Widespread Non-Factualism

Chapter 9 briefly explains how we could go about arguing for neo-positivist views of several different metaphysical questions. The chapter focuses mostly on cases in which neo-positivists endorse non-factualist views of the central controversial subquestions—e.g., questions about Aristotelean properties, tropes, coincident objects, essential properties, non-natural moral facts, and certain kinds of facts about grounding and Lewis-Sider-style joints in reality. But the chapter also briefly addresses some cases in which neo-positivists endorse scientistic views, rather than non-factualist views, of the central controversial subquestions—e.g., questions about libertarian free will, non-Humean causation, Lewisian possible worlds, and immaterial Cartesian souls.

An Anselmian Approach to Divine Simplicity

The doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) is an important aspect of the classical theism of philosophers like Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas. Recently the doctrine has been defended in a Thomist mode using the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. I argue that this approach entails problems which can be avoided by taking Anselm’s more Neoplatonic line. This does involve accepting some controversial claims: for example, that time is isotemporal and that God inevitably does the best. The most difficult problem involves trying to reconcile created libertarian free will with the Anselmian DDS. But for those attracted to DDS the Anselmian approach is worth considering.

Libertarianism and Classical Theism: Historical and Conceptual Interrelations

This paper aims to highlight the historical and conceptual interrelations between libertarianism and classical theism (CT). In the first part of the paper, I show that the concept of CT was introduced in the contemporary philosophy of religion by the proponent of process theology Ch. H. Hartshorne to criticize European philosophical and theological tradition. Hartshorne himself thought that classical theism contradicts the libertarian understanding of free will. I further propose two hypotheses to explain the existing association between libertarianism and classical theism in the contemporary philosophy of religion. In the second part, I explore conceptual dependencies and contradictions between libertarianism and CT. I argue that although libertarianism is more suited to address the problem of evil and the doctrine of eternal damnation than theological compatibilism, it nevertheless faces serious problems on the way of reconciliation with CT. To explain evil and eternal damnation libertarian free will have to be understood as having a great value. However, the value of libertarian freedom might be challenged by exploring its contradictions with such divine perfections as divine goodness and divine foreknowledge and the doctrine of divine conservation. I further argue that to solve theological puzzles one needs to develop explicitly theological libertarian understanding of free will that depends on theological values and does not pretend to be compatible with naturalism and atheism.

Introduction

This book offers a reading of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Specifically, it is a philosophical exposition of his masterpiece, the Ethics, that focuses on his moral philosophy. Central to the reading I defend is the view that there is a way of life that is best for human beings, and what makes it best is that it is the way of life that is in agreement with human nature. I begin this study with Spinoza’s theory of emotions, and I do so because it is one of two doctrines that fundamentally shape the structure and content of his vision of the way of life that is best. The other is his view that striving to persevere in being is the actual essence of a finite thing (3p7). Together these make up the foundation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy, and it is from these two doctrines that his moral philosophy emerges. In saying this I am not denying that his substance monism, the doctrines of mind-body parallelism and identity, the tripartite theory of knowledge, and his denial of libertarian free will, among others, also belong to the foundation of his moral philosophy. Each of these contributes in its way to the portrait of the best way of life, and they play important roles in the chapters that follow. But it is his theory of emotions and the theory of human nature on which it rests that are chiefly responsible for the structure and content of his moral philosophy....

To Be Able To, or To Be Able Not To? That is The Question

A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not justified in asserting P. While such arguments often appeal to principles with wide appeal, such as the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, they also require a commitment to principles that seem far less compelling, e.g. the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’ or the principle that having an obligation entails being responsible. It is argued here that these further principles are dubious, and that it will be difficult to construct a valid transcendental argument without them.