What Counts as a ‘Good’ Metaphysical Language?

The objectively best language is intended to refer to some metaphysically privileged language that ‘carves reality at its joints’ perfectly. That is, it is the kind of language that various ‘metaphysical deflationists’ have argued is impossible. One common line of argument amongst deflationists is that we have no means to compare languages that all express true facts about the world in such a way to decide which is ‘better’. For example, the language is physics is not objectively better than the language of economics, as each language has the semantic purpose of expressing some domain of truths about the world inexpressible in the other language, and therefore neither could be ‘objectively best’. This chapter argues that metaphysical deflationists have failed to recognize a distinction between fine- and coarse-grained semantic purposes of languages, and that a recognition of that distinction provides us grounds to compare languages to see which is objectively best. It argues that once we recognize the distinction between fine- and coarse-grained semantic purposes, then we can see that it is relative to the coarse-grained purpose that we must compare putative objectively best ontological languages.

Introduction

Metametaphysics and metaontology are not new domains of inquiry. For as long as there has been metaphysical theorizing, there has been debate about the scope, methods, and limits of metaphysics. This collection of papers focuses on a particular set of metametaphysical and metaontological issues that arise because of the nature of language. In this introductory chapter, I outline in general terms some of the ways that views about the nature of language might influence our metametaphysical and metaontological commitments, such as the debate between substantive and deflationist metaontological views. This introduction also provides a brief summary of the central focus of the other chapters in this book.

Structural Pluralism

The chapter introduces and defends structural pluralism: the view that there is a plurality of ways of carving nature at the joints. The first part of the chapter argues that structural pluralism is able to meet a challenge to Ted Sider’s monism about joint-carving. The second part spells out the metaontological consequences of adopting structural pluralism, and shows that the view is compatible with a moderate form of deflationism about ontological disagreement. The third and last part fleshes out a number of consequences of adopting structural pluralism, and suggests further applications of that view, including a reassessment of an influential argument against vague existence.

Ontology by Stipulation

In previous work the author suggested that many ontological disputes can be viewed as merely verbal, in that each side can be charitably interpreted as speaking the truth in its own language. Critics have objected that it is more plausible to view the disputants as speaking the same language, perhaps even a special philosophy-room language, sometimes called Ontologese. This chapter suggests a different kind of deflationary move, in a way more extreme (possibly more Carnapian) than the author’s previous suggestion. The chapter supposes we encounter an ontological dispute between two sides, the A-side and the B-side, and we assume that they are speaking the same language so that (at least) one of them is mistaken (perhaps the common language is Ontologese). The author’s suggestion is that we can introduce by stipulation two languages, one for each side, such that in speaking the A-side stipulated language we capture whatever facts might be expressed in the A-side’s position, and in speaking the B-side stipulated language we capture whatever facts might be expressed in the B-side’s position. In this way we get whatever facts there might be in this ontological area without risking falsehood. A further part of the argument consists in explaining why the stipulation maneuver applies to questions of ontology but not to questions of mathematics (such as the Goldbach conjecture). One basic point is that mathematics has application to contingencies in a way that ontology doesn’t.

Are Ontological Questions Really Meaningless?

An influential critique of ontology, traditionally linked to Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricism, and verificationism, has it that ontological questions and statements are meaningless. In recent years, Amie Thomasson has revived this Carnapian critique, albeit in a non-verificationist version. This chapter argues that the meaningfulness of ontological statements can be vindicated by appealing to considerations compatible with Thomasson’s Carnapian approach. Two possible avenues are explored. The first is that of specifying the assertibility conditions of ontological statements like ‘There are Fs’, by providing an adequate rule of use. The second is that of spelling out the truth-conditions of the same ontological statements by means of a T-schema where the right-hand side is a sentence formulated in a language specifically introduced for doing ontology—what several authors call ‘Ontologese’. It is proposed that Ontologese be introduced as a bona-fide Carnapian framework, and this option is defended against a number of objections.

What “X Does Not Exist” Says About We Who Do Exist

An untruth can still be true where thus and such is concerned; no surprise there. What is perhaps surprising is that an unfalsehood can be false, when conceived as addressed to a certain subject matter. So it is with “The King of France is bald,” according to Strawson, understood as a claim about the bald people. Could “Vulcan exists” be like this? Though not false, because the term lacks a referent, it is nevertheless false about the existing things; it misdescribes them as including Vulcan. This is a misdescription because for every existing x, x is not Vulcan even if Vulcan exists. How can “x is not Vulcan even if Vulcan exists” be evaluated, though, when the name is empty? Just use the Ramsey Test. When we imagine the oracle saying, “Vulcan exists,” and consider on that basis whether Vulcan is, say, Saturn, the answer is clear.

Collapse and the Varieties of Quantifier Variance

The aim of this chapter is to bring clarity regarding the doctrine of quantifier variance (due to Eli Hirsch), and two prominent arguments against this doctrine, the collapse argument and the Eklund-Hawthorne argument. Different versions of the doctrine of quantifier variance are distinguished, and it is shown that the effectiveness of the arguments against it depends on what version of the doctrine is at issue. The metaontological significance of the different versions of the doctrine is also assessed. Roughly, quantifier variance concerns there being different possible existential quantifier meanings, and often the doctrine involves a claim to the effect there is no unique “best” quantifier meaning. Much of the discussion in the chapter concerns what it is to be an existential quantifier meaning in the sense at issue.

The Questions of Ontology

Despite its enduring influence, Quine’s account of how we should both understand and go about answering ontological questions has come under increasing fire in the recent metaontological literature. The focus here is on one important and influential critique of Quine’s views, due to Kit Fine (2009), who argues that Quine’s picture of ontology is thoroughly misguided insofar as it both misidentifies the subject matter of ontological questions and misconceives the appropriate methodology for pursuing ontological inquiry. Taking up the defence on behalf of Quine, the chapter argues that Fine’s central objections to the Quinean approach are unsuccessful since the Quinean is well positioned to both explain the apparent triviality of many existential questions and explain how ontological questions might remain open, even once everyday existence questions have been answered in the ordinary business of life.

Levels of Ontology and Natural Language

Two levels of ontology are commonly distinguished in metaphysics: the ontology of ordinary objects, or more generally ordinary ontology, and the ontology of what there really or fundamentally is. This chapter argues that natural language reflects not only the ordinary ontology but also a language-driven ontology, which is involved in the mass-count distinction and part-structure-sensitive semantic selection (as well as perhaps the light ontology of pleonastic entities in the sense of Schiffer). The language-driven ontology does not constitute another level of representation, but is taken to be a (selective) ontology of the real, given a plenitudinous or maximalist conception of reality. The language-driven ontology aligns closely with the functional part of grammar and a commitment to it is mandatory with the use of language. This gives rise to a novel view according to which part of ontology should be considered part of universal grammar on a broadened understanding. The chapter recasts the author’s older theory of situated part structures without situations, in purely ontological terms, making use of a primitive notion of unity.

Why Our Natural Languages Are Ideal Languages for Metaphysics

The chapter argues that our human natural languages are ideal languages for metaphysics and perfectly suited to represent all the facts that metaphysics might aim to find out. It presents an argument for this conclusion from considerations about language alone, without assuming anything about what metaphysics aims to do other than that it is concerned with questions of fact, and without assuming anything about what reality in general is like. A crucial consideration in support of this argument concerns the possibility of facts ineffable for us human beings. We can see from reflecting on our own talk about facts that ineffable facts are ruled out, and thus that our languages are ideal languages for representing reality. After discussing how an argument of this kind could possibly work, the chapter outlines some larger metaphysical issues that all this is related to.