skeptical hypothesis
Recently Published Documents


TOTAL DOCUMENTS

13
(FIVE YEARS 1)

H-INDEX

2
(FIVE YEARS 0)

2021 ◽  
pp. 35-56
Author(s):  
Michael Bergmann

This chapter examines multiple kinds of deductive and nondeductive anti-skeptical arguments from our sensory experience to the likely truth of our perceptual beliefs based on that evidence and finds them all wanting. In the first two sections, it briefly considers deductive anti-skeptical arguments (of the theological and transcendental variety), inductive anti-skeptical arguments from past correlations of sensory experience with true perceptual beliefs based on it, and anti-skeptical arguments based on a priori knowledge of probabilistic principles saying that our sensory evidence for our perceptual beliefs makes probable the truth of those beliefs. In the final three sections, the focus turns to abductive or inference to the best explanation (IBE) arguments, which are currently the most popular anti-skeptical arguments. IBE anti-skeptical arguments conclude that our sensory experience, or some feature of it, is best explained by the truth of our perceptual beliefs. These three sections argue that we lack good reasons for thinking that our sensory experience is better explained by a Standard Hypothesis (saying that the world is approximately as it seems) than by a skeptical hypothesis, such as the hypothesis that a deceptive demon wants to mislead us into falsely believing the world is as it seems.



2020 ◽  
pp. 333-352
Author(s):  
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

Transcendental arguments against skepticism claim that the skeptical argument depends on the falsehood or the unbelievability of the skeptical hypothesis. This chapter argues that the skeptic needs to presuppose the moral or practical rationality of the subject, requiring the existence of an external world with certain features (strongest arguments), the falsehood of the skeptical hypothesis (strong arguments), or the subject’s belief in such a world (weak arguments). The argument starts with rational agency and investigates the sense of moral obligation, moral motives, and virtues that would exist in “vat morality,” arguing that although the skeptic needs to presuppose the rational and moral agency of the subject, the skeptical hypothesis denies or undermines the subject’s agency. The chapter ends by considering whether the skeptic can retreat to Pyrrhonian skepticism to save the skeptical project, concluding that he cannot.



Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Melchior

Sensitivity is a modal epistemic principle. Modal knowledge accounts are externalist in nature and claim that the knowledge yielding connection between a true belief and the truthmaker must be spelled out in modal terms. The sensitivity condition was introduced by Robert Nozick. He suggests that if S knows that p, then S’s belief that p tracks truth. Nozick argues that this truth-tracking relation can be captured by subjunctive conditionals. As a first approximation, he provides the following modal analysis of knowledge: S knows that p iff (1) p is true; (2) S believes that p; (3) if p were false, S wouldn’t believe that p and (4) if p were true, S would believe that p. The dominant terminology in the literature, also adopted here, is to call condition (3) the sensitivity condition and condition (4) the adherence condition. The sensitivity condition is intuitively appealing since it states that a subject does not know that p if she would believe that p even if p were false. Nozick used the sensitivity condition to accomplish two major tasks. First, he provided a solution to the Gettier problem by arguing that in Gettier cases subjects do not know since the sensitivity condition is violated. Second, he presented a controversial solution to the skeptical problem according to which we have external world knowledge but do not know that the skeptical hypothesis is false. This solution is available because sensitivity is not closed under known entailment. Quickly, criticism of the sensitivity condition emerged. First, most epistemologists regarded the price of abandoning knowledge closure as a price too high to pay. Second, it was noted that sensitivity leads to the counterintuitive consequence of precluding us from inductive knowledge since induction typically yields insensitive beliefs. The most dominant reaction to these problems was to replace sensitivity by the modal principle of safety, nowadays the most popular modal principle. However, sensitivity is not only important as a starting point of modal epistemology. Because of its intuitive attractiveness, many authors aimed at refining the original sensitivity account in order to avoid well-known problems. This has led to a second wave of sensitivity accounts. As of today, various sensitivity-based theories are on the market, including accounts that avoid closure failure, probabilistic interpretations of sensitivity and adherence, and contextualist approaches. There is thus a vivid and ongoing debate about the sensitivity principle in epistemology.



Author(s):  
Wendy Beth Hyman

“The Erotics of Doubt” contends that the carpe diem trope whose classical form was an expression of pragmatic Epicureanism became, during the religious upheaval of the Reformation, an unlikely but effective vehicle for articulating religious doubt. For a diverse group of early modern poets, an encounter with ancient theories of essence and substance enabled the articulation of a skeptical hypothesis almost impossible to imagine in any other cultural venue. The unassuming carpe diem trope, that is, parlays classical physics’ materialist paradigm into a robust discourse founded entirely upon the presumption of mortality. The chapter shows that the erotic invitation’s discursive environment—its pitting of assaultive rhetorician against naïve virgin—is inherently confrontational. It reveals, through readings of Herrick, Marlowe, Ralegh, and others, that the dynamic structure that propels a lusty speaker towards consummation is latent with rhetorical and dramatic potentiality. To explore these issues, the chapter turns to Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure, whose central crisis is generated by a series of unwelcome invitations made to the play’s singular virgin, pressed to surrender her chastity in order to spare her condemned brother from execution. The cloud of unredeemed death that hangs over the play forces a “measurement” of that chastity as weighed against the evocative materialist nightmare it fails to redeem.



2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
Justin Remhof

The radical skeptic argues that I have no knowledge of things I ordinarily claim to know because I have no evidence for or against the possibility of being systematically fed illusions. Recent years have seen a surge of interest in pragmatic responses to skepticism inspired by C.S. Peirce. This essay challenges one such influential response and presents a better Peircean way to refute the skeptic. The account I develop holds that although I do not know whether the skeptical hypothesis is true, I still know things I ordinarily claim to know. It will emerge that although this reply appears similar to a classic contextualist response to radical skepticism, it avoids two central problems facing that response.



2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  

AbstractDoris argues that our choices are heavily influenced by forces that we wouldn't count as genuine reasons. This unsettling conclusion is motivated by a debunking argument so wide-ranging that it isn't foisted upon us by the sciences. Doris sometimes seems to lower his ambitions when offering instead a skeptical hypothesis argument, but that conflicts with his aims in the book.



2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-56
Author(s):  
Philip Atkins

Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul suggest a version of skepticism according to which the skeptic posits a distinct skeptical hypothesis for each external world proposition that a person claims to know. In a recent issue of this journal, Eric Yang argues against this piecemeal approach. In this note, I show that Yang’s argument against piecemeal skepticism is fallacious.



2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Yang
Keyword(s):  

Rather than advancing a global skeptical hypothesis, Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul construct a skeptical strategy in which they posit a plurality of skeptical hypotheses for distinct propositions that someone claims to know. I show that such “piecemeal” skepticism fails, suggesting that the skeptic is better off sticking with a global skeptical hypothesis.





Noûs ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 559-595 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan Frances
Keyword(s):  


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document