Explaining temporal qualia

Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a ‘flow-like’ quality. Call this ‘temporal qualia’. Temporal qualia are commonly thought to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as passing. I reject both claims and make the case that passage-talk plays no useful explanatory role with respect to temporal qualia, but rather obfuscates what the philosophical problem of temporal qualia is. I offer a ‘reductionist’ account of temporal qualia that makes no reference to the concept of passage and argue that it is well motivated by empirical studies in motion perception.

Time and Temporal Content

This chapter presents a metaphysics-first treatment of time and temporal concepts and language, opposed to all forms of subjectivism about time. It defends phenomenal externalism about time, and also aims to explain away temptations to subjectivism about time. It argues that we cannot explain the distinction between mere sensitivity to time and representation of time in terms of perceptual constancies. Nor can we explain it in terms of mere sensitivity to time that is coordinated with other genuinely representational states and capacities. A different theory of the distinction is developed, labelled representational preservation, which has to do with the preservation and updating of representations over time. An account of three different kinds of present-tense content in experience is developed. The correct characterization of the kinds can explain away some metaphysical illusions about time and the experience of temporal passage.

The Problem of Time's Passage

While the B-theory of time seems to fit with the current physical theory, it also seems to require treating temporal passage as an illusion. The aim of this article is to show that by understanding cases of apparent motion in a particular way, one can maintain the B-theory while also retaining the privileged status that the phenomenon of temporal passage plays in human experience. However, to understand these cases correctly, one should turn to arguments in the history of philosophy. More specifically, arguments from Russell, Kant and Hume can be used to make the B-theory more plausible.

Time as Motion

The arena of the philosophy of time has been largely concerned with deciding whether tense distinctions reflect absolute metaphysical distinctions or not. After bringing the debate over the metaphysical status of instantaneous velocity to bear on the debate over the nature of temporal passage, I argue that we should further investigate whether aspectual distinctions reflect objective and absolute metaphysical distinctions too. I conclude that those who think that being realist about tense uniquely makes room for the idea that time passes should be realist about the progressive too.

Analysis of Data Collected at Control Room Full Scope Simulator at Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant

This article describes a computer program that will be used by experts to analyze human factor reliability when analyzing data obtained during the training of operators on a nuclear power plant's control room simulator. The program was applied to data collected during the training of a scenario called Rupture of the Hot Loop of the Primary Circuit (250 t/h). Based on the comparison of charts, temporal passage through the scenario, or by personal participation in the training, analysts evaluate the successful passing of the practice scenario and propose final recommendations. The article also describes the criteria for successfully passing the practiced scenario and its final evaluation.