direct anonymous attestation
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2021 ◽  
pp. 1-57
Author(s):  
Lydia Garms ◽  
Siaw-Lynn Ng ◽  
Elizabeth A. Quaglia ◽  
Giulia Traverso

When peers rate each other, they may rate inaccurately to boost their own reputation or unfairly lower another’s. This could be mitigated by having a reputation server incentivise accurate ratings with a reward. However, assigning rewards becomes challenging when ratings are anonymous, since the reputation server cannot tell which peers to reward for rating accurately. To address this, we propose an anonymous peer rating system in which users can be rewarded for accurate ratings, and we formally define its model and security requirements. In our system ratings are rewarded in batches, so that users claiming their rewards only reveal they authored one in this batch of ratings. To ensure the anonymity set of rewarded users is not reduced, we also split the reputation server into two entities, the Rewarder, who knows which ratings are rewarded, and the Reputation Holder, who knows which users were rewarded. We give a provably secure construction satisfying all the security properties required. For our construction we use a modification of a Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme to ensure that peers can prove their own reputation when rating others, and that multiple feedback on the same subject can be detected. We then use Linkable Ring Signatures to enable peers to be rewarded for their accurate ratings, while still ensuring that ratings are anonymous. Our work results in a system which allows accurate ratings to be rewarded, whilst still providing anonymity of ratings with respect to the central entities managing the system.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Liquan Chen ◽  
Tianyang Tu ◽  
Kunliang Yu ◽  
Mengnan Zhao ◽  
Yingchao Wang

Privacy protection and message authentication issues in VANETs have received great attention in academia. Many authentication schemes in VANETs have been proposed, but most of them are based on classical difficult problems such as factorization in RSA setting or Elliptic Curve setting and are therefore not quantum resistant. If a quantum computer becomes available in the next few decades, the security of these schemes will be at stake. This paper presents a vehicular lattice-based direct anonymous attestation (V-LDAA) scheme adopting an optimized signature scheme based on automorphism stability which achieves postquantum security. A distributed pseudonym update and vehicle revocation mechanism based on the lattice is introduced in this paper, which means vehicles can update their pseudonyms and revoke the identity certificate by themselves without the need for pseudonym resolutions or CRLs checking. Compared with the existing lattice-based attestation schemes in VANETs, computation costs during signing and verification operations in V-LDAA are no longer related to the number of users, which makes it suitable for large-scale VANETs. Security analysis shows that V-LDAA resists TPM theft attacks and provides users with user-controlled anonymity, user-controlled unlinkability, and unforgeability against quantum adversaries. Experimental results show that V-LDAA reduces the blind signature size by 18%. The speed of blind signing is increased by 30%, and blind verification operation is accelerated 3 times compared with the existing lattice-based direct anonymous attestation (LDAA) scheme.


Author(s):  
Benjamin Larsen ◽  
Thanassis Giannetsos ◽  
Ioannis Krontiris ◽  
Kenneth Goldman

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 2260-2275
Author(s):  
Kang Yang ◽  
Liqun Chen ◽  
Zhenfeng Zhang ◽  
Christopher J. P. Newton ◽  
Bo Yang ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Stephan Wesemeyer ◽  
Christopher J.P. Newton ◽  
Helen Treharne ◽  
Liqun Chen ◽  
Ralf Sasse ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 99 ◽  
pp. 425-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nada El Kassem ◽  
Liqun Chen ◽  
Rachid El Bansarkhani ◽  
Ali El Kaafarani ◽  
Jan Camenisch ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Jorden Whitefield ◽  
Liqun Chen ◽  
Ralf Sasse ◽  
Steve Schneider ◽  
Helen Treharne ◽  
...  

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