Institutional Commitment Problems and Regional Autonomy: The Catalan Case

This article examines what constitutional arrangements are more likely to facilitate the transfer of effective decision-making power to the regional level. We show that certain constitutional arrangements can result in institutional commitment problems between regional minority and national majority groups, which in turn influence levels of regional autonomy across regions. Specifically, we examine how the depth and scope of decentralization depend on the presence of federal agreements and the availability of institutional guarantees that make the federal contracts credible. Analyzing regional-level data, we show that regions where identity minority groups are majoritarian enjoy more regional autonomy when the commitment problem has resulted in a satisfactory national accommodation. Our findings highlight two important scenarios. The first occurs when the institutional commitment problem is solved, and regional minority groups are granted substantial levels of regional autonomy. The second scenario takes place when the commitment problem is not institutionally accommodated, and hence regional minority groups have systematically lower levels of autonomy. This article illustrates that both federal contracts and credible agreements are important tools to understand regional decision-making powers.

The Origins of Affirmative Action

This chapter examines the origins of affirmative action in the University of Michigan (UM). The pressure that led to the university's first undergraduate affirmative action admissions program came from a federal bureaucrat and the president of the United States, who were both responding to black activism for workplace justice. Yet this pressure never threatened UM with the loss of lucrative federal contracts or potential court cases. UM adopted affirmative action in 1964 because people at the top of the institution wanted the university to change. This environment of weak federal coercion created a perfect recipe for co-optation. After the initial dose of federal pressure, UM officials took control of the purpose and character of affirmative action, creating a program that preserved the university's long-established priorities and values. It is no surprise, then, that between 1964 and 1967, black enrollment rose from only 0.5 to 1.65 percent of the student body. However, given that African Americans constituted more than 10 percent of the state population, affirmative action made a small dent in the racial disparities at UM.

Competition and Federal Contractor Performance

Contracts are increasingly used in government as a way to insert competition into public agencies and policy implementation. Competition among contractors is theorized to drive down costs, encourage innovation, and boost accountability. However, there have been few studies on whether competition actually leads to improved performance among contractors. This analysis examines nearly 25,000 federal contracts to determine how competition is related to performance. Findings indicate that competitively sourced contracts are more likely to suffer from performance problems. However, relationships between contractor and agency correlate with fewer performance problems. This suggests that competition may not be leading to the benefits that many might expect. Instead, relationships and shared experiences, along with other factors, may matter more when seeking to improve contractor performance.

On the Anti-Bribery “Watchlist”: Compliance and Labor/Anti-Trafficking Issues

Today’s companies must understand and prevent the myriad problems flowing from labor issues. Increasingly demanding, serious compliance attention and resources are now being focused on the emerging area of human anti-trafficking and forced labor laws and regulations as they relate to business supply chains. These mandates include the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, the Executive Order on Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking in Persons in Federal Contracts, and the UK Modern Slavery Act of 2015. By enlisting or conscripting companies into the fight against human trafficking, child labor, and other “forced” or “coerced” labor practices, these laws introduce a wholly new compliance reality requiring accountability and supply chain compliance.

Contract Design, Complexity, and Incentives: Evidence From U.S. Federal Agencies

Financial incentives are used throughout the public and private sectors to control costs, expedite projects, maximize quality, and encourage performance. Although federal agencies in the United States utilize incentive contracts, there is little research on the scope of their use or effectiveness. This study analyzes nearly 390,000 federal contracts across service acquisitions of varying complexity to determine whether incentive contracts differ in contract duration, cost, or technical performance when compared with other types of contracts. The results indicate that contracts appear to execute differently on these three dimensions based on the complexity of the acquired service. The findings provide a heightened understanding of the accountability dynamics in third-party implementation, particularly when financial incentives are used to motivate contractor performance.