The Question of Consent’s Scope

This chapter frames this book’s inquiry by discussing the question of what fixes the scope of consent and the methods to use in order to answer this question. The question of the scope of consent is a question about which moral changes are brought about by consent. When someone’s consent is valid, it releases the consent-receiver from duties. This book sets to one side the questions of which duties we have and which conditions must be met for consent to be valid. Instead, this book asks a downstream question. Phrased in terms of duties, this question is: of all the duties from which the consent-giver can release the consent-receiver, what determines the duties from which the consent-receiver is released by the consent-giver’s valid consent? To answer that question, this book will use four methods. First, this book will adopt the comparative method in moral philosophy by comparing the pros and cons of three rival accounts. Each account is made up of a view of consent, a principle for consent’s scope, and an argument that supports this view and principle. Second, this book will develop and evaluate these accounts by adopting the method of cases, which involves considering accounts’ implications for various cases. Third, this book will look at bigger-picture arguments. Fourth, this book will inform our discussion by drawing on work in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and epistemology.

Armchair Physics and the Method of cases

The method of cases, i.e., the informal elicitation of judgements in thought experiments for the purpose of philosophical theorising, has been much criticised in recent years. In this paper we point out that the method of cases is not peculiar to philosophy: it can also be found in physics, where it has made a more limited, but still valuable contribution to the probing and formulation of theories. The method of cases per se should therefore not be treated as intrinsically methodologically flawed. This paper has also a narrower goal: to show that when the analogy underlying the so-called ‘expertise defence’ is drawn between judgements in thought experiments in philosophy and in physics, several objections can be avoided.

Divorce with Certain Categories of Persons in Family Law of Ukraine

The paper deals with the issues on divorce with certain categories of citizens in the family law of Ukraine. Particular attention is paid to the legal and certain procedural aspects of divorce with such categories of persons as servicemen (including prisoners of war), persons sentenced to imprisonment, persons suffering from mental disorders, and persons who are temporarily out of Ukraine’s control. The purpose of the paper is to research the issue of divorce with certain categories of persons in the family law of Ukraine in order to find appropriate ways to solve problems in this field. Such scientific methods as analysis, synthesis, law and comparative analysis, and elements of content-analysis are applied in the paper. Court cases were analysed with the help of method of cases and they were used as illustration of practice of divorce with certain categories of persons. Ways of resolving of problems that have place in the researched field are suggested. In particular, it is suggested to amend the family legislation of Ukraine, which would: enshrine persons sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than five years, as a separate category of persons in the sense of divorce at the request of one of the spouses; it was forbidden to divorce prisoners of war until they returned from captivity. Emphasis is placed on the need to change the conceptual approach of the courts to divorce a person suffering from a mental disorder, which cannot be a basis for declaring a person incompetent. Emphasis is placed on the need to change the conceptual approach of the courts to divorce a person suffering from a mental disorder, which cannot be a basis for declaring a person incompetent. In particular, there is suggested to either create a legal basis for the courts not to take into account the circumstances of mental illness in divorce proceedings, which cannot be a ground for recognizing the incapacity of one of the parties (usually the defendant) as the dominant cause of divorce, or to turn to the actual institution of judicial precedent.

Introduction

Part 1 of the introduction describes the motivations and approach of the book, then summarizes the contents of the book chapter by chapter. Part 2 provides the linguistic and methodological underpinnings of the analysis of the word “know” and related epistemic words that are relied on throughout the book. Standard methods for gathering data in linguistics are described and analyzed. It’s shown why characterizing linguistic evidence practices as “the method of cases” is misleading, and the limitations of social-psychological questionnaire tools are explained. The bearing of lexical semantics on questions of when usages are metaphorical, when they are literal, when ambiguous, and when polysemous are given. The importance of retraction phenomena—how and when speakers withdraw usages under pressure—is described; and as an illustration, it’s shown that “know” is factive. The important distinction between the syntactic/semantic structure of a word and the role it is put to by speakers is described.

FORMATION OF PROFESSIONAL THINKING AMONG MEDICAL STUDENTS AS A STRUCTURAL COMPONENT OF THEIR SUBJECT POSITION

The article deals with the problem of the formation of professional thinking of medical students. It describes and substantiates the possibility of the combined use of modern educational technologies — the method of cases and edutainment in the framework of physical education in order to form the subject position of students and improve the quality of the educational process.

Are thought experiments “disturbing”? The case of armchair physics

Proponents of the “negative program” in experimental philosophy have argued that judgements in philosophical cases, also known as case judgements, are unreliable and that the method of cases should be either strongly constrained or even given up. Here we put one of the main proponent’s account of why philosophical cases may cause the unreliability of case judgements to the test. We conducted our test with thought experiments from physics, which exhibit the exact same supposedly “disturbing characteristics” of philosophical cases.