Skepticism and the Point of Knowledge

This chapter explores the relationship between philosophical skepticism and the concerns of daily life. The aim is to show that function-first epistemology can augment an argument against skepticism. The force of the skeptic’s argument, as well as our desire to reject the skeptical conclusion, is explained in the following way: our need to share information pushes us to accept stricter epistemic standards that might logically end at skepticism, but practical factors encourage us to formulate standards that stop short of skepticism. This tension creates an area of indeterminacy in which controversies about skepticism take place. This chapter explains the persuasive power of skepticism while also explaining why skeptical worries do not (and should not) threaten our everyday knowledge.

The Value of Fallible Knowledge

This chapter attempts to solve the “threshold problem”: how to provide a plausible account of what fixes the threshold (level, degree) of justification (evidence, probability, warrant, supporting ground) for knowledge in a nonarbitrary way that also makes sense of the perceived value of knowledge. Epistemologists have been largely silent about how strong the justificatory component of fallible knowledge must be. Indeed, nothing like a precise specification of this level of justification has ever been seriously suggested, let alone more widely endorsed. This chapter attempts to answer this challenge. By appealing to the hypothesis that the concept of knowledge is used to identify reliable informants, we can determine the level of justification required for fallible knowledge. Further, we may explain why this level of justification has the significance that makes knowledge valuable. This chapter also explores the alleged payoffs of rejecting fallibilism and shows these benefits to be illusory.

The Point of Knowledge

This chapter provides a preliminary statement and defense of the book’s central hypothesis, namely: the purpose of the concept of knowledge is to identify reliable informants. This hypothesis is used to yield a systematic account of knowledge and knowledge claims. We start with the idea of an individual inquirer who needs an informant to satisfy her own need for information; then we imagine a more complex situation in which a community of individuals collaborate to pool and share information. As our interest in information becomes more socially directed, it becomes vital that we identify individuals who are sufficiently reliable for members of our community. After outlining this thought, this chapter defends it from objections. For example, what should we say about people who seem not to qualify as reliable informants and yet clearly have knowledge? Also, does this view lead to skepticism? And doesn’t all this rely on dubious quasi-historical postulations? This chapter provides answers to these (and other) questions.

Impure Knowledge

This chapter defends “communal impurism.” According to this view, a true belief amounts to knowledge partly due to practical (or nonepistemic) factors. “Communal impurism” is based on our need to identify reliable informants to members of our community. Knowers must be sufficiently reliable to serve as actionable sources of information for members of their community, yet impurists claim the level of justification required for knowledge is partly fixed by an individual’s practical reasoning situation. Thus, a knower must meet a communal standard for knowledge and yet the threshold for knowledge is partly determined by an individual’s practical reasoning situation. These ideas are reconciled in the following way: there is a communal standard for knowledge that is needed to promote a deep kind of coordination in our epistemic practices, and yet an individual’s stakes may trump the communal standard when it is not sufficiently demanding for the relevant practical reasoning situation.

What’s the Point of Understanding?

This final chapter extends the function-first approach to human understanding. It is argued that the concept of understanding serves the practical function of identifying good explainers, which is an important dimension of epistemic evaluation. This hypothesis throws light on a variety of issues, including the role of explanation in understanding, the relationship between understanding and knowledge, epistemic luck, and the value of understanding. This chapter also argues that understanding and knowledge play different social roles: roughly, knowledge is closely tied to answering our need for true beliefs, whereas understanding answers our need for good explanations. Everyday inquiry is typically aimed at true beliefs, which is why knowledge matters, but sometimes we need more than just true beliefs to get by in the world, which is why understanding is valuable.

Epistemic Pragmatism

What is the correct semantic account of “knows”? This is a hotly debated question in epistemology. Scholars have recently appealed to putative facts about the purpose of knowledge ascriptions to adjudicate this dispute. This chapter raises doubts about the viability of this strategy. A radical proposal is suggested, namely, that the entire debate about the semantics of “knows” mistakenly presupposes that we should account for the meaning of epistemic claims by determining their truth conditions. A more natural way to approach the meaning of epistemic claims, however, is to ask what practical functions they serve us in communicating with each other. Drawing on the work of J. L. Austin, this chapter articulates a view called “epistemic pragmatism.” If this proposal is correct, it will undercut a variety of popular theories and could potentially reorient contemporary debates about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions.

Methodologies in Epistemology

This chapter outlines the method of “function-first epistemology” and highlights some of its benefits. This method involves three broad steps: we start with a prima facie plausible hypothesis about the role of some epistemic concept (norm, practice) in human life; then we try to determine what a concept (norm, practice) having this role must be like; finally, we examine the extent to which the concept (norm, practice) we have described matches our everyday judgments. To highlight what is distinctive and fruitful about function-first epistemology, this approach is compared to four alternatives: reductive conceptual analysis, knowledge-first epistemology, reverse engineering epistemic evaluations, and epistemological naturalism. Each of these approaches is shown to face limitations that function-first epistemology does not. This meta-epistemological groundwork provides the basis for the rest of the book, which uses the function-first method to answer some of the most challenging questions in epistemology.

Introduction

This introductory chapter outlines the main aim of the book, which is to reveal the nature, purpose, and significance of knowledge by investigating why humans think and speak of knowing. Hannon calls this “function-first epistemology.” At the core of this book are two broad proposals. First, we can make progress in epistemology by taking a function-first approach. Second, the function of the concept of knowledge is to identify reliable informants (a practice that is vital for human survival, cooperation, and flourishing). These ideas are borrowed from Edward Craig’s genealogy of knowledge, but Hannon also highlights some important differences between these two approaches. After situating “function-first epistemology” within the broader theoretical context, a summary of each chapter is provided. The introduction ends by encouraging scholars to apply this “function-first” methodology to other areas of philosophy.

Epistemic Diversity

This chapter provides a new argument against epistemic relativism. Traditionally, epistemological investigation has aspired to general conclusions. According to the epistemic relativist, however, the cognitive norms that determine what counts as knowledge (or whether a belief is rational, justified, etc.) vary with, and are dependent on, local conceptual or cultural frameworks. In recent years, experimental philosophers have claimed to provide empirical evidence for this sort of epistemic diversity. This chapter argues that the data actually supports the existence of a universal folk epistemology. This idea is further supported by providing a theoretical argument for why language users living in social communities would develop a cross-culturally (and cross-linguistically) shared concept of knowledge. More specifically, it is argued that all humans have certain basic practical needs that the concept of knowledge is used to satisfy, and we could not meet these needs without a word that is (near-) synonymous with “know.”

Pluralism about Knowledge

This chapter explores the possibility of “epistemic pluralism,” according to which the concept of knowledge serves multiple purposes. It has been suggested that the concept of knowledge plays each of the following roles: to signal the appropriate end of inquiry; to track the epistemic norm governing warranted assertion and practical reasoning; to distinguish between blameworthy and blameless behavior; to provide assurance to others; to encourage good testimony; and so forth. This chapter attempts to ascertain what the concept of knowledge must be like to accommodate all these plausible functions. It defends a version of epistemic pluralism that countenances the idea that we speak of knowing for a variety of purposes, but it also claims the primary purpose of the concept of knowledge is to identify reliable informants.