vague existence
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2021 ◽  
pp. 162-180
Author(s):  
Alessandro Torza

The chapter introduces and defends structural pluralism: the view that there is a plurality of ways of carving nature at the joints. The first part of the chapter argues that structural pluralism is able to meet a challenge to Ted Sider’s monism about joint-carving. The second part spells out the metaontological consequences of adopting structural pluralism, and shows that the view is compatible with a moderate form of deflationism about ontological disagreement. The third and last part fleshes out a number of consequences of adopting structural pluralism, and suggests further applications of that view, including a reassessment of an influential argument against vague existence.



Author(s):  
Roberto Loss

Alessandro Torza argues that Ted Sider’s Lewisian argument against vague existence is insufficient to rule out the possibility of what he calls ‘super-vague existence’, that is, the idea that existence is higher-order vague, for all orders. In this chapter it is argued that the possibility of super-vague existence is ineffective against the conclusion of Sider’s argument since super-vague existence cannot be consistently claimed to be a kind of linguistic vagueness. Torza’s idea of super-vague existence seems to be better suited to model vague existence under the assumption that vague existence is instead a form of ontic indeterminacy, contra what Ted Sider and David Lewis assume



Author(s):  
Alessandro Torza
Keyword(s):  


2017 ◽  
Vol 94 (4) ◽  
pp. 437-449 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Friedell
Keyword(s):  


Disputatio ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (33) ◽  
pp. 427-443
Author(s):  
Iris Einheuser

Abstract This paper explores a new non-deflationary approach to the puzzle of nonexistence and its cousins. On this approach, we can, under a plausible assumption, express true de re propositions about certain objects that don’t exist, exist indeterminately or exist merely possibly. The defense involves two steps: First, to argue that if we can actually designate what individuates a nonexistent target object with respect to possible worlds in which that object does exist, then we can express a de re proposition about “it”. Second, to adapt the concept of outer truth with respect to a possible world – a concept familiar from actualist modal semantics – for use in representing the actual world.





Noûs ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chad Carmichael
Keyword(s):  




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