The Impact of the Introduction of Uniform European Collective Action Clauses on European Government Bonds as a Regulatory Result of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

This paper conducts an empirical study on the inclusion of uniform European Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts issued from member states of the European Union, introduced as a regulatory result of the European sovereign debt crisis. The study focuses on the reaction of sovereign bond yields from European Union member states with the inclusion of the new regulation in the European Union. A two-stage least squares regression analysis is adopted in order to determine the extent of impact effects of CACs on member states sovereign bond yields. Evidence is found that CACs in the European Union are priced on financial markets and that sovereign bond yields do respond to the inclusion of uniform CACs in the European Union.

Do Enhanced Collective Action Clauses Affect Sovereign Borrowing Costs?

This paper analyzes the effects of including collective action clauses (CACs) and enhanced CACs in international (nondomestic law-governed) sovereign bonds on sovereigns’ borrowing costs, using secondary-market bond yield spreads. Our findings indicate that inclusion of enhanced CACs, introduced in August 2014, is associated with lower borrowing costs for both noninvestment-grade and investment-grade issuers. These results suggest that market participants do not associate the use of CACs and enhanced CACs with borrowers’ moral hazard, but instead consider their implied benefits of an orderly and efficient debt resolution process in case of restructuring.

The Restructuring Process

This chapter goes into depth on the debt restructuring process itself, a topic which has not been covered in the literature in detail before. It gives a step-by-step outline of how restructurings take place, from deciding on the appropriate strategy, to determining which debt should be covered and in what way; to engagement with creditors in the negotiating process. It also covers one of the main structural problems in reaching an agreement with creditors—the collective action problem—and explores ways by which such problems can be overcome with both private creditors (collective action clauses, exit consents) and the official sector (the role of the Paris Club).

Sovereign Reputation and Yield Spreads: A Case Study on Retroactive Legislation

This paper uses recent legislation in Austria to establish a link between sovereign reputation and yield spreads. In 2009, Hypo Alpe Adria International, a bank previously co-owned by the regional government of Carinthia, had been nationalized by Austria’s central government in order to avoid a default triggering multi-billion Euro local government guarantees. In 2015, special legislation retroactively introduced collective action clauses allowing a haircut on both the bonds and the guarantees while avoiding formal default. We document that legislative and administrative action designed to partly abrogate the guarantees resulted in a loss of reputation, leading to higher yield spreads for sovereign debt. Our analysis of covered bonds uncovers an increase in yield spreads on the secondary market and a deterioration of primary market conditions.

A Taxonomy of Challenges to Sovereign Debt Restructurings

Chapter 7 presents a taxonomy of challenges to the outcomes of sovereign debt restructuring, i.e. in what cases private creditors may argue that the restructurings was abusive, oppressive or otherwise invalid and has to be eviscerated accordingly. The starting point here is that the afflicted minority bondholder may challenge the abusive application of collective action clauses, at least in actions couched against the majority of bondholders that put the collective action clauses to use. The source of that power is the obligation of the majority to exercise its broad powers in good faith for the benefit of all bondholders and not to oppress minority bondholders. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the various iterations of this idea in respect of different collective action clauses.