The United States Position towards the Battle of Al-Karameh and its Repercussions, March 21, 1968

This paper explores the United States' position towards the battle for Al-Karameh and its repercussions on the 21 March 1968. It argues that even though American policy has always been completely biased in favor of Israel since Israel's founding on 15 May 1948, its position on the battle of Al-Karameh was at the time considered supportive of Israel, balanced with Jordan, and hostile to Palestinian organizations. The United States position in the research relies mainly on the documents of the US State Department (Foreign Relations of the United States FRUS) and on some of the minutes of the Israeli parliament (Knesset) sessions (Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee meetings). This research dealt with an introduction to the crystallization of the Palestinian resistance after the defeat of the Arabs in the Six-Day War of 1967 as well as the policy of the United States towards the region after this war, its position on the escalation of Palestinian resistance from inside Jordan, and the dialectic of Jordan's control of its territories and borders. It also dealt with the incident of the bombing of the Israeli bus on 18 March 1968, and the escalation of tension, which eventually led to Israel attacking Jordan in the battle for Al-Karameh on 21 March 1968, the initial American reaction to it, and the subsequent issuance of Security Council Resolution 248 and its implications. It further dealt with the official American position after the battle ended, its support for the efforts of the Jarring Peace Mission in the region, and its policy of balancing its positions between Israel and Jordan. In conclusion, reference was made to the most important results of the research.

The Perils of Perfectionism: American Reaction to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals

In the debate that followed the release of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals in 1944, the US government vigorously promoted the idea of international organization, partly due to fears of a resurgent isolationism. Yet as the debate progressed, it became clear that isolationism was not the main enemy, and concerns that the USA would not engage at all with the UN proved unfounded. Instead, the most active critics of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were not those who wished to ignore the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, but those who wanted to perfect them. Calls for a more perfect international union came from across the political spectrum and for different reasons. Ultimately, the Roosevelt administration recognized that perfectionism was an issue that threatened the peace process. Fearing a repeat of the rejection of the League of Nations, the Roosevelt administration worked tirelessly to share the message of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals to the American people. But that message was mostly a cautious one, highlighting that while the proposed UN was not perfect, it was the best option for peace.