Collateral Shocks

We estimate a macroeconomic model on US data where banks lend to households and businesses and simultaneously adjust lending requirements on the two types of loans. We find that the collateral shock, a change in the ability of the financial sector to redeploy collateral, is the most important force driving the business cycle. Hit by this unique disturbance, our model quantitatively replicates the joint dynamics of output, consumption, investment, employment, and both household and business credit quantities and spreads. The estimated collateral shock generates accurate movements in lending standards and tracks measures of market sentiment. (JEL E21, E23, E24, E32, E44, G21)

Lending standards, productivity, and credit crunches

We propose a macroeconomic model in which adverse selection in investment amplifies macroeconomic fluctuations, in line with the prominent role played by the credit crunch during the financial crisis. Endogenous lending standards emerge due to an informational asymmetry between borrowers and lenders about the riskiness of borrowers. By using loan approval probability as a screening device, banks ration credit following increases in lending risk, generating large endogenous movements in TFP, explaining why productivity often falls during crises. Furthermore, the mechanism implies that financial instability is heightened when interest rates are low.

Lending Standards and Borrowing Premia in Unsecured Credit Markets

Using administrative data from Y-14M and Equifax, we find evidence for large spreads in excess of those implied by default risk in the U.S. unsecured credit market. These borrowing premia vary widely by borrower risk and imply a nearly flat relationship between loan prices and repayment probabilities, at odds with existing theories. To close this gap, we incorporate supply frictions – a tractably specified form of lending standards – into a model of unsecured credit with aggregate shocks. Our model matches the empirical incidence of both risk and borrowing premia. Both the level and incidence of borrowing premia shape individual and aggregate outcomes. Our baseline model with empirically consistent borrowing premia features 45% less total credit balances and 30% more default than a model with no such premia. In terms of dynamics, we estimate that lending standards were unchanged for low risk borrowers but tightened for high risk borrowers at the outset of Covid-19. Borrowing premia imply a smaller increase in credit usage in response to a negative shock, which this tightening reduced further. Since spreads on loans of all risk levels are countercyclical, all consumers use less unsecured credit for insurance over the cycle, leading to 60% higher relative consumption volatility than in a model with no borrowing premia.

Do investors value frequent issuers in securitization?

We assess the value of frequent issuers to investors in securitization markets by examining the initial yield spread of 6132 European mortgage-backed securities (MBS), covering a 20-year period between 1999 and 2018. We find that frequent issuers have certification value, and it increases as the credit cycle approaches its peak, as lending standards loosen, and information asymmetries in securitization markets increase. Investors value frequent issuers more favourably on riskier, difficult to evaluate MBS. We find that after the great financial crisis (GFC), investors began to attribute more value to frequent issuers, regardless of MBS credit quality. We also find that in the pre-crisis period, investors required higher yields to compensate for perceived rating shopping, which is not observed after the GFC. Finally, we show that investors expect higher yields on deals closed by subsidiaries of foreign banks.