The Importance of Vow

This chapter addresses the role of vows in Buddhist ethics. Vows generate new moral perspectives, as well as new agent-relative moral considerations. Among the vows addressed are the lay vows, monastic vows, bodhisattva vows, and tantric vows. The chapter discusses the diverse Buddhist interpretations of the metaphysical status of vows, and the ways that they transform one’s moral landscape, changing the ethical status of actions. Also addressed here are the binding power of vows, including the roles of both initial intention and admitted exceptions, and the effects of transgressions, including atonement and confession, and the phenomenon of returning vows.

The metaphysics of perception: enactivism, phenomenology and information.

Enactivism is a major research programme in the philosophy of perception. Yet its metaphysical status is unclear, since it is claimed to avoid both idealism and realism yet still has aspects of both within it. One attempt to solve this conundrum is based on the fusion of enactivism with phenomenology and the mathematical concept of symmetry breaking (Moss Brender, 2013). I suggest this is not entirely successful and propose it needs the addition of a multi-level, non-reductive metaphysics (for example, Informational Structural Realism). The processes we commonly call ‘perception’ are causal transfers of information at certain levels in the hierarchy of meaningful structures that comprise physical reality. Phenomenologists could use the word ‘perception’ metaphorically across all levels, although realists need not do so.

Technological Multistability and the Trouble with the Things Themselves

Following Husserl, phenomenologists and “postphenomenologists” often use a rhetoric of getting back to the “things themselves.” However, open questions remain about how we should understand the metaphysical status of the technologies that we encounter. These questions remain especially open for perspectives such as postphenomenology (and sister accounts such as feminist new materialism, and actor-network theory), with their commitments to an ontology of relations. One way forward is through a deeper consideration of the postphenomenological notion of “multistability,” the idea that technologies always support multiple meanings and uses. Including a detour through Jean-Paul Sartre’s example of the letter opener, I explore what it can mean for technological multistability to constitute a jumping-off point for analysis, rather than a conversation stopper. The “things themselves” are a fine investigative target to be sought. Nevertheless, we should prepare for the possibility that we may find something else.

The Shape of the Statue

This paper discusses the metaphysical status of artefacts and their forms in the ancient commentators on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Specifically, it examines the Peripatetic tradition and Alexander of Aphrodisias to then turn to the commentaries of the late Neoplatonist Asclepius of Tralles, and the Byzantine commentator Michael of Ephesus. It argues that Alexander is the pioneer of the interpretation of artefactual forms as qualities and artefacts as accidental beings. The fortune of this solution goes through Asclepius and Michael to influence Thomas Aquinas.

Why the Debate about the Metaphysics of Biological Species Should Not Be Deflated

Some philosophers of biology state that the metaphysical status of biological species is context determined by the use different branches of biology make of their corresponding proper names, so that one and the same biological species can be both an individual and a natural kind. In this paper, I aim to undermine the idea, often associated with the present thesis, according to which the debate about the metaphysical status of biological species should be deflated, since it would be possible to translate every sentence from natural-kind talk to individual-talk and vice versa. I offer a charitable interpretation of the principle grounding such an idea and show how it is in tension with independent theoretical biological notions.

Preserving Destruction: Philosophical Issues of Urban Geosites

This article examines the philosophical issues that arise when preserving urban geological sites or urban geosites. These are preserved not only because of their geological value but also because of aesthetic, cultural, and economic reasons. To do so, it examines the geosite constituted by Olot and its surroundings, a city in Spain that extends amid four dormant volcanoes. It explores the metaphysical paradox that these geosites have become what they are due to the preservation of destruction: human-caused interventions, mostly extraction of materials and exploitation of the land, are precisely what made these geosites visible as sites worth preserving and determining their metaphysical status. It further explores the preservation criteria and shows how they have determined the status of the geosite. Second, it shows how in such urban geosites the collapse of two diametrically opposed conceptions of time – the geological eon and the lived human time – occurs. Lastly, it discusses aesthetic aspects of such geosites by considering aesthetic experience as a primarily cognitive endeavor and shows how metaphysical, epistemological, and aesthetic issues of preservation of geosites are inextricably linked.

The socio-normative nature of representation

This article tries to offer a different perspective on the issue of what it means for some physical structure to be a representation. In the first sections, it will be shown how and why this issue is still far from settled. This will be done by emphasizing the—what I will call—metaphysically promiscuous character of representation. For although representations are typically assumed to be some sort of physical objects or structures, on closer inspection, the notion of representation is used in such a variety of ways that its fundamental metaphysical status is far from obvious. Proceeding from these observations, it will be argued that, even though “representation” pre-theoretically indeed often picks out objects, their representational status is best not understood in terms of their physical properties or their causal-functional profile. It will be argued that, what it means for some physical structure to be—as a matter of fact—a representation, only first becomes intelligible in relation to certain socio-normative practices in which the cognitive capacity to relate to something as something it is not is prescriptively called upon. Moreover, an answer to the oft-heard question of what makes something (i.e., some physical object or structure) a representation is readily available, provided we take into account certain cognitive abilities, as well as a socio-normative context in which these abilities are normatively regulated. It will be concluded that at the fundamental metaphysical level, the phenomenon of representation is best understood as a triadic relation which involves, but does not reduce to, certain physical objects or structures. Finally, this socio-normative account of representation will be compared with two dominant notions of representation within cognitive science: symbolic representation and S-representation.

A Study of Surgery to Change Genitals in Humans (Transsexuals) according to Max Scheler

Introduction: One of the developments in modern science today is a surgery to change genitals in humans. This has become an important issue in society because of the pros and cons. The most opposed groups are religious groups. Some countries have legalized this action while others have not. The backgrounds of people deciding to change their genitals are twofold: first, because they feel they are in the “wrong body” where their behavior is contrary to the genitals they have. Second, the development of genital devices is not perfect. That is why an axiology study needs to be made on the decision to change the genitals in humans. Axiology itself means the science or theory of the nature of values ​​which investigates values ​​in terms of their nature, their size, and their metaphysical status relating to their usefulness. In axiology, Max Scheler gave four levels of value, namely: (1) The value of “enjoyment” or “pleasure” (agreeable) and “dislike” or “displeasure” (disagreeable); (2) The value of vitality or welfare or life (vital feeling); (3) Spiritual values; (4) Holiness or holy value. Of the four values ​​of Max Scheler, it was found that the decision to change the genitals in humans does not have the essence of any value except just the value of enjoyment or pleasure. Result:That is, this kind of action actually denies the nature of existing values. The value of enjoyment obtained through sex change surgery is actually only “mortal” or for a moment enjoyment because it is precisely the disappointment that appears at the end. It is just the lowest value out of four. Discussion: Therefore, the author suggested that those who feel themselves trapped in the “wrong body” are better off doing psychiatric and religious therapy so that the nature of the values ​​that they have can be developed rather than making changes to the genitals.

“The sound erects white churches in lands…”: Towards the Philosophy of the Sound and the Name in the Poetic Consciousness of S.A. Yesenin

The article makes the first attempt to analyze the philosophy of the sound and the name in the poetic consciousness of S.A. Yesenin. The article argues that in Yesenin’s poem I will not be wandering about… the female image becomes the personification of the ideal prototype of the world, the carnal-symbolic embodiment of the ‘light mystery’: Yesenin gives the female principle a metaphysical status, so sound and name in their physical and material shell become elusive carriers of the superreal divine essence of the world. Another conclusion of the analysis is that one of the sources of the idea of sound as a carrier of the grace of God for Yesenin was N.A. Klyuev poetry. Through his mediation Yesenin accepted the concept of Imiaslavie (‘praising the name’) that sound and name can bring the traces of the divine. The work also compares two articles: Andrey Bely’s Aaron’s rod and Sergey Yesenin’s Father’s word. It concludes that the main opposition of Yesenin’s article (‘humpbacked word with a broken spine’ and a word as a ‘bailer’ to draw the water of life out of nothing) origins from Andrey Bely’s Aaron’s rod, as well as Yesenin’s idea of ‘unsigned word’.

Is Group Ontology Morally Distracting? A Natural Law Approach to Corporate Religious Liberty

In recent years, a variety of corporate litigants, from houses of worship to for-profit enterprises, have brought religious liberty suits to the US Supreme Court. Interestingly, the metaphysical status of such litigants has been subject to intense debate by judges and commentators alike. Are these litigants corporate moral persons or mere aggregates of individuals? How, if at all, does their metaphysical status affect our assignment of corporate rights to religious freedom? While many have entertained such questions, others reject them as morally distracting. This article challenges that latter position. Drawing upon the natural law tradition, I argue that group ontology can be used in the assignment of corporate rights in a morally illuminating way. I point out the tradition’s distinctive ontology, which views groups primarily as social actions, subject to moral evaluation. I then discuss how this conception moves attention away from polarizing rights-based discourse towards measured consideration of what is morally right. Finally, I show how this ontology helps practical reasoning to discover a variety of (non-rights-based) reasons and means to protect religious freedoms as well as other moral stakes. Far from causing moral distraction, a natural law group ontology facilitates careful moral deliberation.