Truth in Practical Reason: Practical and Assertoric Truth in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

Truth has always been a controversial subject in Aristotelian scholarship. In most cases, including some well-known passages in the Categories, De Interpretatione and Metaphysics, Aristotle uses the predicate ‘true’ for assertions, although exceptions are many and impossible to ignore. One of the most complicated cases is the concept of practical truth in the sixth book of Nicomachean Ethics: its entanglement with action and desire raises doubts about the possibility of its inclusion to the propositional model of truth. Nevertheless, in one of the most extensive studies on the subject, C. Olfert has tried to show that this is not only possible but also necessary. In this paper, we explain why trying to fit practical truth into the propositional model comes with insurmount­able problems. In order to overcome these problems, we focus on multiple aspects of practical syllogism and correlate them with Aristo­tle’s account of desire, happiness and the good. Identifying the role of such concepts in the specific steps of practical reasoning, we reach the conclusion that practical truth is best explained as the culmination of a well-executed practical syllogism taken as a whole, which ultimately explains why this type of syllogism demands a different approach and a different kind of truth than the theoretical one.

Aristóteles y Heidegger en torno a la función apofántica del lógos

Este trabajo analiza la interpretación existencial del habla, que Heidegger desarrolla en el §34 de Ser y tiempo. Allí queda planteada la posibilidad de remontarse al uso del término griego λόγος para significar el sentido originario de la palabra alemana Rede. El examen remite a fortiori al §7 B donde el filósofo propone, entre otros aspectos, la traducción de λόγος por “decir”, cuya función primaria es designada por medio del verbo ἀποφαίνεσθαι. Heidegger apela a la autoridad de Aristóteles como una fuente que ha tematizado tal “decir”en cuanto ἀπόφανσις. En consecuencia, serán considerados los primeros capítulos de De Interpretatione a fin de reconocer los límites y alcances de la comprensión heideggeriana respecto de la definición que el stagirita atribuye al concepto de λόγος ἀποφαντικός.

Nāgārjunian-Yogācārian Modal Logic versus Aristotelian Modal Logic

There are two different modal logics: the logic T assuming contingency and the logic K = assuming logical determinism. In the paper, I show that the Aristotelian treatise On Interpretation (Περί ερμηνείας, De Interpretatione) has introduced some modal-logical relationships which correspond to T. In this logic, it is supposed that there are contingent events. The Nāgārjunian treatise Īśvara-kartṛtva-nirākṛtiḥ-viṣṇoḥ-ekakartṛtva-nirākaraṇa has introduced some modal-logical relationships which correspond to K =. In this logic, it is supposed that there is a logical determinism: each event happens necessarily (siddha) or it does not happen necessarily (asiddha). The Nāgārjunian approach was inherited by the Yogācārins who developed, first, the doctrine of causality of all real entities (arthakriyātva) and, second, the doctrine of momentariness of all real entities (kṣaṇikavāda). Both doctrines were a philosophical ground of the Yogācārins for the logical determinism. Hence, Aristotle implicitly used the logic T in his modal reasoning. The Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools implicitly used the logic K = in their modal reasoning.

Aristóteles e a Lógica da Contingência: uma interpretação tradicional do argumento da batalha naval

Since Antiquity, the meaning and purpose of Aristotle’s sea-battle argument have been highly controversial. On the so-called traditional interpretation of De Interpretatione 9, the argument is intended to prove that not every statement is always true or false on the assumption deemed evident that facts may occur contingently in our sublunar world. In this paper I argue that this interpretation is for many reasons much more plausible than any of its competitors, so that its correctness is worthy at least of moral certainty. In particular, I contend that it can coexist in perfect logical harmony with a moderately charitable reading of Aristotle’s texts that at first glance it seems to confute. As a matter of fact, I contend that it is faithful to Aristotle’s view of logical laws as consequent upon the metaphysical structure of reality.

A retórica do capítulo IX do tratado Da Interpretação

This paper analyses the argumentative strategy of the ninth chapter of the treatise De Interpretatione in the light of Aristotle's Rhetoric. The subject of the ‘future events’ developed in chapter IX brings up themes that are proper not only to philosophical thought, but also to political practice, forensic rhetoric, deliberative rhetoric and even tragic poetry. In this paper, it is argued that Aristotle uses the dialectical method and certain rhetorical techniques to touch the various discussions related to the subject addressed. He erects a hypothetical adversary and a thesis to refute, condensing some positions that were probably scattered in the most diverse textual and oratory sources of his time. Moreover, he builds the thesis of his hypothetical opponent from premises established in previous chapters of his own treatise. With this, he can simulate the defense of his opponent's thesis before demolishing it. Thus, according to the hypothesis defended here, the philosopher does not in fact commit himself to the arguments presented between 18a35 and 18b25, but only simulates the defense of the reasoning which he will soon refute. In addition, it is also concluded that chapter IX is part of the argumentative chain of the treatise, having as a peculiar characteristic, not the theme or nature of the arguments exposed, but the rhetorical method it employs.

Equimodalidade e Hôs Epi To Poly no De Interpretatione 9

In the first part of De Interpretatione 9, Aristotle introduces an argument for fatalism that he obviously does not subscribe to. Readers of the chapter wonder how Aristotle replies to that argument. In this paper I claim that the main basis of his reply is the principle of equimodality stated in 19a33 (“statements are true in the same way as the actual things are”). I defend that this principle should be interpreted in the most straightforward way, as saying that the modality with which any statement is true is the same as the modality with which the actual things referred to in the statement are what they are. This entails that something is (or will be) necessarily such and such only if the statement saying that it is (or will be) such and such is necessarily true. By applying this principle to Aristotle’s distinction between two kinds of non-necessary things – those that happen as chance has it and those that happen for the most part (hôs epi to poly) in one way rather than another –, one should conclude that, because these things are contingent, statements about them can only be contingently true.