely due to Reed’s Rules. I further find Conditional Party Government better explains party unity for the Republicans, while Strategic Party Government better explains party unity for the Democrats. I provide theoretical reasons for these findings and how they may impact future research.

Cartel Theory and Cartel Practice: The Case of the International Aluminum Cartels, 1901–1940

The study of cartels is important to economists as well as business historians, but, on the whole, there has been little cross cultivation between the two academic fields. This article examines cartel theory developed by economists in the context of the historical case of international aluminum cartels in existence before 1940. By analyzing three basic theoretical questions—when cartels appear, when they break down, and when they are successful—in light of the empirical evidence of the aluminum industry, the article argues that economics and history, although they have very different approaches, can profit from using each other's methods when studying cartels.

The Dynamics of Negotiated Protectionism

Recent protectionism by the United States has principally taken the form of negotiated barriers to trade, such as voluntary export restraints. These barriers tend to evolve over time and to display three patterns, which we label institutionalized, temporary, and sporadic protectionism. Cartel theory and studies of the politics of protection suggest that the dynamics of negotiated protectionism will depend on three variables: the barriers to entry into an industry, the size of the domestic industry, and the exit barriers for domestic firms. Low barriers to entry will lead to institutionalized protectionism when the domestic industry is large and exit difficult; temporary protectionism results when the domestic industry is small and exit easy; and sporadic protectionism is likely when barriers to entry are high. Brief studies of U.S. protectionism in textiles and apparel, steel, footwear, televisions, and automobiles illustrate the value of this framework.