ancient interpretation
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2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federica Benuzzi

A detailed analysis of the scholiastic material relating to Ar. Av. 299-300 shows not only that the entire scholium is ascribable to the grammarian Didymus, but also that the ancient interpretation of the Aristophanic line implied several reception dynamics: firstly, the influence played on Euphronius’ dialectological exegesis by the allusion to Alcman’s poem on the bird named kērylos in ll. 250-252 of the Birds; secondly, the reuse of zoological writings and, possibly, of Callimachus’ Aitia in Didymus’ explanation of the pun on the ornithonym kērylos.



2021 ◽  
pp. 35-83
Author(s):  
James Warren

Plato associates metameleia with ‘akratic’ (un-self-controlled) agents and, in Republic 9, with tyrannical characters. How does his notion of metameleia relate to different accounts of the nature of virtue found in different dialogues? For example, in the Protagoras Socrates associates regret with the retrospective recognition that the agent has been misled by appearances and has failed to select the greatest good. But this does not occur because of akrasia. Is the tyrannical soul of Republic 9 subject to internal conflict and, if so, of what sort? The chapter also considers Proclus’ commentary on Republic 10 as a later ancient interpretation of the Platonic position.



2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-177
Author(s):  
Nathan Eubank

Scholarship on Matt 5.25–6 has focused on the question of whether the saying offers mundane wisdom or threatens divine judgement, with the majority concluding that it refers to eternal punishment in hell. This article examines debt-prison and related phenomena before turning to the illuminating history of ancient interpretation. The article concludes that the ‘eternal damnation’ gloss widely favoured today is an overinterpretation first inspired by the exigencies of fourth- and fifth-century doctrinal controversy. Instead of eternal perdition, Matt 5.25–6 and its parallels suggest a time of straits followed by possible release.



Rhizomata ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Carraro

AbstractAlthough the view that Anaximander was a Material Monist is not very popular nowadays, it is still widely held that it was embraced by Aristotle at least on some occasions, then adopted by Theophrastus, and later on inherited by Simplicius, our main source on the Presocratics. I argue that none of these three philosophers held this view and that, for this reason, it should not be seen as the standard ancient interpretation of Anaximander.



Janus Head ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-238
Author(s):  
Kevin Aho ◽  

This paper attempts to reconcile, what appear to be, two conflicting accounts of authenticity in Heidegger's thought. Authenticity in Being and Time (1927) is commonly interpreted in 'existentialist' terms as willful commitment and resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) in the face of one's own death but, by the late 1930's, is reintroduced in terms of Gelassenlieit, as a non-willful openness that "lets beings be." By employing Heidegger's conception of authentic historicality (Geschiclidichkeit), understood as the retrieval of Dasein's past, and drawing on his writings on Hölderlin in the 1930'sand 1940's, I suggest that the ancient interpretation of leisure and festivity may play an important role in unifying these conflicting accounts. Genuine leisure, interpreted as a form of play (Spiel), frees us from inauthentic busy-ness and gives us an opening to face the abyssal nature of our own being and the mystery that "beings are" in the flrst place. To this end, leisure re-connects us with wonder (Erstaunen) as the original temperament of Western thought. In leisurely wonder, the authentic self does not seek purposive mastery and control over beings but calmly accepts the unsettledness ofbeing and is, as a result, allowed into the original openness or space of play of time (Zeit-Spiel-Raum) that lets beings emerge-into-presence on their own terms.



Phronesis ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 348-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lloyd Gerson

AbstractThe perennial problem in interpreting De Anima 3.5 has produced two drastic solutions, one ancient and one contemporary. According to the first, Aristotle in 3.5 identi fies the 'agent intellect' with the divine intellect. Thus, everything Aristotle has to say about the human intellect is contained mainly in 3.4, though Aristotle returns to its treatment in 3.6. In contrast to this ancient interpretation, a more recent view holds that the divine intellect is not the subject of 3.5 and that throughout the work Aristotle is analyzing the nature of the human intellect. But this view contends that the properties Aristotle deduces for this intellect, properties that have encouraged the view that Aristotle must be speaking about a divine intellect, are in fact to be discounted or interpreted in such a way that they do not indicate the immortality and immateriality of the human intellect. In this article I argue that close attention to the text and the sequence of argument supports the conclusion that Aristotle is speaking throughout De Anima of a uni fied human intellect, possessed of the properties Aristotle explicitly attributes to it. This intellect functions diff erently when it is and when it is not separate from the hylomorphic composite. I argue further that it is Aristotle's view that if we were not ideally or essentially intellects, we could not engage in the diverse cognitive activities of this composite.



1940 ◽  
Vol 34 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 78-84
Author(s):  
H. J. Rose

It is no longer the fashion to imagine Herodotos a liar when he tells marvellous stories, for some of his most extraordinary statements have long since been shown to contain at least a substantial measure of truth. It is perhaps not sufficiently realized, however, that on occasion he misleads his readers and himself by too much critical unbelief in his materials and consequent application of the crude methods of mythological investigation then current. In other words, he often rationalizes in the only way then possible, superficially altering the story so as to rid himself of the incredible details, or at all events, as I think, attributing to the actors motives which a somewhat drily rational mind could understand and approve or condemn. It is of course well known that at least the former method was a commonplace of the sophists, whose influence on Herodotos is manifest and widespread; it has been said, indeed, that it is much older than they and characteristically Ionic. L. Radermacher finds traces of it in the Odyssey itself and adds that, although we can sometimes catch the rationalizer (or Fälscher, as he impolitely calls him) at work, we cannot be sure of always doing so and ‘müssen annehmen, dass der Glaube an die Geschichtlichkeit ihrer Sage manche griechischen Autoren früh verführt hat, sie geschichtlicher zu erzählen als eigentlich erlaubt war’. This is a true and useful statement. Modern criticism has long learned to set aside ancient allegorizations of myths, about which I need say nothing, for the subject has been repeatedly and well handled by my colleague, Dr. J. Tate; it has often, however, confused ancient interpretation of myth with ancient criticism of saga. Euhemerism indeed is usually recognized for what it is, although even this is not always so; but uixere inepti ante Euhemerum multi, and their efforts are by no means always distinguished either from allegorizing or from real sagas. For an example of the former confusion I may refer to Stallbaum's note on Plato, Phaedrus, 29 C-D, where the reader is referred to the account given by Lobeck of the rise and growth of allegorization. But Plato says nothing at all of allegories in this passage. He quotes, with ironical admiration of its ‘wisdom’, a version of the story of Boreas and Oreithyia according to which she. was knocked off the Areiopagos, or some other place, by a strong north wind, and so was killed and consequently said to have been carried away by Boreas. He adds that it would be a laborious and dismal business to go through all the tales of wonder in that way, rationalizing the Hippocentaurs, Gorgons, Chimaira, Pegasos, and the rest out of existence; a wise saying which was uttered in vain for Palaiphatos and his kind. However, most moderns know a myth from a saga and an allegory from a crude rationalization which accepts the story as true except for the incredibilities and is quite ready to believe, for instance, in Romulus if we will but postulate that he was not snatched up to heaven but murdered and his body hidden. There is a much more subtle snare, consisting of a story which, although rationalized, is well told, and Herodotos in this respect can be a notable offender, for he never tells a story ill.



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