If Many Seek, Ye Shall Find: Search Externalities and New Goods

Consumer search serves productive roles in an economy with multiple goods. In equilibrium, search promotes the sorting of consumers among producers, thereby enabling the market for new goods, and potentially increasing welfare and profits above the benchmark case (an economy with a single good, hence, no search). When competitors are few, additional direct competitors may benefit a firm, as more sellers may encourage more consumers to search. In return, consumer search entices producers of new goods to enter. Neither of these externalities, nor the coordination problems faced by consumers and producers, is appropriately recognized in the literature. (JEL D11, D43, D62, D82, D83, G22)

EFFICIENT SORTING IN FRICTIONAL LABOR MARKETS WITH TWO-SIDED HETEROGENEITY

This paper studies how search externalities and wage bargaining distort vacancy creation and the allocation of workers to jobs in markets with two-sided heterogeneity. To do so, I propose a model of a frictional labor market where heterogeneous workers decide which job to look for and firms decide which technology to adopt. At equilibrium, there is perfect segmentation across sectors, which is determined by a unique threshold of workers' productivity. This threshold is inefficient because of participation and composition externalities. The Pigouvian tax scheme that decentralizes optimal sorting shows that these externalities have opposite signs. Furthermore, their relative strength depends on the distribution of workers' skills, so that when there are many (few) skilled workers, too many (few) high-technology jobs are created.