Aristotle, Eleaticism, and Zeno’s Grains of Millet

This paper explores how Aristotle rejects some Eleatic tenets in general and some of Zeno’s views in particular that apparently threaten the Aristotelian “science of nature.” According to Zeno, it is impossible for a thing to traverse what is infinite or to come in contact with infinite things in a finite time. Aristotle takes the Zenonian view to be wrong by resorting to his distinction between potentiality and actuality and to his theory of mathematical proportions as applied to the motive power and the moved object (Ph. VII.5). He states that some minimal parts of certain magnitudes (i.e., continuous quantities) are perceived, but only in potentiality, not in actuality. This being so, Zeno’s view that a single grain of millet makes no sound on falling, but a thousand grains make a sound must be rejected. If Zeno’s paradoxes were true, there would be no motion, but if there is no motion, there is no nature, and hence, there cannot be a science of nature. What Aristotle noted in the millet seed paradox, I hold, is that it apparently casts doubt on his theory of mathematical proportions, i.e., the theory of proportions that holds between the moving power and the object moved, and the extent of the change and the time taken. This approach explains why Aristotle establishes an analogy between the millet seed paradox, on the one hand, and the argument of the stone being worn away by the drop of water (Ph. 253b15–16) and the hauled ship, on the other.

Arnau Vilanova i la concepció de la medicina com a ciència aristotèlica

Arnau considered medicine to be an Aristotelian science, grounded on natural philosophy. However, he did not link medicine to philosophical speculation but rather con-ceived it as an art, a technique to be practiced by following Aristotelian principles. The ability and experience of the physician were fundamental to producing knowledge.

Institutioni Scholasticae Minime Accommodata

This contribution reconstructs the controversy between Gerard de Neufville (1590-1648) and Johann Clauberg about the comparative merits of Bacon and Descartes in the university classroom. This controversy had a crucial pragmatic dimension, evaluating the question of how Baconian and Cartesian philosophical projects could meet the pedagogical needs of the university as an educational institution. The exchange between de Neufville and Clauberg shows that textbooks of natural philosophy contain important discussions of pedagogical practice. De Neufville fears that a revolution of natural philosophy along Baconian lines may well take centuries. But professors still need something to teach to students. Therefore, he envisions a Baconian philosophia nov-antiqua that reintroduces certain aspects of Aristotelian science into a broadly Baconian empirical investigation of nature. Clauberg’s criticism of his teacher focuses on two perceived weaknesses. First, Baconian doubt renders natural philosophy unteachable; while Cartesian doubt does not, because it can be dissolved comparatively quickly. Second, de Neufville’s evolutionary approach may inadvertently convey false doctrines to students, thereby preventing their epistemic progress. The only defence against unexamined opinions is the suspension of judgment. Besides that, he argues, de Neufville’s pragmatic worries are unfounded: Cartesians are successful professionals in theology, medicine, and in the university itself.

Physical earth and its sciences in Istanbul: a journey from pre-modern (Islamic) to modern times

Researching, compiling and analysing geophysical ideas and measurements in historical periods will contribute to the historical development of earth science. Also, this is important for geophysicists working on time-dependent (historical) data and revealing the physical properties of the earth. This paper is focused on the earth and its sciences (with concepts, ideas and measurements) in classical Islamic science in the Ottoman Empire and the evolution of these thoughts and concepts in the context of the transition to modern science. The pre-modern period of science in Islamic geographies is represented by Aristotelian science and some original contributions. In the geophysical sciences of the Ottoman Empire, earthquakes and weather events are explained by his views and ideas. Modern concepts and scientific measurements of geophysical events such as magnetic, seismologic and meteorologic events were systematically begun by observatories. Before this, there are some individual measurements.

The struggle is nothing new

The question of tension between scientific study and religious commitment is examined through two historic examples: the impact of Aristotelian physics on thirteenth-century Europe, and the motion of the Earth argued by Copernicus and Galileo. Aristotelian physics was constructed from ideas around change, form, and substance, which together implied the physical universe must have existed into the infinite past. This conflicted with religious ideas about time itself having been brought into being in the finite past. Bonaventure wished to reject Aristotelian science, but others such as Averroes and Aquinas adopted a more nuanced view, in which the meaning of statements is to be drawn with reference to their context. Something similar happened in the resolution of the seventeenth-century dispute about Earth’s motion. From the perspective of Einstein’s General Relativity, statements about motion, including accelerated motion, are never absolute but always relative to frame of reference.