The Magellan effect – training future naval officers for mission command

Purpose Officers in post-cold war military operations frequently encounter situations that are not easily handled through central control and chain of command, but demand a more flexible leadership style and the ability to yield some control to subordinates. This study aims to investigate what it takes to train military leaders to master such Maneuver Warfare skills in a culture that still, unconsciously, fosters a chain of command structure. Design/methodology/approach Using a quasi-experimental pre-post design, the authors studied 30 teams of naval cadets (n = 228) in three separate Leadership Development Programs, each of 12 months full time duration. In the three otherwise identical programs, the authors varied one of the major exercises (sailing) both in duration and degree of structure and challenge. Parameters of team interaction were measured using the Systematizing the Person-Group Relation method and summarized in a construct labeled synergy. Findings One of the cohorts showed a significant positive effect. This cohort sailed a barque for ten weeks, crossing the Atlantic during winter storms. Apart from the clear mission of sailing the ship safely back to its home haven, they received no further instructions or training. Although the duration and the challenge likely count for part of the result, the authors argue that the lack of initial structure combined with a shared mission were more important. Research limitations/implications Because of the cost and time involved in each program, it was not possible to independently vary duration, structure and mission. As a result, conclusions as to the reason for the greater positive effect seen in one of the programs cannot be definitively determined. Originality/value The study contributes to the understanding of the effect of unstructured situations on building Maneuver Warfare skills.

Organizational perspectives on the maneuver warfare movement in the United States Marine Corps: insights from the work of James G. March

This article describes a key period in the institutional and organizational history of the United States Marine Corps. Using historical, archival, and interview material, we apply some of the ideas and perspectives of James G. March to understand the organizational dynamics and mechanisms that enabled the maneuver warfare movement and made the modern Marine Corps a more innovative and adaptive organization. We build on and integrate several streams of March’s research, legacies, and interests, including understanding the organizational conditions that help novelty and outlier-ness flourish, finding interest and value in apparent contradictions, and deriving implications for organizational scholarship and for the organization under study.

Sabers through the Reich

This work provides a complete battle history of American corps cavalry in World War II. It asserts that these cavalry formations made an outsized contribution to the Allied victory in the European theatre in correlation to their actual size. These cavalry groups made the "90 Division gamble" actually work, allowing American corps and army commanders to mass combat power at the decisive point. Furthermore, this work also highlights the role of the reconnaissance and security battle at the operational level. It demonstrates how this long-overlooked part of military operations is an absolute essential in maneuver warfare. This “battle before the battle” fundamentally shapes the conditions for the main action, yet a thorough study of this fighting has long been ignored in the literature—a failing that this work remedies.