The Non-existence of Foundational Truths

This chapter discusses problems that arise from the assumption that there is a final, ultimately true theory of the world and considers a variety of arguments (connected with the coherence theory of truth, semantic contextualism, and the denial of absolutely general quantification) against it. From this it follows that if there cannot be an ultimately true theory then it also cannot be ultimately true that the world has a non-wellfounded structure. This leaves us with a problem, for it appears as if the theory of the non-existence of the real world we defend in the book as a whole cannot be a final theory either. The chapter closes with a discussion of this final problem, together with some reflections on what the implications of the denial of ultimately true theories are for the ontological or philosophical enterprise more generally.

Interpretive Context, Counterpart Theory and Fictional Realism without Contradictions

Models for truth in fiction must be able to account for differing versions and interpretations of a given fiction in such a way that prevents contradictions from arising. I propose an analysis of truth in fiction designed to accommodate this. I examine both the interpretation of claims about truth in fiction (the ‘Interpretation Problem’) and the metaphysical nature of fictional worlds and entities (the ‘Metaphysical Problem’). My reply to the Interpretation Problem is a semantic contextualism influenced by Cameron (2012), while my reply to the Metaphysical Problem involves an extension and generalisation of the counterpart-theoretic analysis put forth by Lewis (1978). The proposed analysis considers interpretive context as a counterpart relation corresponding to a set of worlds, W, and states that a sentence φ is true in interpretive context W iff φ is true at every world (w∈W). I consider the implications of this analysis for singular terms in fiction, concluding that their extensions are the members of sets of counterparts. In the case of pre-existing singular terms in fiction, familiar properties of the corresponding actual-world entities are salient in restricting the counterpart relation. I also explore interpretations of sentences concerning multiple fictions and those concerning both fictional and actual entities. This account tolerates a plurality of interpretive approaches, avoiding contradictions.

Contemporary “Contextualism” and the Twilight of Representationalism

The chapter considers the bearing of contemporary semantic “contextualism”—as championed by philosophers such as David Lewis and Charles Travis—on the philosophical method of cases. In maintaining that the contribution a word makes to the overall sense of an utterance depends in part on the context of the utterance, contemporary contextualism already challenges the philosophical method of cases as commonly practiced. The chapter argues, however, that in holding on to the representationalist conception of language, contemporary contextualism does not go far enough in revealing the misguidedness of the philosophical method of cases. The chapter also argues that, though J. L. Austin has commonly been identified as a forefather of contextualism, his work actually points away from the representationalist conception of language to which contemporary contextualists are still committed.