Duty to Read vs Duty to Disclose Fine Print. Does the Market Structure Matter?

Firms use standard contracts and possibly include unfavorable fine print which consumers may read at some positive cost. We propose a comparison between a monopoly and a perfect competition market under (1) an unregulated legal regime (duty to read) and (2) a regulation that mandates clause disclosure (duty to disclose). If consumers bear the duty to read contract terms, regardless of market structure, sellers disclose in equilibrium only if it is cheaper than reading for consumers. Conversely, if sellers bear the duty to disclose contract terms, then such regulation is never welfare improving in either market; it may turn out to be consumer protective only if there are several sellers, whereas it is uneffective on this regard in a monopoly.

To understand a meta-analysis, best read the fine print.

The results of a meta-analysis are more than just the reported odds ratio, 95% confidence interval, and P value. Of equal importance is the fine print of the study which should include assessment of risk of bias, certainty in evidence, and heterogeneity in the individual point estimates and confidence intervals. These areas all have influence on the quality of the data in the analysis. Reading and understanding the fine print is important.

Contracts of Inattention

The standard paradigm of contracting assumes that parties will revise subsequent contracts if a court interpretation of a clause does not reflect their intent. This assumption, however, often does not match behavior—particularly, in boilerplate contracts. We examine the aftermath of an (in)famous 2016 case, Wilmington Savings Fund v. Cash America, to unpack possible reasons for this mismatch between theory and practice. We find evidence of a phenomenon in contracts that involves sophisticated parties who are nevertheless not represented by their own lawyers, lack full awareness of the fine print of the contractual terms, and, having devoted little attention to them, may be eclectic as to their meaning when they enter into these contracts. In these contracts, which we call contracts of inattention, a gap between lawyers’ understanding of a provision and the understanding of market participants is prone to emerge. The potential for such gaps has implications for how courts should interpret contracts of inattention and for how market participants will react to court rulings.