The intractable problems with brain death and possible solutions

Brain death has been accepted worldwide medically and legally as the biological state of death of the organism. Nevertheless, the literature has described persistent problems with this acceptance ever since brain death was described. Many of these problems are not widely known or properly understood by much of the medical community. Here we aim to clarify these issues, based on the two intractable problems in the brain death debates. First, the metaphysical problem: there is no reason that withstands critical scrutiny to believe that BD is the state of biological death of the human organism. Second, the epistemic problem: there is no way currently to diagnose the state of BD, the irreversible loss of all brain functions, using clinical tests and ancillary tests, given potential confounders to testing. We discuss these problems and their main objections and conclude that these problems are intractable in that there has been no acceptable solution offered other than bare assertions of an ‘operational definition’ of death. We present possible ways to move forward that accept both the metaphysical problem - that BD is not biological death of the human organism - and the epistemic problem - that as currently diagnosed, BD is a devastating neurological state where recovery of sentience is very unlikely, but not a confirmed state of irreversible loss of all [critical] brain functions. We argue that the best solution is to abandon the dead donor rule, thus allowing vital organ donation from patients currently diagnosed as BD, assuming appropriate changes are made to the consent process and to laws about killing.

F. M. Dostoevsky – great human-lover, expert in human, well-wisher of human, sage and visionary

The philosophical meaning and humanistic pathos of F. M. Dostoevsky’s work is revealed, embodied in his novels and «The diary of a writer». The depth and bottomlessness of a person – the writer’s symbol of faith – are presented. The philosophical, ethical and psychological generalisations of the Russian writer are presented as the central point of the metaphysical problem of man as a personality, her life, quest, suffering, love, faith. The theory of F. M. Dostoevsky’s creativity is reconstructed, for which a person is interesting when he embarks on only his own, individual path, but passing which, highlights something typical for the entire people, its historical fate and destiny, strength and weakness. Only in the personal identity of each person is the general identity of the nation embodied; to defend in any circumstances the honour of the Russian man and the honour of his people – this is precisely what the citizen writer saw as the vocation of Russia. The dialectic of love, freedom, beauty and immortality as components of the meaning of human life is revealed. Against this background, death is presented as an inevitable moral lesson, the meaning of which is to sharpen the feelings of love and humility: love for man and humility before God. This understanding of life and death is opposed by demonic, a phenomenon devoid of love and humility. For F. M. Dostoevsky, who had an acute presentiment of future social upheavals in Russia and Europe, devilry is embodied in the revolutionary ideas of seizing power, restructuring society and man according to the patterns of political leaders who only yearn for domination and submission of others to their will. The prophecies and premonitions made by F. M. Dostoevsky about the future of Russia and its place in world history are characterised. The emphasis is on the writer’s rejection of the revolution as a fratricidal war and the denial of the viability of communist ideas and ideals. Only religiously coloured humanism can be opposed to these gloomy forecasts: a better future will come when people, based on the implementation of the main Christian thesis, to love their neighbour as themselves, will be able to unite into a single harmonious whole or the paradise of Christ.

THE ‘REVERSE’ SHIP METAPHOR: APPROACHING METAPHYSICS VIA SOCIETY

The metaphor of a ship led by a skillful captain as an image of society/state led by a wise ruler was perceived in the 18th century Russian culture as a well-known cultural meme. In Andrey Bolotov's (1738–1833) treatise The Guide to True Human Happiness this metaphor is used to illustrate and clarify a complicated metaphysical problem. Bolotov used this image in an attempt to explain the processes inside the human soul, the struggle between the rational and the sensual, between “thoughts and desires”, between “reason and arbitrariness”. He uses the full range of social characteristics and applies them to various mental structures. Any individual’s actions and way of life are represented as resulting from the functioning of their “inner society,” a coordinated work of a ship's crew led by reason as its captain towards the great goal – a virtuous life, bliss and peace.

The Puzzle of the Sophist

The many definitions of sophistry at the beginning of Plato’s Sophist have puzzled scholars just as much as they puzzled the dialogue’s main speakers: the Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus. The aim of this paper is to give an account of that puzzlement. This puzzlement, it is argued, stems not from a logical or epistemological problem, but from the metaphysical problem that, given the multiplicity of accounts, the interlocutors do not know what the sophist essentially is. It transpires that, in order to properly account for this puzzle, one must jettison the traditional view of Plato’s method of division, on which divisions must be exclusive and mark out relations of essential predication. It is then shown on independent grounds that, although Platonic division in the Sophist must express predication relations and be transitive, it need not be dichotomous, exclusive, or express relations of essential predication. Once the requirements of exclusivity and essential predication are dropped, it is possible to make sense of the reasons that the Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus are puzzled. Moreover, with this in hand, it is possible to see Plato making an important methodological point in the dialogue: division on its own without any norms does not necessarily lead to the discovery of essences.

Laws, Dispositions, Memory: Three Hypotheses on the Order of the World

The more science progresses, the more it is evident that the physical world presents regularities. This raises a metaphysical problem: why is the world so ordered? In the first part of the article, I attempt to clarify this problem and justify its relevance. In the following three parts, I analyze three hypotheses already formulated in philosophy in response to this problem: the hypothesis that the order of the world is explained 1) by laws of nature, 2) by dispositions of the fundamental physical entities, 3) or by a memory immanent to matter (a hypothesis developed by Peirce, Bergson and James). The third hypothesis may seem surprising. However, it can be shown that the three hypotheses have a psychomorphic dimension in the sense that they give to nature properties analogous to those of mind. In addition, this third hypothesis presents several interesting arguments.

To doubt in our hearts: The substance dualism in the light of Peirce's criticism of 'The spirit of Cartesianism'

In this article, the author addresses the problem of Cartesian dualism through the prism of Peirce's criticism of the 'spirit of Cartesianism'. The faith in the intuitive knowledge and the strong emphasis on individualism Peirce sees as its two main features, therefore, they are the focus of the paper. The underlying idea is to show that, in the light of the pragmatic critique, the Cartesian substance dualism appears to be foremost an epistemological and methodological problem, and not a metaphysical problem of disparate substances.

Metaphysics of a forgotten tradition I. Introduction of the concept of “intrinsic modus of thing” by John Duns Scotus: From the theological explication of “infinity” to the metaphysical problem of “contraction of being”

The article is the first part of a study on the notion of the “intrinsic modus” of thing or reality in the metaphysics of the early Scotist tradition (first quarter of the 14th century). This part of the study analyses the circumstances of the first formulation of the notion of “modus intrinsecus” in the theological writings of John Duns Scotus and identifies two main (and one additional) contexts for Scotus’s explication of this concept, which will be important for the subsequent Scotistic tradition of meta[1]physics. The article then puts forward a hypothesis about a historical shift in the use of this concept based on an analysis of Scotus’s texts. Scotus initially introduces it solely for a theological explanation of the concept of “infinite being”, but later, in connection with his discussion of the reality of the concept of being, uses the concept of intrinsic mode as key to his own solution to the metaphysical problem of the “contraction” of the transcendental concept of being, which he thinks of as a particular “modification”. Finally, the article identifies the main structural elements in Scotus’s discussion of “intrinsic mode” and attempts to present the content of this concept by distinguishing between intrinsic mode and Scotus’s other related metaphysical concepts (quiddity, difference, property).

Individuation and Attunement: Identities in Process

Picking up the thread of an asubjective realism introduced in the first chapter, this chapter focuses on the question of individuation. Because pure experience lacks a transcendental subject as the source of identity, it intensifies questions of how to stabilise and identify either objects or enduring subjects. This metaphysical problem of individuation operates at the intersection between the abstract and the existential. The chapter argues that both Deleuze and Whitehead shift the nature of this problem from one of identifying discrete individuals to understanding processes of individuation that are perspectival, scale-relative, and by degree. The chapter develops three theses that emerge as consequences of this shift.

Loke on the Abstractist/Concretist Christological Distincton: A Semantic Problem or a Metaphysical Problem?

SummaryOriginating from the Evangelical Philosophical Society’s Panel Discussion at the American Academy of Religion 2017 on themes in Andrew Loke’s Christological work, Kryptic Christology, the present article isolates one important issue that began as discussion in Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie between James Arcadi and Andrew Loke on the nature of Christ’s human nature according to abstractism and concretism. Upon summarizing the debate, I make two claims. After I take a fresh look at the state of the analytic Christological literature, I, first, suggest that Loke is not consistent with the common descriptions of abstractism/concretism as stated in the analytic literature. And, second, I argue, based on Loke’s own words, that he confuses a metaphysical distinction with a semantic distinction.