PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN A FORM OF DISCOUNTS: CATEGORIZATION AND IMPACT ON COMPETITION

This paper is aimed to clarify the definition and categorization of discounts as well as pro- and anticompetitive effects of discounts. The author applied qualitative methods to the research. The modern literature review unfolds the gap of proper discounts definition, which is proposed to be covered by five-dimensions approach to discounts categorization. Based on such aspects of discount scheme as time, product, threshold, distribution level and customer, the approach provides comprehensive and uniform characteristics of discount. It allows assessing effects of competition, which are classified in two groups. Pro-competitive effects include stimulation of demand, decreasing cost due to economy of scale, solving coordination problems within a supply chain. Anti-competitive effects encompass predation scheme, raising rival’s cost, exclusive dealing, leverage and exclusionary bundling. The importance of correct assessment of the discounts by antitrust authorities is high as an overenforcement in this sphere may lead to adverse effect on total welfare.

A Non-Paternalistic Model of Research Ethics and Oversight

This chapter argues that prospective review of research before bodies of diverse representation should not be understood as a paternalistic interference in the private interactions between researchers and participants. Instead, it is a mechanism for resolving a set of coordination problems that threaten the integrity of research. Its proper role is to provide credible social assurance that the research enterprise constitutes a voluntary scheme of cooperation through which diverse stakeholders can contribute to the common good without being subject to the arbitrary exercise of social authority including antipathy, abuse, coercion, domination, exploitation, or other forms of harmful, unfair, or disrespectful treatment. The limitations of prospective review are discussed, including the need for mechanisms that better address incentives for a wider range of stakeholders whose decisions shape the research agenda.

M Equilibrium: A Theory of Beliefs and Choices in Games

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered unrelated. M equilibrium is empirically robust and, despite being set-valued, falsifiable. Results from a series of experiments that compare M equilibrium to leading behavioral game theory models demonstrate its virtues in predicting observed choices and stated beliefs. Data from experimental games with a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and multiple M equilibria exhibit coordination problems that could not be anticipated through the lens of existing models. (JEL C72, C90, D83)

How to Put the Cart Behind the Horse in the Cultural Evolution of Gender

In The Origins of Unfairness, Cailin O’Connor develops a series of evolutionary game models to show that gender might have emerged to solve coordination problems in the division of labor. One assumption of those models is that agents engage in gendered social learning. This assumption puts the explanatory cart before the horse. How did early humans have a well-developed system of gendered social learning before the gendered division of labor? This paper develops a pair of models that show it is possible for the gendered division of labor to arise on more minimal assumptions.

Embodied Heuristics

Intelligence evolved to cope with situations of uncertainty generated by nature, predators, and the behavior of conspecifics. To this end, humans and other animals acquired special abilities, including heuristics that allow for swift action in face of scarce information. In this article, I introduce the concept of embodied heuristics, that is, innate or learned rules of thumb that exploit evolved sensory and motor abilities in order to facilitate superior decisions. I provide a case study of the gaze heuristic, which solves coordination problems from intercepting prey to catching a fly ball. Various species have adapted this heuristic to their specific sensorimotor abilities, such as vision, echolocation, running, and flying. Humans have enlisted it for solving tasks beyond its original purpose, a process akin to exaptation. The gaze heuristic also made its way into rocket technology. I propose a systematic study of embodied heuristics as a research framework for situated cognition and embodied bounded rationality.

Human players manage to extort more than the mutual cooperation payoff in repeated social dilemmas

Social dilemmas are mixed-motive games. Although the players have a common interest in maintaining cooperation, each may try to obtain a larger payoff by cooperating less than the other. This phenomenon received increased attention after Press and Dyson discovered a class of strategies for the repeated prisoner’s dilemma (extortionate strategies) that secure for themselves a payoff that is never smaller, but can be larger, than the opponent’s payoff. We conducted an experiment to test whether humans adopt extortionate strategies when playing a social dilemma. Our results reveal that human subjects do try to extort a larger payoff from their opponents. However, they are only successful when extortionate strategies are part of a Nash equilibrium. In settings where extortionate strategies do not appear in any Nash equilibrium, attempts at extortion only result in a breakdown of cooperation. Our subjects recognized the different incentives implied by the two settings, and they were ready to “extort” the opponent when allowed to do so. This suggests that deviations from mutually cooperative equilibria, which are usually attributed to players’ impatience, coordination problems, or lack of information, can instead be driven by subjects trying to reach more favorable outcomes.

Hatay Yöresinde Tıbbi ve Aromatik Bitkiler İşleme Sektörünün Değerlendirilmesi

In this study, the medicinal and aromatic plants sector of the Hatay province was evaluated with the SWOT Analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats), and aimed to offer solutions for the development of the sector based on the opinions of the companies which are operating in the province. According to the research results, the rich natural vegetation of the province and its proximity to raw material resources, were found as the main 'strengths'. Insufficient incentives, lack of coordination, problems in accessing quality raw materials, and adulteration were found as the 'weaknesses'. Increase in demand and high added value potential, and the EXPO 2021 exhibition were found as the 'opportunities'. Security problems in the region due to the ongoing war in Syria were determined as the prominent 'threat'.

Investigating a real-options approach to modelling public policy investments, and implications for public administration

<p>This thesis investigates the application of real-options modelling to policy investment coordination problems across government departments, with the aim of informing high-level institutional and system design choices in public administration. This analysis is motivated by recent and ongoing reforms to the legislative framework underpinning New Zealand's public service which, unlike the last major public administration reforms of the 1980s, are not expressly driven by or obviously supported by economic theory. We find that a simple real-options framework allows for a compelling illustration of the coordination problems that the current reforms are in part aiming to solve, and supports analysis of the types of mechanism that might be employed to address them. Such mechanisms include the promotion of structural integration, the broadening or alignment of departmental policy objectives, a relaxation of public finance restrictions, and joint decision-making over policy investments.</p>