victor tadros
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2021 ◽  
pp. 381-396
Author(s):  
Molly Gardner

A complete theory of harming must have both a substantive component and a formal component. The substantive component, which Victor Tadros calls the ‘currency’ of harm, tells us what I interfere with when I harm you. The formal component, which Tadros calls the ‘measure’ of harm, tells us how the harm to you is related to my action. This chapter surveys the literature on both the currency and the measure of harm. It argues that the currency of harm is well-being and that the measure of harming is best captured by a causal account on which harming is causing a harm. A harm for you is the presence of something intrinsically bad for you or the absence of something intrinsically good for you. Thus, although a counterfactual account of the measure of harm need not distinguish between a harm and a harmful event, the causal account reserves the term ‘harm’, not for a harmful event, but only for its effect. Finally, the chapter shows how a complete theory of harming can help us to answer questions about whether we can harm people with speech, whether we can harm the dead, and how it is possible to harm future generations.


2018 ◽  
pp. 237-258
Author(s):  
Steven Sverdlik

Many philosophers argue that it is morally objectionable in principle to punish people in order to deter others from committing crimes. Such punishment is said to treat the offender simply as a means to benefit others. This Kantian argument rests on a certain reading of the Formula of Humanity. However, the central concept in that formula is not “treating a person simply as a means” but rather “treating a person as an end.” This conclusion speaks against the moral principle that Victor Tadros uses to support his nonconsequentialist theory of punishment. Furthermore, a plausible way of interpreting the injunction to treat people as ends—Rawls’s original position—does not rule out seeking deterrence. Therefore, Kantianism and consequentialism do not differ in a fundamental way on the permissibility of deterrence. But Rawls’s Kantianism sets an implausible ceiling on the severity of punishments, and consequentialism does not.


2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-71
Author(s):  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
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