Constructing a General Model Accounting for Interstate Rivalry Termination

Unlike many topics in international relations, a large number of models characterize interstate rivalry termination processes. But many of these models tend to focus on different parts of the rivalry termination puzzle. It is possible, however, to create a general model built around a core of shocks, expectation changes, reciprocity, and reinforcement. Twenty additional elements can be linked as alternative forms of catalysts/shocks and perceptual shifts or as facilitators of the core processes. All 24 constituent elements can be encompassed by the general model, which allows for a fair amount of flexibility in delineating alternative pathways to rivalry de-escalation and termination at different times and in different places. The utility of the unified model is then applied in an illustrative fashion to the Anglo-American rivalry, which ended early in the 20th century.

Issue Intractability and the Persistence of International Rivalry

Rivalries are likely to persist as long as contentious issues remain unresolved. Due to differing issue characteristics, some issues may be more intractable than others and therefore especially likely to prolong rivalry. In this study, I argue that rivalries rooted in territorial issues tend to be enduring due to broad-bases of domestic support for continuing to pursue territorial claims and loose linkages between territorial issues and particular political leaders, resulting in the persistence of territorial conflict over time despite changes of leadership. Alternatively, ideological and regime-related conflicts tend to be relatively fleeting due to narrow societal salience and close connections between such issues and particular political leaders, facilitating rivalry termination through leadership change. The empirical results reveal that territorial rivalries (as well as positional rivalries concerning influence/prestige) tend to be more enduring than rivalries rooted in ideological or regime-related conflict and that unlike territorial rivalries, ideological rivalries tend to terminate upon irregular changes of leadership.

Committed To Peace: Liberal Institutions and the Termination of Rivalry

Rivalry is characterized by mutual mistrust, anger and fear, and becomes increasingly intractable as confrontations between rivals militarize. The empirical record confirms that rivalries account for the vast number of militarized interstate disputes and wars in the international system. Although considerable attention has been spent on the initiation, duration or termination of rivalries, to date no comprehensive theoretical framework for their persistence or failure exists. Following Fearon, a rationalist explanation of rivalry termination is developed. It is argued here that the adoption of liberal institutions helps alleviate the commitment problems arising in rivalry. Free-market reform, democratic institutions and membership in international organizations all build trust and increase defection costs among rival states, and therefore help to shorten the duration of rivalry. Using a Cox proportional hazard model and Thompson's data on rivalries, it is shown that change towards democracy, as well as the joint effect of democracy and economic development increase the likelihood of rivalry termination. Also, joint membership in international organizations with mechanisms for dispute settlement reduces the duration of rivalry.Arobustness check using Diehl and Goertz's list of rivalries produces similar results.