Man against machine: Debates in the expert community on the lethal autonomous systems

In the recent years debates surrounding the autonomous weapons systems development and regulation have gained a new momentum. Despite the fact that the development of such type of weapons continues since the twentieth century, recent technological advances open up new possibilities for development of completely autonomous combat systems that will operate without human in-tervention. In this context, international community faces a number of ethical, legal, and regulatory issues. This paper examines the ongoing debates in both the Western and the Russian expert community on the challenges and prospects for using lethal autonomous systems. The author notes that Russian and Western discourses on most of the issues have very much in common and diff erences are found mainly in the intensity of debates — in the West they are much more ac-tive. In both cases the most active debates focus around two issues: the potential implications of fully autonomous weapons systems including the unclear line of accountability, and the prospects for international legal regulation of the use of lethal autonomous weapons. Both the Russian and the Western experts agree that the contemporary international humanitarian law is unable to handle the challenges posed by aggressive development of the lethal autonomous weapons. All this points to the need to adapt the international humanitarian law to the new realities, which, in turn, requires concerted actions from leading states and international organizations.

International Law and Weapons Review

International law requires that, before any new weapon is developed, purchased or modified, the legality of its use must be determined. This book offers the first comprehensive and systemic analysis of the law mandating such assessments – Article 36 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Underpinned by empirical research, the book explores the challenges the weapons review authorities are facing when examining emerging military technology, such as autonomous weapons systems and (autonomous) cyber capabilities. It argues that Article 36 is sufficiently broad to cover a wide range of military systems and offers States the necessary flexibility to adopt a process that best suits their organisational demands. While sending a clear signal that law should not simply follow technological developments, but rather steer them, the provision has its limits, however, which are shaped and defined by the interpretative decisions made by States.

Autonomous Weapon Systems In International Humanitarian Law – Simply Just Another Weapon System

<p>This paper reviews the arguments made by the opponents of the utilization at all of so called autonomous weapons (killer robots), on the basis of alleged inherent non compliance with certain cardinal principles of IHL, against the argument that said weapons or systems, and their use, can be satisfactorily accommodated under existing IHL. It gives an overview of the issues identified by the opponents and the main arguments made in favour of banning autonomous weapons. The author looks at the characteristics of two weapon systems and concludes there are already fully autonomous weapon systems in non contentious use. The author submits that the concerns of the banning authors are not rational, the purported distinctions made between certain weapon systems cannot factually and consistently be maintained and are based on the averred existence of categories of weapons that do not exist. Finally, the author argues that the opponents’ concerns and arguments are in the main and based on the normal uncertainties, inherent in all factually to be determined situations and also on slippery slope reasoning. The author emphasises the established rules of IHL and opines that the same are adequate to regulate the so called autonomous weapons and weapon systems and any liability arising from their use.</p>

Autonomous Weapon Systems In International Humanitarian Law – Simply Just Another Weapon System

<p>This paper reviews the arguments made by the opponents of the utilization at all of so called autonomous weapons (killer robots), on the basis of alleged inherent non compliance with certain cardinal principles of IHL, against the argument that said weapons or systems, and their use, can be satisfactorily accommodated under existing IHL. It gives an overview of the issues identified by the opponents and the main arguments made in favour of banning autonomous weapons. The author looks at the characteristics of two weapon systems and concludes there are already fully autonomous weapon systems in non contentious use. The author submits that the concerns of the banning authors are not rational, the purported distinctions made between certain weapon systems cannot factually and consistently be maintained and are based on the averred existence of categories of weapons that do not exist. Finally, the author argues that the opponents’ concerns and arguments are in the main and based on the normal uncertainties, inherent in all factually to be determined situations and also on slippery slope reasoning. The author emphasises the established rules of IHL and opines that the same are adequate to regulate the so called autonomous weapons and weapon systems and any liability arising from their use.</p>

Maturing Autonomous Cyber Weapons Systems

This chapter identifies significant policy and military intersections between the evolving international cybersecurity and autonomous weapons systems (AWS) policy regimes that should receive deeper policy attention. So far, within policy discussions on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), there seems to have been less focus on related cyber implications compared with other policy questions. This is mirrored within the international cybersecurity policy community where AWS, maturing autonomous cyber technologies, and component technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) have not yet garnered extensive attention publicly. So far, most of the focus on AWS has centred on physical platforms for land, sea, air, space, and undersea, and not the cyber domain. Discussions surrounding AWS have generally been held under the rubric of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Nevertheless, threat assessment reports and analysts are highlighting this subject more frequently. This chapter addresses these gaps by first unpacking the nature of so-called AWS and then highlighting a number of potential arms race considerations as well as consequences of the widespread adoption of autonomous technologies for warfare. It then proposes a framework to deal with the impact of autonomy on international security policies—namely strengthening technical safeguards and addressing the policy implications for international cyber stability. Lastly, the chapter argues for a need to ensure norm coherence and careful analysis of the implications arising from either banning or legitimizing maturing autonomous capabilities for international cybersecurity and AWS regimes.