The Second Welfare Theorem in Economies with Non-Walrasian Markets

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEONIDAS C. KOUTSOUGERAS ◽  
NICHOLAS ZIROS
Econometrica ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M. Anderson

Author(s):  
Sjur Didrik Flåm

AbstractBy the first welfare theorem, competitive market equilibria belong to the core and hence are Pareto optimal. Letting money be a commodity, this paper turns these two inclusions around. More precisely, by generalizing the second welfare theorem we show that the said solutions may coincide as a common fixed point for one and the same system.Mathematical arguments invoke conjugation, convolution, and generalized gradients. Convexity is merely needed via subdifferentiablity of aggregate “cost”, and at one point only.Economic arguments hinge on idealized market mechanisms. Construed as algorithms, each stops, and a steady state prevails if and only if price-taking markets clear and value added is nil.


2006 ◽  
Vol 90 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 871-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dagobert L. Brito ◽  
Jonathan H. Hamilton ◽  
Michael D. Intriligator ◽  
Eytan Sheshinski ◽  
Steven M. Slutsky

2012 ◽  
Vol 08 (01) ◽  
pp. 53-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. BARKLEY ROSSER

Kumaraswamy Vela Velupillai74 presents a constructivist perspective on the foundations of mathematical economics, praising the views of Feynman in developing path integrals and Dirac in developing the delta function. He sees their approach as consistent with the Bishop constructive mathematics and considers its view on the Bolzano-Weierstrass, Hahn-Banach, and intermediate value theorems, and then the implications of these arguments for such "crown jewels" of mathematical economics as the existence of general equilibrium and the second welfare theorem. He also relates these ideas to the weakening of certain assumptions to allow for more general results as shown by Rosser51 in his extension of Gödel's incompleteness theorem in his opening section. This paper considers these arguments in reverse order, moving from the matters of economics applications to the broader issue of constructivist mathematics, concluding by considering the views of Rosser on these matters, drawing both on his writings and on personal conversations with him.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (03) ◽  
pp. 257-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
HAROLD HOUBA

This contribution addresses the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. [1992, Theory and Decision32] on the use of game theory in river basin management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers unrelated to water prices and game theoretic solutions impose a computational burden. For the bilateral alternating-offers model, a single optimization program significantly reduces the computational burden. Furthermore, water prices and property rights result from exploiting the Second Welfare Theorem. Both issues are discussed and applied to a bilateral version of the theoretical river basin model in Ambec and Sprumont [2002, Journal of Economic Theory107]. Directions for future research are provided.


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