Conclusion

Everyone is free to define “ethics” (“morality”) as he pleases. Throughout history ethics (morality), like philosophy, has been conceived in a variety of ways. According to one conception, ethics is about moral obligation, moral responsibility, and moral oughts. In the introduction I refer to this way of conceiving ethics as the accountability project....

The Empowered Life

The person of Spinozistic fortitudo takes intelligent care of himself, which is to possess the virtue of tenacity, and he takes intelligent care of others, which is to possess the virtue of nobility. The person of fortitudo is a friend to himself and he is a friend to others. This chapter examines Spinoza’s theory of nobility and the central role of friendship in his conception of the empowered life. The author argues that nobility is a distinct type of love. Nobility is empowered love. Essential to empowered love is the desire to help and befriend others, and he shows that helping others is about empowering others to live joyously and lovingly. The most important way to help others to live in this way is through education. Moreover, education, in Spinoza’s view, is a social project, and the author highlights three ways that it is social. Finally, the chapter shows how Spinozistic friendship and the virtue of courtesy (modestia) prepare us for a life of learning.

Summum Mentis Bonum

Spinoza maintains that knowledge of God is the mind’s greatest good (4p28). This chapter addresses two questions concerning Spinoza’s account of the summum mentis bonum. First, in what way is knowledge of God related to emotions and desires and to the evaluative judgments that result from emotions and desires? The author argues that, for Spinoza, knowledge is, or is invariably accompanied by, an enhancement of power, and that as an enhancement of power knowledge is a type of joy. It is not the case that knowledge, in Spinoza’s view, is motivationally inert. The second question the chapter addresses is whether the goodness of knowledge of God is on a par with the goodness of such things as food, shelter, sporting activities, and theater while differing from these sorts of things only in degree. The author argues that the goodness of knowledge of God qualitatively differs from the goodness of food, shelter (etc.). Unlike the derivative goodness of human deeds and of spatially external objects, the goodness of knowledge of God is underivative.

Spinoza and Moral Anti-Realism

It is undeniable that the Ethics contains seemingly incompatible claims about the nature of goodness and badness. The text presents its share of challenges to anyone who sets out to construct a coherent interpretation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. It is not a surprise that these difficulties have led scholars to interpretations that do not agree on every detail. This chapter focuses on what in the author’s judgment is a major difficulty for a charitable interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of goodness and badness and then he examines Michael LeBuffe’s way of meeting this challenge, a way that constitutes an alternative to the moral realist reading defended in chapter 3.

Spinoza’s Moral Realism

This chapter shows that Spinoza is committed to a type of moral realism. By “moral realism” is meant a theory of the way of life that is best for us as human beings, a theory based on a view on which good and bad are objective properties. By “objective property” is meant a property whose instance(s) does (do) not directly depend on anyone’s desires, emotions, or beliefs about its existence and nature. The author argues that, for Spinoza, the properties of goodness and badness are objective properties. Instances of goodness do not directly depend on someone’s desires, emotions, and beliefs about the existence and nature of goodness. The same holds for badness. His argument for this reading hinges on the conception of human nature that Spinoza appeals to in his definition of “virtue” (4D8). This conception of human nature serves as the foundation for the objectivity of the properties of goodness and badness, and the author contends that it is this that makes Spinoza a type of moral realist.

Emotions as Axiological Information

This chapter argues that because emotions symptomatically represent changes in power, emotions carry information about the status of an individual’s power. Emotions, in Spinoza’s view, carry axiological information. Emotive information is “axiological” in the sense that it is information about the goodness and badness of the state of an individual’s power of acting. Increases in power and decreases in power are not psychologically and ethically equal. It is not the case that an increase in an individual’s power is psychologically and ethically no better and no worse than a decrease in power. On the contrary, an increase in power in part of an individual is, other things equal, better than a decrease in power, and an increase in power as a whole is invariably better than a decrease in power. The author also argues that, for Spinoza, increases and decreases in power are not psychologically and ethically neutral or indifferent. An increase in an individual’s power as a whole is a genuine enhancement of his nature, whereas a decrease in power as a whole is a genuine impairment of his nature.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions

This chapter shows that Spinoza believes that an episode of emotion represents a change in the power of the subject’s body in the way that a symptom represents that of which it is symptomatic. On the reading here defended, some emotions symptomatically represent increases in the power of the subject’s body. Others symptomatically represent decreases in power. Regardless of whether it is symptomatic of an increase or a decrease, an episode of an emotion qua mental item is symptomatic of the state of the power of acting of the subject’s body, and an emotion serves as a symptom in virtue of its qualitative character. It represents a change in power by virtue of the way it feels to experience an emotion. While an episode of the qualitative character of joy signals an increase in the body’s power, an episode of the qualitative character of sadness signals a decrease in its power.

Derivative Goodness and Derivative Badness

In addition to the goodness and badness of wellness and illness, Spinoza has things to say about the goodness and badness of types of actions and about such things as food, music, sporting activities, and knowledge of God. This chapter continues to flesh out his moral philosophy. To avoid confusion with “action” in Spinoza’s technical sense of the word (3D2), the author uses “deed” when speaking of actions in our ordinary sense. By “deed” is meant an individual’s voluntary behavior—that is, behavior that results from an individual’s desires, emotions, and beliefs regardless of whether the desires and emotions are active or passive and regardless of whether the beliefs are adequate or inadequate. In contrast with the underivative goodness of wellness and the underivative badness of illness, this chapter shows that Spinoza is committed to the derivative goodness and derivative badness of deeds and of spatially external objects.

Introduction

This book offers a reading of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Specifically, it is a philosophical exposition of his masterpiece, the Ethics, that focuses on his moral philosophy. Central to the reading I defend is the view that there is a way of life that is best for human beings, and what makes it best is that it is the way of life that is in agreement with human nature. I begin this study with Spinoza’s theory of emotions, and I do so because it is one of two doctrines that fundamentally shape the structure and content of his vision of the way of life that is best. The other is his view that striving to persevere in being is the actual essence of a finite thing (3p7). Together these make up the foundation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy, and it is from these two doctrines that his moral philosophy emerges. In saying this I am not denying that his substance monism, the doctrines of mind-body parallelism and identity, the tripartite theory of knowledge, and his denial of libertarian free will, among others, also belong to the foundation of his moral philosophy. Each of these contributes in its way to the portrait of the best way of life, and they play important roles in the chapters that follow. But it is his theory of emotions and the theory of human nature on which it rests that are chiefly responsible for the structure and content of his moral philosophy....

The Empowered Life

Everyone at times experiences intense passive emotions and, specifically, experiences intense types of sadness. This is unavoidable. Spinoza’s view is that we need not and should not surrender to a life of passivity and unhappiness. Although invulnerability is impossible, we can achieve a robust level of self-determination and happiness. We can take care of ourselves and have good lives. But taking care of oneself is something to be achieved. This chapter shows that Spinozistic tenacity is the intelligent care of oneself through hardship, setbacks, and misfortune. It is empowered self-love. It is empowered self-love because, as a species of strength of character, it is both a type of intelligence and a form of strength and resilience.