Knowledge from Perceived Indicators and Background Knowledge

The focus is on knowing that something is so by perceiving something that indicates that it is so. It is argued that some of our knowledge of this sort is more akin to perceptual knowledge than might at first appear. This is because recognition figures in two ways. We recognize the indicating phenomenon as being of a certain sort and we recognize the indicative significance of the indicator. The view is shown to be compatible with taking the knowledge in question to be evidence-based. An alternative model—the covering generalization model—is critically discussed. Since generalizations do figure in our thinking about indicators, their status is discussed. This leads into a more general discussion of standing factual knowledge that touches on public knowledge and picks up themes from Moore and Wittgenstein.

Perception and the Justification of Belief

The discussion in this chapter is critical of theories that treat experiences, conceived in a non-relationalistic fashion, as evidence for beliefs, as in the work of Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. It is also critical of James Pryor’s theory of immediate justification. Judgements implicated in recognition, being exercises of general recognitional abilities, are regarded as rationally responsive to ways the world is. Justification for beliefs acquired in acts of recognition is provided by truths as to what one perceives to be so. An account is given of our access to such truths, and objections to the view of justification are addressed. Affinities with, and differences from, views advanced by John McDowell are explored, with particular attention given to his conceptions of experience. Implications for empiricism are drawn out.

Going By What We Know

We have knowledge and often know that we have it. It is argued that epistemology should be guided by what we know about knowledge and not simply by so-called intuitions. This theme is worked out within a broader discussion of method in epistemology. Considerations motivating resistance to such a view are discussed, including the Russellian Retreat mentioned by Crispin Wright and the quest to understand human knowledge in general discussed by Barry Stroud. Sources of puzzlement about how we can have knowledge of our environment are identified. A positive lesson—the limits to self-understanding—is drawn from Stroud. Arguments from Ignorance (by Sceptical Hypotheses) in support of scepticism are critically discussed. It is suggested that the right response to scepticism is to show what is mistaken about the theories that underpin it.

Abilities

Perceptual knowledge is viewed as a paradigm of knowledge in virtue of so clearly exemplifying cognitive contact with a fact in an act—recognition—in which reason reaches out to the fact itself. This outlook is contrasted with that on which the work of reason is confined to forming a belief that might or might not be true in a manner that reliably but not infallibly yields true beliefs. The latter outlook is implicit in strands of virtue epistemology, notably in work of Greco and Sosa. It is argued that we should not attempt to explicate recognitional abilities in terms of more basic abilities that bear directly on the justification of belief or in terms of more basic belief-forming dispositions. Some complexities concerning the individuation of recognitional abilities are explored.

Abilities, Competences, and Fallibility

The account of recognitional abilities is situated within a broader perspective on general abilities, beginning with those exercised in doing things intentionally, like riding a bicycle. The success thesis—that abilities are exercised only in doing what the ability is an ability to do—is shown to be compatible with (i) there being success-rate abilities that account for being good at hard performances that one does not bring off whenever one tries, even in favourable circumstances, and (ii) there being abilities that one can be exercising even if one does not complete the doing of the thing that the ability is an ability to do (e.g., making an omelette). Recognitional abilities are not exercised by intentional actions but in acts that are, nonetheless, directed. They yield to analogous treatment. Contrasts with John McDowell’s conception of rational capacities and with Ernest Sosa’s conception of competences are considered.

Justified Belief, Reasons, and Evidence

Normative reasons for belief—reasons to believe something—are constituted by truths or facts. Such reasons are distinguished from motivating reasons for belief, that is, reasons for which a subject believes something. These are constituted by considerations that the subject treats as reasons to believe. One has a justified belief, in the sense of a well-founded belief, only if the considerations that constitute one’s motivating reason are truths that one knows. Evidence-based knowledge that P is explicated in terms truths or facts that provide an adequate reason to believe that P. It is argued that not all knowledge is evidence-based, and suggested that we need to make sense of the idea that evidence adequate for knowledge is clinching evidence. The discussion addresses a problem raised by Jennifer Hornsby about the distinction between normative and motivating reasons.

Epistemology and Philosophical Method

Mainstream epistemology has aimed to provide reductive analyses of knowledge in terms of conditions on belief. Kinds of knowledge, for instance, perceptual knowledge and knowledge from testimony, are supposed to be explicated by drawing on the general analysis. This chapter outlines an alternative approach to epistemological method that aims to provide substantive accounts of knowledge of particular kinds and to illuminate knowledge in general in terms of those accounts. A case is made for the claim that those enquiring into the truth of some matter should aim at knowledge, and indeed reflective knowledge. It is argued that although epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge it should be sensitive to how the concept of knowledge figures in our thinking. Fruitful conceptual enquiry need not aim to provide analyses of concepts.

Perceptual Knowledge and Recognitional Abilities

Recognizing a thing as being some way from its appearance to some sense-modality is knowing that it is that way from that appearance. It is the exercise of a general ability to tell of things that are the way in question that they are that way from the way they appear. The ability is exercised only if the subject succeeds in that respect. Our fallibility in relation to those abilities consists in our not always exercising them whenever we make a judgement directed at recognition. For things to be recognized as being of some kind from their appearance, the environment has to be favourable to the exercise of the relevant ability. It will be so only if the appearance of things of the kind is distinctive of being of the kind. The view does not depend on the assumption that experiences have representational content in any rich sense.

Perception, Experience, and Direct Realism

Direct Realism is the thesis that our perception of mind-independent things is routinely direct. It is true if and only if, routinely, our perception of mind-independent things is not by means of perceiving something that is distinct and separate from those things. This chapter defends Direct Realism. It begins with an examination of reasons that have been given in the past for rejecting it, focusing on Hume and G. E. Moore. There follows a discussion of relationalist versus non-relationalist conceptions of perceptual experience. Particular attention is given to reconciling a non-relationalist conception with Direct Realism. To this end discussion is focused on how perception facilitates perceptual–demonstrative thought. An important role is played by a view of how to understand non-committal descriptions of experiences. This view figures in a response to problems raised by Michael Martin for non-relationist conceptions of experience.