Nāgārjunian-Yogācārian Modal Logic versus Aristotelian Modal Logic

There are two different modal logics: the logic T assuming contingency and the logic K = assuming logical determinism. In the paper, I show that the Aristotelian treatise On Interpretation (Περί ερμηνείας, De Interpretatione) has introduced some modal-logical relationships which correspond to T. In this logic, it is supposed that there are contingent events. The Nāgārjunian treatise Īśvara-kartṛtva-nirākṛtiḥ-viṣṇoḥ-ekakartṛtva-nirākaraṇa has introduced some modal-logical relationships which correspond to K =. In this logic, it is supposed that there is a logical determinism: each event happens necessarily (siddha) or it does not happen necessarily (asiddha). The Nāgārjunian approach was inherited by the Yogācārins who developed, first, the doctrine of causality of all real entities (arthakriyātva) and, second, the doctrine of momentariness of all real entities (kṣaṇikavāda). Both doctrines were a philosophical ground of the Yogācārins for the logical determinism. Hence, Aristotle implicitly used the logic T in his modal reasoning. The Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools implicitly used the logic K = in their modal reasoning.