The threshold of awareness as an empirical given and as a logical inevitability

The nature of the sensory threshold and approaches to solving the threshold problem in psychophysics are discussed. There were presented experimental results, empirical facts that do not fully correspond to existing psychophysical theories and do not receive an explanation in line with modern approaches. It was concluded that the explanation of the thresholds without description of the participation of consciousness raises doubts. A new look at the nature of thresholds is proposed, in which the threshold is considered as an inevitable consequence of the processes of classification and categorization. Due to the fact that the operations of identification of the non-identical and discernment of the indiscernible are mandatoryin the act of cognition, a zone is formed, within which objectively different elements are identified in consciousness andrelate to the same class. This zone exists across the entire spectrum of cognitive tasks, including detection and discrimination. Thresholds fix the boundaries of this zone. Thus, the problem of the threshold requires a description of the work of not so physiological as cognitive mechanismsfor its solution.

Form friction factor of armored riverbeds

Resistance to flow because of the presence of bed forms over armored riverbeds is of paramount importance, leading to the effective design of water-resources-related projects. Based on the findings over bed armored surfaces, it is shown that the controlling roughness (ks) can be taken as equal to the median diameter of the armor layer. Analytical methodologies for total and grain friction factors have been proposed here that take flow non-uniformity into account using the velocity distribution and friction slope. The percentage composition of form friction factor in the total friction factor was estimated to be 40%. The results were explained in light of the coupling of the sediment threshold problem with the friction factor and coarse-grain rearrangement in armor layer. The computed form friction factor by proposed method was compared with Keulegan’s method and is found to give satisfactory results, showing 80% agreement of all field data sets.

Religious Experience, Pragmatic Encroachment, and Justified Belief in God

The secondary literature on religious epistemology has focused extensively on whether religious experience can provide evidence for God’s existence. In this article, I suppose that religious experience can do this, but I consider whether it can provide adequate evidence for justified belief in God. I argue that it can. This requires a couple of moves. First, I consider the threshold problem for evidentialism and explain pragmatic encroachment (PE) as a solution to it. Second, I argue that religious experience can justify belief in God if one adopts PE, but this poses a dilemma for the defender of the veridicality of religious experience. If PE is true, then whether S has a justified belief in God on the basis of religious experience depends on how high the stakes are for having an experience with God. This requires one to determine whether the stakes are high or low for experiencing God, which puts the experient of God in an awkward position. If the stakes are not high, then justified belief in God on the basis of religious experience will be easier to come by, but this requires conceding that experiencing God is not that important. If the stakes are high, then the experient can maintain the importance of experience with God but must concede that justified belief in God on the basis of experience with God is less likely to happen, perhaps impossible.

The Threshold Problem, the Cluster Account, and the Significance of Knowledge

The threshold problem is the task of adequately answering the question: “Where does the threshold lie between knowledge and lack thereof?” I start this paper by articulating two conditions for solving it. The first is that the threshold be neither too high nor too low; the second is that the threshold accommodate the significance of knowledge. In addition to explaining these conditions, I also argue that it is plausible that they can be met. Next, I argue that many popular accounts of knowledge cannot meet them. In particular, I lay out a number of problems that standard accounts of knowledge face in trying to meet these conditions. Finally, near the end of this paper, I argue that there is one sort of account that seems to evade these problems. This sort of account, which is called a cluster account of knowledge, says that knowledge is to be accounted for in terms of truth, belief and a cluster of epistemic properties and also that knowledge doesn't require having all members of the cluster, but merely some subset.

The Value of Fallible Knowledge

This chapter attempts to solve the “threshold problem”: how to provide a plausible account of what fixes the threshold (level, degree) of justification (evidence, probability, warrant, supporting ground) for knowledge in a nonarbitrary way that also makes sense of the perceived value of knowledge. Epistemologists have been largely silent about how strong the justificatory component of fallible knowledge must be. Indeed, nothing like a precise specification of this level of justification has ever been seriously suggested, let alone more widely endorsed. This chapter attempts to answer this challenge. By appealing to the hypothesis that the concept of knowledge is used to identify reliable informants, we can determine the level of justification required for fallible knowledge. Further, we may explain why this level of justification has the significance that makes knowledge valuable. This chapter also explores the alleged payoffs of rejecting fallibilism and shows these benefits to be illusory.