Maturing Autonomous Cyber Weapons Systems

This chapter identifies significant policy and military intersections between the evolving international cybersecurity and autonomous weapons systems (AWS) policy regimes that should receive deeper policy attention. So far, within policy discussions on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), there seems to have been less focus on related cyber implications compared with other policy questions. This is mirrored within the international cybersecurity policy community where AWS, maturing autonomous cyber technologies, and component technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) have not yet garnered extensive attention publicly. So far, most of the focus on AWS has centred on physical platforms for land, sea, air, space, and undersea, and not the cyber domain. Discussions surrounding AWS have generally been held under the rubric of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Nevertheless, threat assessment reports and analysts are highlighting this subject more frequently. This chapter addresses these gaps by first unpacking the nature of so-called AWS and then highlighting a number of potential arms race considerations as well as consequences of the widespread adoption of autonomous technologies for warfare. It then proposes a framework to deal with the impact of autonomy on international security policies—namely strengthening technical safeguards and addressing the policy implications for international cyber stability. Lastly, the chapter argues for a need to ensure norm coherence and careful analysis of the implications arising from either banning or legitimizing maturing autonomous capabilities for international cybersecurity and AWS regimes.

Study on Micro Recoil Mechanism of the Weapon with a Nozzle and Two Chambers Separated by a Partition

In order to improve the recoil reduction ability of the weapon without reducing the projectile velocity, the weapon with a nozzle and two chambers separated by a partition is proposed. Taking the 35 mm caliber grenade launcher as the research object, the physical model of its launching process is proposed, and the one-dimensional two-phase flow interior ballistic model is established. MacCormack difference scheme is used to calculate the coupling of multiple physical fields formed by front and rear chambers and nozzles. Compared with the calculation results obtained by using the classical interior ballistic model, the correctness of the two-phase flow interior ballistic model is verified. The effects of the charge amount in the rear chamber and the size of the air guide hole in the barrel on the internal ballistic performance of the weapon with a nozzle and two chambers separated by a partition. The calculation results show that compared with conventional weapons, the recoil impulse can be reduced with maintaining muzzle velocity, and the recoil reduction efficiency can reach 72.27%, which is of great significance for improving weapon performance.

The United Kingdom and the European Union and their post-brexit trade in heavy conventional weapons

The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union in early 2020 brought new changes and challenges concerning also the heavy conventional weapons trade. Both the UK and the EU now have an opportunity to strengthen their position in the global conventional arms trade and revise territorial structures of their defence industries. The author attempts to analyse the positions of the United Kingdom and the European Union in the global heavy conventional arms trade over the past five years and to outline their future prospects after Brexit. The main source of the paper comes from quantitative data available in world databases monitoring conventional arms transfers as well as the UK’s new defence strategy.

Collective violence

War and other forms of armed conflict cause many adverse effects on health and the environment, including morbidity and mortality due to weapons; damage to the health-supporting infrastructure of society; contamination of air, water, and soil; forced displacement; violation of international agreements and human rights; diversion of resources; and promotion of additional violence. While conventional weapons account for the vast majority of fatal and non-fatal injuries during war, weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear and radiological weapons, chemical weapons, and biological agents) as well as antipersonnel landmines and unexploded ordnance pose additional threats. Public health workers and other health professionals can help to minimize the health and environmental consequences of war and other forms of armed conflict and to help end war itself. Categories of preventive measures include documentation; education and awareness-raising; advocacy and support for policies and programmes to minimize the consequences of, and help to reduce the risks of, war and other forms of armed conflict; and provision of preventive services. Public health frameworks of prevention can be useful in identifying opportunities for prevention and designing, implementing, and improving policies and programmes. These frameworks include levels of prevention (primary, secondary, and tertiary) and the host-agent-environment model.

Inadvertent escalation in the age of intelligence machines: A new model for nuclear risk in the digital age

Will AI-enabled capabilities increase inadvertent escalation risk? This article revisits Cold War-era thinking about inadvertent escalation to consider how Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology (especially AI augmentation of advanced conventional weapons) through various mechanisms and pathways could affect inadvertent escalation risk between nuclear-armed adversaries during a conventional crisis or conflict. How might AI be incorporated into nuclear and conventional operations in ways that affect escalation risk? It unpacks the psychological and cognitive features of escalation theorising (the security dilemma, the ‘fog of war’, and military doctrine and strategy) to examine whether and how the characteristics of AI technology, against the backdrop of a broader political-societal dynamic of the digital information ecosystem, might increase inadvertent escalation risk. Are existing notions of inadvertent escalation still relevant in the digital age? The article speaks to the broader scholarship in International Relations – notably ‘bargaining theories of war’ – that argues that the impact of technology on the cause of war occurs through its political effects, rather than tactical or operational battlefield alterations. In this way, it addresses a gap in the literature about the strategic and theoretical implications of the AI-nuclear dilemma.

Nuclear Issues

The world is closer to catastrophic, accidental nuclear war than it has been in decades. The successful regimes for arms control and nonproliferation, constructed by diplomats and scientists during the Cold War, have been undermined and deconstructed without serious efforts to replace them. The gravity of the nuclear threat is not widely recognized. Hundreds of nuclear missiles are ready for launch on a few minutes’ notice in accordance with the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Political leaders are increasingly willing to threaten to use nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons blur once-clear distinctions between atomic and conventional weapons, eroding the taboo against using nuclear weapons. Hypersonic missiles, autonomous weapons, and artificial intelligence make it easier to blunder into nuclear war. Nuclear issues require detailed understanding and respect for the interactions of science, technology, and world affairs. An annex to the chapter gives a brief introduction to nuclear science and technology.

Duration of Intrastate Wars of Attrition: The Causal Impact of Military Build-Ups

Scientific knowledge on the effectiveness of governmental military build-ups to terminate intrastate conflicts is sparse and inconclusive. Developing a war-of-attrition framework, we derive the impact of governments' armaments on the duration of these conflicts: military build-ups, as reflected in inflows of major conventional weapons, enable the government to inflict costs onto its adversaries, forcing them to withdraw earlier from the conflict. This type of weapons is required in particular to project military power over larger distances and to fight rebels in remote areas. Using SIPRI arms transfer data for the first time in a disaggregated dyadic design, covering 418 government-rebel group dyads in 134 conflicts, we empirically corroborate the formal model's predictions. As endogeneity issues might arise when governments procure arms in anticipation of a protracted conflict, we ensure causal identification with an instrumental variable survival approach based on the Aalen additive hazards model.

Export Control Regimes—Present-Day Challenges and Opportunities

The system of export control regimes is an important instrument to prevent the proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. However, this system faces several structural and recent challenges. The regimes are informal, and consequently, their measures are non-binding upon states. Second, the regimes consist of a selective group of countries, excluding some dominant arms exporters. New technology is rapidly changing the military field, and it is difficult for the export control regimes to keep up with these developments. Further, most of the regimes were designed when states were the most important international actors while currently legitimate and illegitimate non-state actors play an ever-increasing role for export controls. In addition, it is unclear how the regimes will advance with the multipolar world order of the twenty-first century. All new developments could lead to the proliferation of weapons, making efforts to prevent proliferation more relevant than ever. There are several opportunities to reform and strengthen the export control regimes. Cooperation could help the regimes to remain relevant. The sharing of good practices can help the regimes to find the least disruptive and effective non-proliferation measures. Setting up a paradigm-based regime instead of a weapon-based regime may be more suitable for the future. In addition, a revision of the decision-making process would help the regimes to respond swiftly to developments in the field.