The specifi cs of Monotheism (tawhid) as “a thing-in-itself”. On the Evolution of Islamic Theology in the Late Russian Empire

In this paper, we will try to give a dynamic characterization of the object and the subject of Modern theology among the Tatar Muslims on the exemplar of the theological views of ‘Abdunnasīr Qursavi (1776–1812), Shihabutdin Marjani (1818–1889) and Murad Ramzi (1854–1934) (and partly of their contemporaries). The incognizability of the Creator and the faith as “a thing-in-itself” transformed Tatar Religious Epistemology into the cognition of more defi nite realities. Agnosticism in the question of God’s attributes led to the anthropocentric features of theological worldviews. The above-mentioned chain of theologians demonstrates not only the continuity of the Tatar Theology, but also refl ects the dynamics of the evolution of the attitude towards the madhhabs and towards the role of an individual, the specifi cs of the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidiya Sufi brotherhood, as well as the Ottoman ‘usul fi qh’ in the modernization period of the early XVIII century. In general, the works of Qursavi constitute a certain system of views that can be considered as a certain cornerstone, the so-called ‘starting point’ of Tatar School of Theology.

Substantiation of the Testimonial Knowledge in the Religious Epistemology: The Approach of J. Greco

Currently, the study of religious knowledge is carried out mainly within the framework of religious epistemology, which does not exclude its consideration from the standpoint of a non-cognitive approach, for example, fideism. However, the greatest interest is in cognitivism, whose proponents explore the problems of religious knowledge using a number of standards of classical epistemology, yet at the same time modify them, creating standards of religious epistemology proper. One of the authors who develop this direction is J. Greco, who continues the tradition of studying evidence ("testimonial evidence") and its role in the formation and functioning of religious consciousness. In an effort to organize witness knowledge, he tries to typologize it, distinguishing, on the one hand, knowledge presented as a set of witness data, and, on the other hand, as knowledge transmitted and assimilated in the processes of communication that take place, for example, within a religious community. J. Greco criticizes the arguments of skeptics who claim that it is impossible that the evidence can serve as a sufficient basis for religious belief. The article emphasizes the simplicity of such an approach, since J. Greco does not distinguish the types of knowledge that are formed as a result of evidence (in particular, reflexive and value-based knowledge, which are formed and assimilated in different ways), which are different in their epistemological characteristics. At the same time, he focuses on a problem that is significant not only for religious, but also for classical epistemology, namely, the influence of the moral authority of a particular form of comprehension of being (science, religion, etc.) and its specific representatives who develop the relevant knowledge on the assimilation of certain epistemic truths by both specialized communities (for example, the scientific community) and society as a whole. The philosophical arguments of J. Greco shows that the theme of religious evidence within the framework of classical epistemology is not reduced to banal statements that they do not meet the criteria generated by scientific knowledge. These reflections touch upon a number of topics relevant to this epistemology. At the same time, these arguments point to the need to develop a religious epistemology based on the specifics of religious knowledge with its own verification criteria and methodology for obtaining it.

Religious Disagreement and Pluralism

This volume explores many issues at the intersection of the epistemology of disagreement and religious epistemology. Epistemological questions about the significance of disagreement have advanced in concert with broader developments in social epistemology concerning testimony, the nature of expertise and epistemic authority, the role of institutions, group belief, and epistemic injustice, among others. During this period, related issues in the epistemology of religion have re-emerged as worthy of new consideration, and available to be situated with new conceptual tools. Does disagreement between, and within, religions, challenge the rationality of religious commitment? How should religious adherents think about exclusivist, inclusivist, and pluralist frameworks as applied to religious truth, or to matters of salvation or redemption? This volume engages in careful reflection on religious diversity and disagreement, offering ways to balance epistemic humility with personal conviction. Recognizing the place of religious differences in our social lives, it provides renewed efforts at how best to think about truths concerning religion.

Narrative and Truthfulness through the Body: Interpreting Mark Wynn

This short article responds to, and interprets, two epistemic claims made by Mark Wynn concerning truth and Christian ethics. The first claim concerns how the body knows something prior to an operation of reason. The second claim concerns the relationship between narrative and metaphysics, particularly when considering the eucharist. The article interprets these claims by drawing upon Wynn's previous work in religious epistemology, and it points to its moral and doctrinal relevance for Christian ethicists today.

Creencia y pertenencia: El laberinto de las sociedades posotomanas

Post-colonial coagulation is the dilemma of many societies in endless formation due to the aftermath of colonialism and the dominance of coloniality, and even more so when this aftermath has been converted into a never-ending labyrinth for political-Islamic anthropology, particularly in the Arab case. The present study primarily aims to analyze the emergence of Abrahamic religions among Arab tribes and their role in supplanting the canon of identity and belonging, forming a universal standard for legal identity substantially different from the European one, and overturning the ancient tribal concept. The study then shifts to analyz-ing the formation of Islamic ideology as positive law by means of an empirical parallelism with Roman law, thus introducing the Latin concept of interpolare. We therefore arrive at the conclusion of how foreign-colonial interference played the main role in diluting the identity canon and that of belonging, creating a false identity, shaped to conform to colonial compromises, wrapping religious epistemology in a forced normative system to have caused schizophrenia and cognitive resistance to power and normative disobe-dience, even prompting schizophrenia and an aversion to reality.

Are there de jure objections to Mādhvic belief?

Recently, Erik Baldwin and Tyler McNabb have brought Madhva's epistemological framework into active dialogue with Alvin Plantinga's religious epistemology and have argued that individuals within Madhva's tradition cannot make full use of Plantinga's epistemology, according to which, Christian belief resists de jure objections and can also have warrant. While I do not contest this specific claim, I demonstrate that an analysis of Madhva's epistemological framework reveals that this framework has its own resources through which it can resist de jure objections. I address various objections to the rationality of Mādhvic belief and conclude that there are no de jure objections to Mādhvic belief that are independent of de facto objections.