Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Youpa Andrew

This book offers a reading of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Specifically, it is a philosophical exposition of his masterpiece, the Ethics, that focuses on his moral philosophy. Central to the reading I defend is the view that there is a way of life that is best for human beings, and what makes it best is that it is the way of life that is in agreement with human nature. I begin this study with Spinoza’s theory of emotions, and I do so because it is one of two doctrines that fundamentally shape the structure and content of his vision of the way of life that is best. The other is his view that striving to persevere in being is the actual essence of a finite thing (3p7). Together these make up the foundation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy, and it is from these two doctrines that his moral philosophy emerges. In saying this I am not denying that his substance monism, the doctrines of mind-body parallelism and identity, the tripartite theory of knowledge, and his denial of libertarian free will, among others, also belong to the foundation of his moral philosophy. Each of these contributes in its way to the portrait of the best way of life, and they play important roles in the chapters that follow. But it is his theory of emotions and the theory of human nature on which it rests that are chiefly responsible for the structure and content of his moral philosophy....

2019 ◽  
pp. 40-60
Author(s):  
Youpa Andrew

This chapter shows that Spinoza is committed to a type of moral realism. By “moral realism” is meant a theory of the way of life that is best for us as human beings, a theory based on a view on which good and bad are objective properties. By “objective property” is meant a property whose instance(s) does (do) not directly depend on anyone’s desires, emotions, or beliefs about its existence and nature. The author argues that, for Spinoza, the properties of goodness and badness are objective properties. Instances of goodness do not directly depend on someone’s desires, emotions, and beliefs about the existence and nature of goodness. The same holds for badness. His argument for this reading hinges on the conception of human nature that Spinoza appeals to in his definition of “virtue” (4D8). This conception of human nature serves as the foundation for the objectivity of the properties of goodness and badness, and the author contends that it is this that makes Spinoza a type of moral realist.


Author(s):  
Youpa Andrew

This book offers a reading of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Central to the reading the author defends is the view that there is a way of life that is best for human beings, and what makes it best is that it is the way of life that is in agreement with human nature. It is important to note that Spinoza’s moral philosophy does not fit within a framework that takes accountability as an essential function of morality. An ethics of accountability is about what a person deserves. It is a system for assigning credit and debt in the economy of good and evil. The ethics of Spinoza’s Ethics is not about what a person deserves. Rather, it is about how to live joyously and lovingly, not sadly and hatefully. Instead of an ethics of accountability, Spinoza’s is an ethics of joy. It is centered on what, with respect to mental and physical wellness, deserves our attention and what, with respect to mental and physical wellness, does not deserve our attention. Spinoza’s ethics of joy belongs to a philosophical tradition that adheres to a medical model of morality. Accordingly, the purpose of morality is not to assign credit and debt in the economy of good and evil. Its purpose is to heal the sick and empower the vulnerable, which is to say that it is for each and every one of us. Furthermore, Spinoza’s moral philosophy is pluralistic in that there are as many good ways of life as there are ways of living joyously and lovingly. There is a variety of empowered ways of life, and there is a variety of disempowered ways of life.


1978 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 489-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard W. Bulliet

One of the few predictable opportunities for the exercise of free will that comes the way of most human beings is the bestowal of names upon their children. To be sure, local or national custom may legally restrict or otherwise limit the scope of that freedom in some cases; but by and large, there is normally some choice to be made, and the beneficiary of the choice, the child, is inevitably powerless to influence it.


1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-208
Author(s):  
Frank I. Michelman

Prescriptive political and moral theories contain ideas about what human beings are like and about what, correspondingly, is good for them. Conceptions of human “nature” and corresponding human good enter into normative argument by way of support and justification. Of course, it is logically open for the ratiocinative traffic to run the other way. Strongly held convictions about the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, of certain social institutions or practices may help condition and shape one's responses to one or another set of propositions about what people are like and what, in consequence, they have reason to value.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 147
Author(s):  
Rosângela Tenório de Carvalho

Este artigo tem como objeto o discurso sobre alteridade em articulação com experiência docente. Pretende-se dar visibilidade à expressão material, conceitual e pedagógica desse discurso em suas relações. A reflexão está sustentada nos estudos pós-colonialistas e pós-estruturalistas. Problematiza-se a interpretação da alteridade como uma possibilidade de acessar a experiência do outro, sentir como o outro em sua essencia, pois entende-se que não há uma natureza humana, mas, sim, humanos produzidos culturalmente e linguisticamente. O enfoque recai sobre a alteridade como uma relação de interdependência permeada por relações de poder, a versão da afirmação da diferença e a dignidade nas relações. AbstractThis article has as its object the discourse on otherness in articulation with teaching experience. It is intended to give visibility to the material, conceptual and pedagogical expression of this discourse in their relations. The reflection is sustained in postcolonialist and poststructuralist studies. The interpretation of otherness as a possibility to access the experience of the other is problematized, to feel as the other in its essence, because is understood that there is no human nature, but human beings produced culturally and linguistically. He focus is on otherness as a relation of interdependence permeated by power relations, the version of affirmation of difference and dignity in relationships.KeywordsOtherness; Cultural difference; Teaching.


Kairos ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-205
Author(s):  
Teofil Stanciu

For Metropolitan Anthony Bloom, the kenosis of Christ climaxes with his God-forsakenness on the cross. It is this aspect of kenosis that the present article tries to explore and build upon. One key element will be the meaning of the concept of “a-theist” Christ – coined by Bloom – and how this status of the incarnated Son can function as a basis for our identification and solidarity with today’s atheists. By the way of kenosis, the incarnation brings together in one hypostasis the divine and human nature. This reality endowed both our nature and created order with significant dignity. This paper explores the possibilities from this dignity and how it can serve as a bridge for dialogue with humanists and materialists. As Bloom suggests, this can open the discussion towards the secular world and Christians could take some responsibility for the process of secularization. The objective of this article is to demonstrate that Anthony Bloom’s controversial idea of “a-theist” Christ can become a connection point with the other and a mirror in which western Christians might look at some of their anthropological shortcomings that hamper their solidarity and dialogue with those who do not share the faith in God.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Martineau

In Book I of Paradise Lost, John Milton (1608-1674) asserts his intent to “justifie the wayes of God to men” (Paradise Lost1 I 26), paving the way for a revolutionary discussion of human nature, divinity, and the problem of evil, all couched in an epic retelling of Satan’s fall from grace, his temptation of Adam and Eve, and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden, as recounted in the Book of Genesis. In his treatment of the biblical account, Milton necessarily broaches a variety of subjects which were both relevant during his time and remain relevant in ours. Among these topics, and certainly one of the most compelling, is the matter of human free will.


Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen

This chapter examines Friedrich Nietzsche's moral philosophy, first by explaining what makes him different from most of the other moral philosophers such as David Hume, Thomas Hobbes, the Greeks, and Baruch Spinoza. It then considers Nietzsche's notion of good and evil by addressing three questions: How do we find out what sort of creatures men are? How do we decide what sort of creature man ought to be? Is it possible for man to transform himself into that sort of creature. It also discusses the problem faced by Nietzsche in his attempts to assess human nature, namely: what is to count as health in the spiritual dimension, when is a soul diseased, what is mens sana. Finally, it analyzes the main arguments put forward by Nietzsche in his two books Beyond Good and Evil and The Genealogy of Morals.


2021 ◽  
pp. 29-70
Author(s):  
Christopher Coker

Human beings began hunting each other after dispatching the competition – the megafauna that once roamed the planet. From prey we became the Alpha predator. War has its origins in hunting, and the other criteria which distinguishes as a species – the use of language, the capacity for sacrifice and altruism; the use of tools and the ability to bind socially with small communities from clans to tribes which also encourages us of course to separate insiders from outsiders.  It owes much to the very human interplay of nature and nurture, and the way in which humans ha e gendered war from the very beginning. Above all, we are still lumbered with the brains of our Stone Age ancestors which is why evolutionary psychologists argue that we are so maladapted to the world in which we live


Author(s):  
Sara Brill

This chapter offers an account of the bios of the human animal in light of Aristotle’s treatment of the lives of non-human animal collectives. This discussion is anchored in Aristotle’s claim that the regime (the politeia) is the way of life of the city, and it is argued that proper attention to the zoological lens informing Aristotle’s Politics requires us to view the relation between human being and polis as an intensified form of the relation between any animal and its proper habitat. Its intensity is due precisely to the forms of intimacy and estrangement made possible by the possession of language. The Politics’s sustained meditation on how to ensure the longevity of a city’s bios—its political ecology—must, then, be read as a necessary complement to its account of human nature, its anthropology.


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