Arguing about Free Will

I explore some issues in the logics and dialectics of practical modalities connected with the Consequence Argument (CA) considered as the best argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. According to Lewis (1981) in one of the possible senses of (in)ability, the argument is not valid; however, understood in the other of its possible senses, the argument is not sound. This verdict is based on the assessment of the modal version of the argument, where the crucial notion is power necessity (“no choice” operator), while Lewis analyses the version where the central notion is the locution “cannot render false.”Lewis accepts closure of the relevant (in)ability operator under entailment but not closure under implication. His strategy has a seemingly strange corollary: a free predetermined agent is able (in a strong, causal sense) to falsity the conjunction of history and law. I compare a Moorean position with respect to radical skepticism and knowledge closure with ability closure and propose to explain Lewis’s strategy in the framework of his Moorean stance.

Intuitionist Particularism: An Introduction

This chapter lays out an account of the particularist approach to epistemological inquiry and develops a version of it in terms of epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about epistemic value (such as justification or knowledge). It begins by briefly reviewing the history of particularism, from Thomas Reid through G. E. Moore to Roderick Chisholm, and then gives a clear statement of the particularist methodology. The remaining sections elaborate the view, giving pride of place to epistemic intuitions, which is why the resulting view is called ‘intuitionist particularism.’ Particularism in epistemology (which tends to be endorsed by commonsense anti-skeptics) puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about particular cases and which of our beliefs are rational. It stands opposed to methodism, which is typically endorsed by proponents of radical skepticism and puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about principles that say what’s required for a belief to be rational. In their extreme forms, these positions occupy two ends of a spectrum. The position advocated in this chapter is a moderate one that leans toward the particularist end of the spectrum, in a way that is compatible with both internalism and externalism in epistemology.

Ecumenical Noninferential Anti-skepticism

This chapter employs the intuitionist particularist approach laid out in Chapters Six and Seven to develop an ecumenical noninferential anti-skeptic’s response to the underdetermination arguments (considered earlier in the book) for radical skepticism about perception, memory, a priori intuition, introspection, and reasoning. The sense in which this response is ecumenical is that it can easily be endorsed by both internalists and externalists in epistemology. The chapter concludes by arguing that, despite the ecumenical nature of this anti-skeptical response to radical skepticism, one lesson of the book so far is that there is a sense in which “externalism” of a certain kind (acceptable to both internalists and externalists alike) wins the day.

Intuitionist Particularism: Elucidations and Defenses

This chapter elucidates and defends intuitionist particularism, which is introduced in Chapter Six. Sections 1 and 2 focus on seemings, elucidating the nature of epistemic intuitions understood as seemings and defending the reliance of intuitionist particularism on seemings. These sections present a detailed account of what seemings are and respond to various objections to seemings playing a role in philosophical work. Sections 3 and 4 elucidate the goal of the intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism (noting that it is not intended to convert the skeptic) and defend the respectability of that commonsense response against the charges that it fails to engage the skeptic or to take radical skepticism seriously.

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition rejects argument-based attempts to resist radical skepticism and advocates, instead, for noninferential intuition-based commonsense resistance inspired by the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. The book begins by setting aside closure-based arguments for radical skepticism and focusing on the more fundamental underdetermination arguments, which highlight the problematic gap between our evidence and our beliefs that are based on that evidence despite their truth being underdetermined by it. The rejected argument-based response to skepticism aims to provide good noncircular arguments from the evidence on which we base our ordinary beliefs (e.g. our perceptual and memory beliefs) to the conclusion that those beliefs are true or at least probable. Part I of the book finds all such anti-skeptical arguments wanting. Part II lays out and defends a unique version of the commonsense Reid-inspired response to radical skepticism, with two distinctive features. The first is its self-conscious, explicit, and extensive reliance on epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about the nature and exemplification of epistemic goods (such as justification or knowledge). The second is that it is ecumenical in the sense that it can be endorsed without difficulty by both internalists and externalists in epistemology. Part III of the book responds to objections to the commonsense reliance on epistemic intuitions proposed in Part II, with special attention given to challenges from underdetermination, epistemic circularity, disagreement, and experimental philosophy.

Introduction

After concisely highlighting the book’s main themes, this chapter explains why it is important to think about responses to radical skepticism, and provides an overview of the book and its key concepts. First, it identifies three reasons it is worthwhile to devote time to thinking about how best to respond to radical skepticism. These reasons are that it enables us to consider (in a more informed way) our options for dealing with less radical forms of skepticism (e.g. moral or religious skepticism), it affects our stance on a multitude of other positions in epistemology and other subfields in philosophy, and it is intrinsically interesting. Second, this chapter provides a detailed overview of the book’s contents, noting that Part I objects to argument-based resistance to radical skepticism, Part II defends noninferential commonsense epistemic-intuition-based resistance to radical skepticism, and Part III responds to objections to epistemic intuition (on which the approach to skepticism, developed in Part II, heavily relies). Third, it clarifies three key concepts that play an important role in the book—skepticism, justification, and evidence—by distinguishing a variety of understandings of each concept and highlighting the ones that are relevant to the book’s content.

Epistemic Intuition and Experimental Philosophy

This chapter considers the skeptical objection to epistemic intuition that is based on experimental philosophy, which aims to use the methods of cognitive science to conduct experimental investigations of the psychological processes underlying people’s intuitions about central philosophical issues. Section 1 carefully lays out this objection, identifying the crucial premises on which it relies. Section 2 considers how strong this objection needs to be if it is to be successful, arguing that stronger objections are needed if the beliefs the objections are intended to undermine are rationally held with a high degree of confidence (as appears to be the case with the beliefs based on epistemic intuition that are targeted by this objection). Section 3 examines the objection from experimental philosophy in detail, noting that each of its crucial premises faces serious challenges, with the result that it is not strong enough to undermine the intuitionist particularist anti-skeptic’s reliance on epistemic intuitions. Section 4 draws together the various argumentative strands in the book and situates the book’s conclusions in a moderate commonsense tradition that avoids the extremes of both dogmatism and radical skepticism.

Ridiculous Beliefs, Irresponsible Beliefs, and Anti-skeptical Evidence

This chapter identifies three more potential problems (in addition to the one discussed in Chapter Nine) for the commonsense intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism laid out in Chapters Six through Eight, and argues that none of these three alleged problems constitutes an insurmountable objection to commonsense anti-skepticism. The first additional problem is the Problem of Ridiculous Beliefs, according to which noninferential anti-skepticism is committed to approving of a way of responding to skepticism even if that way of responding to skepticism were used to defend ridiculous beliefs. The second is the Problem of Irresponsible Beliefs, according to which unperturbed persistence in endorsing beliefs undefended by argument (e.g. perceptual beliefs), in the face of obvious skeptical possibilities, is epistemically irresponsible. The third is the Problem of Anti-skeptical Evidence, which objects to the view (endorsed by the intuitionist particularism laid out in Chapters Six through Eight) that many of our justified beliefs in anti-skeptical propositions are based on good evidence. The worry behind this last alleged problem is that, even if people can have justified belief in anti-skeptical propositions (i.e. propositions that assert the falsity of radical skeptical hypotheses), there are good reasons for concluding that these sorts of beliefs cannot be based on good evidence. The chapter concludes that, after careful examination of all three problems, commonsense intuitionist particularism emerges unscathed.

Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity

This chapter argues that the commonsense intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism laid out in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight does not fall prey to the Problem of Easy Knowledge, which can also be called the ‘Problem of Epistemic Circularity.’ The core concern here is that one can’t rationally rely on a belief source to justify the belief that that very belief source is trustworthy or reliable because that would be too easy, as well as circular. The chapter concedes that this sort of epistemic circularity is often problematic, yet argues that this is not true in general, but only in certain specified circumstances. It explains how epistemic circularity (which is disparaged largely on the basis of intuitions) can be defended both by arguments and by intuitions. And it uses these defenses to respond to the Problem of Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity and to explain why it seems threatening even though it isn’t.